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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a study of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) from its 
inception in 1919 to the Brussels Conference in 1925. The study argues, based upon evidence 
from ICC conference proceedings and reports that the ICC, as well as the League of Nations, was 
part of the pre-war Allied (the United States, Great Britain, and France) imperial project that 
sought to maintain Allied global hegemony following the Great War. The businessmen of the 
ICC, who had numerous Allied political ties, were descendants of the social Darwinist milieu, 
which guided their thought processes and perceptions of the world. Their belief that they 
operated in a globalized world was, therefore, a misconception. Business leaders were 
mistakenly convinced that free trade would create and maintain world peace. Business and 
government operated through a symbiotic relationship throughout the 1920s. Fledgling 
industries, including automotive and air transport, relied upon government assistance. Thus, 
Allied and corporate international manipulation of markets was cloaked in the rhetoric of “free 
trade.” Furthermore, ICC business leaders, operating during the Progressive Era’s focus upon 
scientific efficiency, were convinced that mass production was the key to rebuilding the global 
economy in the aftermath of the Great War. Evidence shows that the political economic system 
erected by the bankers, businessmen and politicians of the 1920s helped lay the foundations for 
the Great Depression. The system, controlled by the Allied powers, included the gold standard 
system of international fiduciary exchange, trade regimes operated under the auspices of Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence, Allied multinational corporate (MNC) control of Latin America and the 
Middle East, via electrical MNCs and oil MNCs, and the control and manipulation of labor and 
migration. 
This study contributes to the literature concerning the causes of the Great Depression as 
well as studies regarding global capitalism. Moreover, the evidence contained within this work 
suggests that many parts of the neoliberalist argument are actually rooted in the 1920s rather than 
the late 1970s. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Cornelius Vanderbilt, the commanding U.S. nineteenth century shipping and railroad 
magnate, was known to frequently say: “There is no friendship in trade.” One of the original 
“Captains of Industry,” Vanderbilt overcame numerous fierce rivalries and built his fortune 
through decades of savvy business deals and monopolization. During the American Civil War, 
Abraham Lincoln called upon Vanderbilt for assistance. The government asked to use 
Vanderbilt’s ship, the Vanderbilt, to help defeat the Confederate Navy. The patriotic Vanderbilt 
donated his ship to the Union’s cause. Government and business worked together to defeat a 
common enemy. For the remainder of his life, however, Vanderbilt fought the likes of Jay 
Gould, James Fisk and John Rockefeller in an effort to control the U.S. railway system. Indeed, 
“there was no friendship in trade.” At the time of his death in 1877, Vanderbilt was the richest 
man in America. 
Rivalry on an international scale contributed to the outbreak of the Great War in August 
of 1914. Once again, government called upon business to assist the war effort. However, the war 
was the first of its kind to require the shift of entire economies to war production. The British, 
French and American governments created administrative boards to direct production and, in 
essence, nationalize industry. Following the war, numerous Allied businessmen, including 
prominent figures such as Thomas Lamont and A.C. Bedford, met in Atlantic City from October 
20-24, 1919 to discuss the creation of a permanent international business organization that could 
help restart “the privately operated peacetime machinery of world industry and commerce.”1 
                                                 
1 George Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace (Little, Brown and Company, 1959), p. 30. 
2 
They agreed to meet again the following year in Paris where they would create the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
The ICC is an international business organization. The ICC’s goal is to reduce trade 
barriers, resolve trade disputes, through its Court of Commercial Arbitration, and ensure that the 
interests of businessmen are known by political leaders and citizens around the globe. The 
organization’s global headquarters, which publishes trade reports and proceedings, is located in 
Paris, although its biennial meetings are held in member cities around the world. The meetings, 
under the leadership of an elected chairman (also referred to as president), are typically attended 
by representatives of multinational corporations (MNCs), representatives of national chambers of 
commerce, bankers, economists, diplomats and, at times, members of academia. Today, the 
organization boasts a membership of six and a half million companies and one hundred and 
thirty countries.2 
The businessmen and bankers who met in Paris in 1920 created “a new organization 
which would be permanent in character and constituted so as to bind together the business and 
economic forces of the countries of the world, and to furnish a body to which business men could 
turn for information regarding commercial, financial and economic conditions in all foreign 
countries.”3 The original goal of the organization, informed by international business leaders and 
bankers, was the perpetuation of free trade. The ICC, whose members referred to themselves as 
“merchants of peace,” established the ICC motto: “world peace through world trade.”4 
                                                 
2 International Chamber of Commerce, “International Chamber of Commerce: ICC Global Headquarters,” 
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/icc-global-headquarters/. 
3 J. H. Fahey, “The International Chamber of Commerce,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 1921, 126–30, p. 127. 
4 Dominic Kelly, “The International Chamber of Commerce,” New Political Economy 10, no. 2 (2005): 259–271, p. 
261. 
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Business leaders such as Owen Young, the founder of Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) and Vice President of General Electric, Alberto Pirelli, President of the Italian Pirelli Tire 
Company, and numerous others were motivated to form the organization for a few key reasons. 
First, they disdained government nationalization of industry that had taken place during the war. 
As we will see, business leaders were convinced that government interference hindered 
economic progress, trade and profit. The war itself also played a critical role. The evidence 
shows that economic elites believed that the liberalization of trade, or “free trade,” was a 
guarantor of global peace. Finally, the spirit of internationalization and the creation of the 
League of Nations offered an opportunity for men of business to collaborate and discuss ideas, 
like nation-states in the League, in an established, regularly scheduled forum. 
The ICC was viewed as “a businessmen’s League of Nations” that worked to maintain 
the independence of MNCs and create resolutions to submit to their respective governments to 
eliminate tariffs.5 The organization sought, as stated in its original constitution, “to further the 
development of an open world economy with the firm conviction that international commercial 
exchanges are conducive to both greater global prosperity and peace among nations.”6 ICC 
businessmen and bankers were, they believed, the political and economic experts who would 
avert the tragedy of another world war. 
The ICC was an economic consultant for the League of Nations throughout the 1920s, 
and, by 1927, was the dominant economic advisory body for the League, operating as a non-
voting member through the League’s Economic Consultative Committee (LECC). Moreover, its 
members, including prominent politicians, business leaders, bankers and economists such as A. 
C. Bedford, Thomas Lamont, Walter Leaf, Fred Kent, Etienne Clèmentel, Alberto Pirelli, 
                                                 
5 Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace, p. 22. 
6 Kelly, “The International Chamber of Commerce,” p. 259. 
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Gustave Cassel and a host of others, advised their governments, on a national level, and the 
League, on an international level, on political economy. The ICC was a biennial platform for 
discussion and debate that hosted the men who helped determine the economic course of the 
1920s. ICC proceedings and economic reports were made available to the public shortly after 
each meeting. These proceedings and reports form the basis of analysis for this dissertation. 
This project is the first scholarly account of the organization, covering its formative years 
from 1919-1925. The important political economic role of the ICC in the 1920s has been 
virtually ignored in the historiography of the inter-war period. The decision-making processes, 
ideas, biases and mentalities of ICC participants, extrapolated from the organization’s 
proceedings, offer valuable insights into not only 1920s international relations and political 
economy, but also the causes of the Great Depression. The ICC proceedings offer an intimate 
view of the ideas of businessmen, bankers, politicians, and economists that informed and guided 
international political economic decision-making during the inter-war era and, as we shall see, 
contributed to the onset of the Great Depression. 
The focus of this dissertation is limited to the years 1919-1925 because, I argue, the 
ICC’s mindset was consolidated during these years and remained for the duration of the 1920s. 
The 1921, 1923 and 1925 conferences show the unwavering commitment of ICC businessmen 
and bankers to the axioms that formed their perspective of how to maintain global peace. These 
axioms, as we will see, included fierce dedication to the political economic systems of the Allied 
powers, the U.S., Britain and France (throughout this dissertation, I will interchangeably refer to 
the U.S., Britain and France as either the “core,” the “Allies,” or the “Allied powers”). The 
Allied systems, which operated in a social Darwinist intellectual milieu, included the gold 
standard as the basis for global fiduciary exchange, an imagined free market and globalized 
5 
world economic system, and the manipulation of labor in the name of production. Although, at 
times, minor rifts developed between the Allied powers, the ICC remained dedicated to the 
aforementioned axioms and the empowerment of the Allied system of control. 
The businessmen and bankers of the ICC, who created the institution during the 
Progressive Era’s emphasis upon societal perfection, were regarded as the international 
economic “experts” of the 1920s. Additionally, ICC participants had numerous political 
connections that contributed to a business-government nexus. Thus, ICC calls for laissez faire 
were impractical and, perhaps, disingenuous. Allied governments helped MNCs penetrate Latin 
American and Middle Eastern markets. Burgeoning industries such as air and automobile 
transport relied upon government assistance, with ICC support, to initiate their development. The 
supposed post-war “globalized” system, under the auspices of international organizations such as 
the ICC and the League, was actually a slightly augmented continuation of the pre-war imperial 
model. 
This study of the ICC contributes to globalization and Great Depression literature and 
sheds light upon today’s political economy. Africanist scholar Frederick Cooper argues that 
today’s use of the term globalization is vague, misleading and farcical. “The world has long 
been—and still is—a space where economic and political relations are very uneven.” The world, 
Cooper contends, “Is filled with lumps, places where power coalesces surrounded by those 
where it does not, where social relations become dense amidst others that are diffuse…structures 
and networks penetrate certain places and do certain things with great intensity, but their effects 
tail off elsewhere.”7 The world is, in Cooper’s estimation, not a single, connected system. For 
example, International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) manipulate 
                                                 
7 Frederick Cooper, “What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For?  An African Historian’s Perspective,” African 
Affairs, Royal African Society 100 (2001): 189–213, p. 190. 
6 
and warp peripheral economies while market access in various parts of the globe is often limited 
by disparate distributions of wealth. Furthermore, if we assume the world is globalized, we 
overlook smaller scale economic processes and cultures. 
The views of the ICC during the 1920s are similar to neoliberal beliefs today. The 
businessmen of the ICC believed that they lived in a globalized world. Pretentiously, they 
believed that they spoke for “all nations” and that their supposed free market economic policies 
would prevent another world war. Like neoliberals today, the ICC believed that they could 
integrate the globe through standardization of trade practices and currency exchanges. Today’s 
neoliberals, like their ICC predecessors, believe that “all nations have to do is trust in the 
effectiveness of self-regulating markets.”8 The businessmen and bankers of the 1920s were the 
trusted experts who insisted that if MNCs were given free reign, they could be trusted to 
maintain global prices, production and hence employment. 
This analysis of the ICC also contributes to literature on the Great Depression. Prominent 
economists and historians such as Charles Kindleberger, John Kenneth Galbraith, Peter Temin, 
Barry Eichengreen, Milton Friedman, Ben Bernanke and numerous others have addressed the 
causes and consequences of the Great Depression. Friedman, and to some extent, Bernanke, 
finds fault in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies during the 1920s. Others, such as 
Eichengreen and Temin focus on the gold standard as a root cause. For the sake of brevity, let us 
look at two of the most popular, classic accounts of the causes of the Depression by Kindleberger 
and Galbraith. 
Kindleberger blames the crash of the economic system on “British inability and U.S. 
unwillingness” to police and maintain open markets, exchange rates, lending systems and 
                                                 
8 Fred Block, “Introduction,” p. xxxiii, in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, 2nd Beacon Paperback ed (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001). 
7 
coordinated “macroeconomic policies.”9 Essentially, Kindleberger insists that there needed to be 
a reliable financial structure, governed by the U.S. or Britain, following the Great War. Galbraith 
blames the onset of the Depression upon the poor distribution of income, corrupt business 
practices on Wall Street, poor banking structures, nation-state debt and what he terms “the poor 
state of economic intelligence.”10 
The analysis of the ICC during its formative years, however, reveals a more nuanced 
understanding of the causes of the Great Depression. Key ICC business leaders were granted a 
great deal of international prestige and relied upon to inform political leaders of global economic 
health. Banking and business leaders insisted upon the gold standard as well as the 
standardization of trade as international frameworks to repair and maintain global economic 
vitality. The works of Kindleberger and Galbraith overlook the influences of individual bankers 
and businessmen, as well as international institutions such as the ICC, as causes of the 
Depression. ICC proceedings, investigated here, provide an intimate look at the mentalities at 
work in the business and banking world of the 1920s. 
1.1 Previous Works  
Secondary sources that analyze the ICC, especially during the inter-war era, are scarce. 
George Ridgeway’s profile of the organization, published in 1938 and republished and updated 
in 1959, is the only book-length discussion of the ICC. Ridgeway’s volume discusses each 
biennial conference from 1921 to 1957. Though he quotes the proceedings and places the 
organization’s activities within the historiography, the volume lacks citations and an index.  
                                                 
9 Charles Poor Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Rev. and enl. ed, History of the World Economy 
in the Twentieth Century, v. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 289. 
10 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), p. 182. 
8 
Ridgeway’s arguments were fundamentally in support of the ICC and its policies; his 
volume, while very useful, is of a different nature than this study, which seeks to examine how 
the new spirit of internationalism was applied within the international business community in the 
early 1920s. 
Ridgeway accepts globalization, the free market and the “revolutionary concept of free 
trade,” like the 1920s ICC, as established truths. He labels the ICC as a “liberal economic force” 
that acted for the good of the globe. Ridgeway’s bias may, arguably, be a product of his 
profession as a corporate executive and member of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that all history, including this dissertation, is written 
through the biased lens of its author. 
Ridgeway’s book, however, is useful in terms of its framing and introduction of key ICC 
participants. Ridgeway interposes key historical events between ICC biennial meetings, placing 
the organization in the broader historical context. Moreover, although his quotes from the 
proceedings lack citations, I have been able to verify many of them. Ridgeway introduces 
numerous important ICC participants including Etienne Clèmentel, Walter Leaf, Owen Young, 
among numerous others, but biographical sketches of participants are wanting. 
“International Organization and the International Chamber of Commerce,” an article by 
Kurt Wilk published in 1940, discusses the ICC’s collaboration with other international 
institutions, especially the League of Nations, during the 1920s. However, Wilk’s article 
provides no discussion of the actual ICC minutes. Thus, it lacks descriptions regarding the 
influence of individual ICC members. Such detail would show the intricacies of the institution 
including multinational corporate and nation-state influences.11 
                                                 
11 Kurt Wilk, “International Organization and the International Chamber of Commerce,” Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 2 (June 1940): 231–48. 
9 
Dominic Kelly’s 2005 article, entitled simply “The International Chamber of 
Commerce,” provides a brief overview of the founding of the organization. The short article is 
by no means an exhaustive study of the organization. Though Kelly’s commentary relating to the 
inter-war era is brief, Kelly’s assertions regarding the foundations and role of the organization 
are useful. Kelly argues, as does this dissertation, that the ICC’s “actions are steeped in the 
liberal tradition of political economy.”12 Kelly, rightfully, also points out the ICC’s desire to 
create “expansive monetary and trade regimes,” while questioning “the legitimacy of [its] private 
authority in international affairs.”13 Kelly’s analysis, like Wilk’s, however, does not analyze ICC 
proceedings. Moreover, Kelly’s aforementioned assertions, though valid, only scratch the surface 
of the ICC’s influence and significance, especially during the 1920s. 
Other sources that focus directly upon the organization include a handful of articles from 
the Advocate of Peace, known today as World Affairs, written by ICC participants following 
their attendance at a particular ICC conference in the 1920s. These contributions, though biased, 
provide a glimpse of the thought processes of ICC participants and serve as another primary 
source for this project. 
The ICC proceedings and trade reports from the 1920 Organizational Conference and the 
three biennial conferences held in 1921, 1923 and 1925 are the authoritative sources for this 
study. The 1920 and 1921 conference proceedings are located online, in their entirety. The 1923 
and 1925 conference proceedings and reports were obtained via inter-library loan from various 
libraries across the United States. It is also important to indicate that ICC conferences, and thus 
the minutes, were broken into various committees. Typically, the committees were labeled 
“Transportation,” “Industry and Trade,” and “Finance.” These labels are used throughout the 
                                                 
12 Kelly, “The International Chamber of Commerce,” p. 259. 
13 Ibid, p. 260. 
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dissertation. Other useful primary sources include, but are not limited to, The New York Times, 
The Nation, Advocate of Peace, The New Republic, and economic reports published by the 
League of Nations. 
1.2 Method      
This dissertation relies upon a hybrid of Wallersteinian and Foucauldian theories. 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, from an economic perspective, helps explain the 
political economic international relationships between the ICC and the core powers and the 
interactions of these entities with Latin America and the Middle East during the 1920s. Michel 
Foucault’s theories of power provide an intricate cultural understanding of ICC participant and 
Allied core mentalities. Before we engage the function of each theoretical construct, let us first 
look at the international power structures of the 1920s including the ICC, League, core powers 
and individual businessmen. 
The ICC and the League held a degree of power on the international stage, but each was 
limited by nation-state ambition. Each organization established an international headquarters, the 
League in Geneva and the ICC in Paris, which was a new aspect of international organization 
that required steady individual and nation-state participation. Both organizations held regularly 
scheduled conferences and meetings, though the League more frequently, out of which were 
produced various resolutions intended to guide economic and political nation-state interactions. 
Furthermore, both organizations provided a forum for a “meeting of the minds,” per say, which 
permitted an international exchange of ideas. Both organizations also provided arbitration. The 
ICC’s Court of Arbitration helped resolve trade disputes between corporations while the 
League’s arbitration committee helped resolve political disputes between countries. 
11 
League and ICC policies were, in reality, recommendations. Neither institution could 
enact and enforce policy. Embargoes initiated by League vote, for example, were only 
enforceable to the extent that sovereign nation-states wished to enforce them. ICC resolutions 
were really policy preferences that the organization wished for nation-states to follow. ICC 
resolutions that called for the elimination of tariffs, for example, went unheeded as the U.S. and 
Britain, at various times in the 1920s, invoked tariff legislation in their industrial and agricultural 
sectors. The League, comprised of numerous institutions with the backing of governments, may 
have seemed to have more sway on the international stage relative to the ICC. This assertion, 
however, is misguided. The League was also voluntary. Nation-states could rescind their 
membership at any time as many did during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Individual decision-makers in the Allied business and banking sectors, most of which 
were ICC members, held a great deal of power and influence. Bankers such as Edwin Kemmerer 
and Thomas Lamont were looked upon to reform economic and banking systems in Latin 
America and Central Europe. Other bankers such as Benjamin Strong, head of the Federal 
Reserve, and Montague Norman, head of the Bank of England, played a central role in 
determining exchange rates, based upon the gold standard. Businessmen such as Roy Chapin and 
Owen Young as well as bankers such as Thomas Lamont and Fred Kent were key advisors to 
Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover and relied upon to devise major financial restructuring 
strategies such as the Dawes Plan and Young Plan. 
The businessman’s powers were limited to the decision-making processes of individual 
nation-state leaders, who hoped to maintain the pre-war imperial order. During the 1920s, 
however, businessmen and bankers were regarded as “experts.” Because these experts were held 
in such high esteem, power coalesced around individual bankers, businessmen and the political 
12 
leadership of core nation-states. Bankers and businessmen played a fundamental role in 
international economic policy-making. Businessmen and their corporations relied upon core 
military, economic and political manipulation of peripheral nation-states. Bankers and corporate 
leaders, with core trust and backing, were the agents of manipulation in peripheral nation-states. 
The ICC’s prestige and power was derived from the trust placed upon its participants by the core. 
The ICC proceedings expose the thought processes of its participants and show us the 
crucial intersection of the 1920s where business and core nation-state interests aligned. These 
interests included the sequestration of labor, the manipulation of Latin American and Middle 
Eastern markets for MNC penetration, the gold standard as an international fiduciary exchange 
control, and, overall, the maintenance of core global hegemony. The relationship between 
businessmen and the core for the duration of the 1920s was, then, symbiotic. It is important to 
indicate, however, that this symbiosis was a nation-state choice, not a businessman’s choice. 
Thus, nation-states could, and by the 1930s, did, pull the rug from beneath the power base of the 
transnational economic elite. 
This study uses a combination of the theories of Immanuel Wallerstein and Michel 
Foucault. Both scholars investigate human interaction, on a global scale, in regard to power. 
Wallerstein’s world-systems theory, at its most basic level, grants agency to what he terms the 
“core,” or, a collection of nation-states with supreme political economic power who work to 
maintain their global hegemony. Foucault’s theories, at their most basic level, focus more upon 
mentalities, which guide human behavior and the development of power. A shortcoming of 
Wallerstein’s theory is his focus upon economy, which seems to disregard a cultural component 
of power accumulation. Furthermore, it reduces power to a basic class struggle. 
13 
Foucault’s method of analysis concerning power relations denies the conscious existence 
of dualities “extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the 
very depths of the social body.”14 Power is, in Foucault’s analysis, an esoteric phenomenon that 
works through and upon people rather than emanating from people. This power approach is 
problematic in that it does not grant agency to specific groups. Therefore, it seems to conflict 
with Wallerstein’s model, which grants agency to the core. 
The use of both theoretical approaches, in tandem, is tenable if we use Wallerstein to 
show us the realities on the ground in the 1920s. In other words, Wallerstein’s model shows us 
the contemporary political economic situation between the core, working with the businessmen 
of the ICC, and periphery. Foucault’s analysis gives us a deeper understanding of relationships 
and interactions by elucidating the mental frameworks that guided individual decision-making 
processes and helped form the world-system. Using Foucault, we can understand the cultural 
roots of the decision-making processes of the ICC and the core.   
Wallerstein helps us understand the 1920s at its political economic surface. The core, 
consisting of the U.S., Britain and France, with the assistance of its businessmen and bankers 
indeed maintained a hegemonic authority over the globe for the duration of the decade. The 
Allied powers worked to maintain the pre-war imperial order, through an international division 
of labor and various Allied economic control mechanisms such as the gold standard and the 
creation of trade laws based upon Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Foucault helps us understand the 
mentalities operating beneath the core’s power base. Social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxon 
superiority, the gold standard mentality (GSM) and free market mentality were long established 
Allied psychological, cultural schemas that were regarded as governing logic. Wallerstein’s 
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 
1990 [1976]), p. 94.  
14 
theories, then, operate as our economic analytical tool. Foucault’s theories operate as our cultural 
analytical tool. Together, their theories will give us a better understanding of the political 
economy of the 1920s. 
The U.S., Britain and France, especially with the defeat of Germany, remained in control 
of the world-system, to use Wallerstein’s term, following the war. The world-system divided the 
globe into core, semi-peripheral and peripheral powers. The core consisted of the U.S., Britain 
and France with, in this study, Latin America and the Middle East on the periphery. The ICC 
proceedings show us that the political economic interests of the core nation-states typically 
coincided, especially in regard to the use of the gold standard as an international fiduciary 
exchange base, the empowerment of businessmen and bankers as international “experts,” and the 
control of labor. Though some rifts developed on topics such as immigration, war debts and 
tariffs, the core maintained its domination of the world-economy for the duration of the 1920s. 
The world-economy, which Wallerstein defines as “a large geographic zone within which 
there is a division of labor and hence significant internal exchange of basic or essential goods as 
well as flows of capital and labor,” was manipulated and preserved with Allied economic 
mechanisms such as the gold standard and the reorganization of peripheral banking systems to fit 
Allied interests.15 The ICC proceedings, in regard to labor, reveal the clear delineations between 
the elite and the subaltern. Business leaders demanded increased production, for the duration of 
the 1920s, while maintaining blatant contempt for labor unions. Ideally, as Wallerstein indicates, 
capitalists, in their effort to endlessly accumulate capital, seek “ways to reduce the costs of 
production” and boost profits.16 The demand for production was part of the Progressive Era’s 
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reliance upon “scientific efficiency,” which played into the ICC members’ idealization of the 
“efficiency of production.” 
The ICC’s goal to facilitate free trade was rhetorical, yet sincere. We will investigate the 
“sincerity” of the ICC’s free trade mission in our discussion of Foucault. The “capitalist world-
economy,” as Wallerstein argues, never functions as “totally free.” Realistically, businessmen 
operate in a “quasi-monopoly” reliant upon state intervention and market manipulation. We will 
see throughout this work that the businessmen of the ICC had numerous political, business and 
banking ties. The core worked to open and control markets, as we will see in chapter two’s 
discussion of Allied oil MNCs in the Middle East and chapter three’s discussion of American 
electricity MNCs in Latin America, for the benefit of corporate investment. The core facilitated 
and maintained this process through military and political coercion to maintain a low cost labor 
force, which we will see in chapter four’s discussion regarding migrant workers in Latin 
America. 
The quasi-monopoly is also maintained through patent protections and definitions of 
international exchange rules, both of which were key issues for the ICC in the 1920s. Due to 
competition from similar products on the market, Wallerstein contends, makers of patented 
“leading products” tend to form oligopolies to maintain higher price levels.17 We will see the 
establishment of Allied oligopolic regimes, with the tacit support of the ICC, in chapter two in 
our discussion of Allied oil MNCs in the Middle East. Furthermore, ICC resolutions called for 
laws regarding flag discrimination and bills of exchange to be constructed with Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence, regarded by the ICC as a superior legal system. Thus, the core was able to create 
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an exclusionary international trade regime that forced the periphery to adopt core exchange 
methods in order to participate in global commerce. 
The analysis above provides an understanding of how the 1920s political economy 
functioned, but does not tell us why it functioned in this manner. Why, for example, did the 
businessmen of the ICC believe they operated in a free-trading, globalized world when, in fact, 
they did not? The core powers, the ICC and the League operated under their own, to borrow 
Foucault’s term, “regimes of truth.” Foucault argues that “each society has its regime of truth, its 
‘general politics’ of truth—that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true.”18 
Regimes of truth, over the course of time, mutate into a “governmentality,” or an established set 
of methods and procedures to control the behavior of others. 
The 1920s governmentalities adamantly relied upon by the ICC included, but were not 
limited to, the free market, production, social Darwinism and the GSM. Each of these 
governmentalities derived from a long-established lineage. The businessmen and bankers of the 
ICC, as well as the political leaders of the core, as we will see in chapter one, were descendants 
of the nineteenth century era in which these governmentalities were rooted. The truth regime 
“society” consisted of the Anglo-Saxon core, including its businessmen, bankers and politicians, 
represented in the ICC, who, over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
assumed the existence of a globalized, free market and that free trade was the key to global 
peace. Terms such as “free trade” and “free market,” as well as the belief in an interconnected 
globe, became part of the core’s political economic discourse. Globalization, in essence, became 
an “established truth.” Furthermore, from the businessman’s perspective, the only way to 
rejuvenate the global economy after the war and the 1920-1921 depression was to permit free 
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trade and continually produce manufactured goods for the global marketplace. International 
commercial transactions were to be backed by the gold standard, the “civilized” and most secure 
form of exchange. 
Challenges to the established truth of free trade emerged in the form of socialist and 
communist agitation by the fin-de-siècle. Such challenges, as we will see in chapter four, were 
dismissed by the ICC business class. Communists and socialists were linked with labor 
radicalism and deemed a hindrance to production and the maintenance of the perceived free 
market. It is important to indicate, however, that ICC businessmen were not necessarily 
conscious of the inherent contradictions they displayed in regard to demanding free markets and 
free competition while practicing the opposite. Labor strife, for example, was not as much a 
threat to the businessman’s status as it was to the perceived free market and production. The core 
governmentality required the sequestration of labor in an effort to maintain the truth regime of 
the free market. Labor strife, from the 1920s ICC businessman’s perspective, was labor’s 
misunderstanding of the legitimacy, in the businessman’s mind, of the free market system. The 
only power capable of maintaining the free market system was the culturally, and therefore 
politically and economically, superior core. 
Foucault, in his book The History of Sexuality, Volume One, contends that power 
relations are not controlled or conveyed by any single human entity over another human entity. 
“Discourse,” Foucault contends, is not “divided between accepted discourse and excluded 
discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one.”19 Rather, power relations 
are “games of truth” that generate categories and structures that become “the intellectual and 
practical instruments and devices enjoined upon human beings to shape and guide their ways of 
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‘being human.’”20 For the ICC, the free market, as they imagined it, was central to “being 
human.” Hence, the manipulation of non-Anglo-Saxon markets was viewed as an ethical, 
common-sense endeavor. 
The ICC and the core powers were trapped within the confines of their own discourse and 
logic. Anglo-Saxon superiority, for example, was an unconscious episteme, to use Foucault’s 
term, which guided the ICC mentality. Anglo-Saxon superiority became an established 
conviction, reinforced by pre-war imperial domination that controlled the logic of ICC 
businessmen and core politicians. This sheds light upon the core belief in the “expertise” of 
1920s bankers and businessmen. ICC bankers and businessmen, members of the superior human 
class, were the ultimate practitioners of free trade and the gold standard system. It was a logical 
conclusion, within the constraints of myopic ICC and core logic, that these men could be the 
saviors of the global economic system in the wake of the Great War. Discourses and power, as 
we will see in the concluding chapter, are fleeting. By the 1930s, the ICC and the core 
discovered that their system was dysfunctional as it crumbled under the weight of the Great 
Depression and the rise of competing systems including fascism. 
1.3 Layout of the Chapters     
The first chapter provides the historical antecedents for the free market mentality of the 
ICC and helps us understand why the businessmen and bankers of the ICC believed that they 
lived in a globalized world. The development of the free market mentality in conjunction with 
the ICC’s belief in social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxon superiority, led ICC members to believe 
that they spoke for “every class.” The ICC, in conjunction with the League of Nations, was part 
of the broader core imperial project, which manipulated markets and sought to control global 
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resources. The organization, however, was convinced of the veracity of its core motto: “world 
peace through world trade.” Finally, we are introduced to Etienne Clèmentel, the first ICC 
president. He serves as an example of the numerous political and business ties that characterized 
most members of the organization. 
Chapter two investigates the ICC’s mission to create free trade regimes, as well as its 
commitment to laissez faire, through the creation of export credits and bills of exchange. These 
exchanges, however, were to be carried out between “civilized” nation-states. Although the 
organization demanded laissez faire and believed that free world trade would create world peace, 
it tacitly accepted the League’s Middle Eastern mandate system because this region was 
“uncivilized.” Despite the ICC’s demand for laissez faire, MNCs, namely oil companies, 
penetrated and monopolized Middle Eastern markets with the assistance of core governments 
and implicit support from the ICC. 
The third chapter focuses upon bankers, government subsidization of fledgling industries, 
and the penetration of Latin American markets. We are introduced, in this chapter, to the central 
importance of the gold standard. ICC bankers and businessmen, representing the core powers 
who also held the ICC’s leadership positions of the 1920s, operated under a “gold standard 
mentality” (GSM). The ICC proceedings reveal the high reverence given to gold as the base for 
international fiduciary exchange and the over-whelming fear of inflation amongst business and 
financial leaders. Furthermore, we will see the high esteem granted to ICC participants, who 
were viewed as experts by core politicians and the League of Nations. In addition, the ICC, 
despite its supposed laissez faire approach to business, called for government assistance to new 
and developing industries in air, auto and rail transport as well as electricity. There was a 
symbiotic relationship between business (including banks) and the core during the 1920s. This 
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relationship is exemplified by the incursion of electric companies into Latin America with core 
governmental assistance. 
The final chapter focuses upon the ICC’s relationship with labor. The ICC was formed in 
the midst of the Progressive Era. Businessmen put great emphasis upon scientific management 
and mechanized mass production. Efficiency and mass production, ICC leaders believed, were 
the keys to maintaining the well-being of the global economy. Labor unions were viewed as a 
nemesis to mass production and hindrance to free trade. Although wages in the top consumer 
economy, the U.S., remained stagnant, business leaders continued their demand for more 
production, which they linked with “human happiness.” The ICC “flag discrimination” debate 
revolved around the definition of migrants. The ICC was thoroughly concerned with the free 
movement of peoples around the globe as a source of low-cost labor. Thus, they disdained U.S. 
immigration restrictions during the 1920s. The U.S., however, was able to reproduce its own 
labor supply for MNCs in Latin America, with its military, economic and political control of 
numerous nation-states in Central America and the Caribbean. 
The following study of the ICC tells us much in regard to the international political 
economy of the first half of the 1920s. It elucidates the decision-making processes of individual 
business administrators, bankers, and Allied political leaders. This work exposes the meanings 
and understandings of “globalization” that developed in the aftermath of the Great War and 
operated throughout the following decade. We will see concepts such as “free trade” and “laissez 
faire” intertwined with aspirations of power and control. The pages that follow provide an 
intimate portrait of the views of multinational corporations regarding production, and the 
businessman’s attempt to reign in labor in an effort to accumulate capital and manipulate the 
21 
global marketplace. Finally, this work is a contribution to the discourse on twentieth century 
global capitalism and literature regarding the causes of the Great Depression. 
2     CHAPTER ONE: IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS 
The ICC Organizational Session held in June of 1920 was witness to numerous speeches 
from representatives of the various nation-states participating in the conference, including 
Belgium, Britain, France, Italy and the U.S., that emphasized economic cooperation in the wake 
of the economic, social and political catastrophe of the Great War. The American representative, 
John H. Fahey, the head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and organizer of the committee that 
drafted the ICC constitution, opened the conference by introducing the parameters of the 
organization’s new charter. He also introduced the intellectual precepts that would dominate the 
thinking of the members of the ICC and of the organization itself for the duration of the 1920s: 
the belief that they existed in a naturally globalized world and that the ICC, working to improve 
the condition of “all peoples,” was a new, integral agent of globalization. 
Referring to the end of the war, fresh on the minds of all participants, Fahey stated: 
“When we pause to consider thoughtfully the situation which confronts all nations, it must 
become apparent at once that there has never been a time in history when knowledge and 
experience could count more toward the attainment of real progress.”21 It was imperative, Fahey 
insisted, that “every class and every group must do its part” to help the world recover from the 
ravages of war. “The war has demonstrated the absolute interdependence of the peoples 
inhabiting every part of the globe. The businessmen of the world,” Fahey argued, could 
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“overcome” the intense “nationalism” and “just pride in nationality” that not only helped cause 
the Great War, but, more importantly, hindered international trade and thus global peace.22 
Evidence indicates that Fahey’s speech echoed the core beliefs of his ICC cohorts. An 
analysis of the ICC proceedings show ICC participants believed that they spoke for “every class” 
and that the ICC could work to address “the situation” which “confronts all nations.” Members 
believed that they lived in an interconnected world in which the actions and policies of one 
nation-state impacted the affairs of other states. This was indeed the case. However, the power to 
influence belonged to the nation-states holding the most political and economic sway: the U.S., 
Britain and France. The aforementioned major powers, allies during the Great War, had the 
agency and ability to define, in Fahey’s words, “real progress.” ICC businessmen, bankers and 
politicians, citizens of the Allies, would work closely with their governments for the duration of 
the 1920s to maintain the nineteenth century imperial order that existed prior to the Great War. 
They would seek to manipulate labor, migration, the money supply and governments themselves 
to maintain the political economic system that they (the ICC) deemed beneficial for the world as 
they imagined it. 
This chapter analyses the foundations of international organizations and the motivations 
behind their formation, providing a scaffolding to help us understand why Allied leaders 
(Britain, France and the U.S.) sought to form the ICC and the League of Nations. The urge for 
international collegiality began shortly after the French Revolution with the emergence of public 
opinion, the industrial revolution and nationalism. After a period of intense mid to late nineteenth 
century nationalism, which drove a wedge between interstate collegiality, the Great War created 
a renewed desire for internationalization. With closer political and economic cooperation on a 
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global scale, Allied leaders believed, the cataclysm of the Great War would never be repeated. 
Utilizing the ICC as our lens, we will see that what Allied leaders believed was an economically 
integrated, globalized world was actually internationalist, and dominated by the political and 
economic imperial endeavors of the U.S., Britain and France.  
At the heart of the ICC mentality was a mischaracterization and misunderstanding of 
globalization, confusing it with internationalism. The leaders of the ICC understood 
internationalism to be the cooperation of a sovereign nation-state in a trans-national endeavor or 
organization (e.g. the League of Nations or war time alliances). This cooperation is based on the 
premise that the long term interests of the collective nation-states are indeed mutual and that the 
long-term interest supersedes the shorter term interests of the individual states. Internationalism, 
then, is artificial and more contrived than globalization. Internationalism is an egocentric nation-
state decision to participate in an interconnected cohort of nation-states. The cohesion of 
international agreements is reliant upon the decision-making processes of the individual 
members. ICC members viewed the interconnectedness of 1920s internationalism as more 
natural than contrived. 
Globalization is an organic process that is not necessarily reliant upon the direct initiation 
of policies by an individual nation-state or collective. For example, the spread of disease, 
pollution, cultural values, or ideas do not require direct initiation by a particular government. 
Globalization is a natural integration of the interests and values of peoples and, by default, the 
governments of nation-states. The ICC, though, was part of the nineteenth century imperial 
contrivance of internationalism, driven by the political and economic motivations and the desires 
of the U.S., Britain and France. The issues confronting “all peoples” and “all nations” were often 
a byproduct of the imperial order that had been under the tutelage of the major powers, the U.S., 
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Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Germany and Portugal, since the beginnings of 
the “new imperialism” of the nineteenth century. 
The aforementioned European and American empires controlled large swaths of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. They were internationalist agents of an imagined globalization. The 
confusion over internationalism and globalization was rooted in the “spirit” of international 
organization that emerged in the early nineteenth century, where political economy, liberalism 
and industrialization both intersected and diverged. We focus in this chapter upon the historical 
roots of international organization that created the ICC and the League of Nations. Undergirding 
the formation of these organizations, as we shall see, was the misconstrued notion of 
globalization. In reality, the U.S., Britain and France, through the ICC and the League, sought to 
initiate a return to the international pre-war imperial order. The ICC and League of Nations were 
conduits for the reestablishment of the pre-war political economic system based upon 
internationalism, not globalization. 
The idea of international organization is rooted in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth 
century writings of the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham. Though earlier philosophical tracts discussed 
the concept of internationalism, Bentham’s writings opportunistically reached a wider, more 
literate audience during the height of the Enlightenment Era. Furthermore, the Enlightenment Era 
marked a fundamental shift in the understanding of internationalism. Pre Enlightenment authors 
“had thought unity imperative to heal Christendom’s divisions.”23 Enlightenment philosophers, 
however, viewed the world in a mechanistic, secular prism in which the light of internationalism 
was ordered by scientific law rather than God’s commandments as interpreted by the Church. 
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Relations between nation-states were driven by competition, as competition drove innovation 
and commerce. 
Bentham coined the term “international” in his work An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, written in 1780 and published in 1789. Bentham’s immediate purpose in 
coining the term was “to clarify two technical matters that he felt the old ‘law of nations’ 
muddled: the need for a sharp distinction between law within a state and law between states.”24 
Bentham’s call for internationalism fell within the confines of his utilitarian argument, based 
upon communal interests. “The interest of the community…is the sum of the interests of the 
several members who compose it.”25 Laws, both national and international, operate, ideally, to 
ensure the greatest good and happiness for the greatest amount of people. Internationalism, 
however, by its very definition, cannot provide for the greater good of all peoples globally. 
Rather, as Bentham states, internationalism “is the sum of the interests of” those nation-states 
that create international organizations. This was the case for the duration of the nineteenth 
century. 
Bentham could not predict the course of the nineteenth century. However, his statement: 
“It is evident enough, that international jurisprudence may, as well as internal, be censorial as 
well as expository, unauthoritative [sic] as well as authoritative” provided a realistic preview of 
the internationalism that would develop over the course of the nineteenth century and remain 
intact, with efforts from the ICC and the League of Nations, throughout the 1920s.26 Both the 
ICC and the League were products of the imperial era who sought to implement their version of 
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internationalism, revolving around free market rhetoric and political economic control of Latin 
America and the Middle East under the tutelage of the U.S., Britain and France. 
Etienne Clèmentel discussed the spirit of internationalism that could be forged by the 
ICC while speaking before the General Meeting on Monday 27 June 1921:  
Human nature ever finds strengthening encouragement in the presence of 
adversity. In its misfortune and anxiety mankind will find a remedy for 
many of the evils of to-day in the development of a mutual fellowship 
between nations and individuals, in the birth of a truly international spirit, 
and in the creation of one controlling purpose which aims at the bettering 
of a common lot of mankind.27 
 
The “adversity” to which Clèmentel referred was in reference to both the Great War and 
the 1920-1921 economic depression. To avoid war and global economic crises, Clèmentel 
argued, nation-states must create a “mutual fellowship,” working together for a common interest. 
Ideally, this would help the condition of all of mankind. Ironically, Clèmentel’s statement was 
made at a time when Britain and France directly controlled large swaths of Africa and Asia while 
the U.S. held colonial possessions in the Philippines and dominated the economic systems of 
Central America and the Caribbean. The “fellowship between nations” was, in reality, based 
upon the economic and political aspirations of the Allied powers.  
Britain shifted to the core of the global political economy during the nineteenth century, 
pushing other regions, including Africa and Eurasia, to the periphery and Latin America to the 
semi-periphery. As historian Michael Adas notes, “Scientific and technological measures of 
human worth and potential dominated European thinking on issues ranging from racism to 
colonial education.”28 European technological advances outpaced technological advancements in 
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Africa, Asia and Latin America. This, along with the development of social Darwinism, excited 
the notion, in the minds of core leaders, that they were indeed a superior race. Technological and 
racial motivations, as well as the need for raw materials for industrial production, drove the 
imperial endeavors of major European powers in the first half of the century and the United 
States by the middle of the century following its civil war. 
Most of Africa and Southeast Asia fell under the colonial sway of European powers, their 
resources extracted for the benefit of their European usurpers. Latin America, though 
independent of colonial rule for most of the nineteenth century, found its economic systems 
manipulated from within and without. Brazil, Cuba, Chile and Peru, among others, became 
export economies, shipping products such as sugar, coffee and cotton to Europe and North 
America. Core nation-state capitalists, especially from the U.S. and Britain, provided loans for 
infrastructure projects such as railways and power plants, indebting Latin American 
governments. Hence, Latin American countries were unable to develop their own indigenous 
industries. Wealthy Latin American landowners and political leaders benefited from this system, 
while the majority of the population remained trapped in low paying agricultural jobs with little 
opportunity for social advancement. In Argentina and Chile, for instance, only one-quarter of the 
population had access to primary school enrollment by the end of the nineteenth century.29 
The 1921 ICC conference acknowledged this global situation, introducing a set of core 
goals that included putting “a stop to rivalries between nations in their search for raw materials, 
to stamp out the cause of economic conflicts which may threaten peace, to do away with the 
natural inequality arising from the fact that the riches of the world are unequally spread over its 
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surface, and to assure the rapid restoration of the world’s commerce.”30 These ICC goals were in 
reply to the 1920-1921 economic recession as well as the Great War, which ICC members 
viewed as a product of “rivalries between nations.” However, the goals were also in reaction to 
the long term trends set in motion by the rise of Western Europe and the U.S. to the global core 
over the course of the nineteenth century. 
The nineteenth century foundation of internationalism was also rooted in the 
development of economic liberalism. Economic liberalism provides deeper insight into the 
rationale behind the creation of both the ICC and the League. Economic liberalism, a belief in 
free trade and laissez faire policies, combined with a strong sense of nationalism, permeated the 
global economic ponderings and discourse of European leaders and businessmen during the 
nineteenth century. The prominent British parliamentarian and arch proponent of free trade 
Richard Cobden, arguing against Britain’s Corn Laws (established in 1815), argued that “free 
trade acted ‘on the moral order as the principle of gravitation in the universe--drawing men 
together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language, and uniting us in the 
bond of eternal peace.’”31 Benjamin Disraeli, in 1853, condemned colonial mercantile rule 
arguing: “We cannot cling to our rags and tatters of a protective system.”32 Former systems of 
trans-European political, governmental control, especially Metternich’s Concert of Europe, were 
considered a pariah in an atmosphere of aspiring free traders. Moreover, because those such as 
Metternich who sought to repress popular sovereignty and economic liberalism across Europe 
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were united in their endeavors, liberals such as Cobden saw all the more reason to “pursue 
strategies of international cooperation” to break down trade barriers.33 
Global free trade was associated with peace and avoidance of war. An interconnected 
global economic system of nation-states, Western European leaders concluded, would make war 
more costly and less enticing. It was widely believed that politicians and special interests were 
the causes of war. In order to avoid the corruption of “man’s innate selfishness,” it was widely 
believed, governments must “allow the free association of men and ideas” to flourish since this 
would “construct a force for peace.”34 Many free trade advocates by the mid-nineteenth century 
would likely have agreed with Adam Smith’s argument made nearly seventy years prior: 
The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his 
condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private 
opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the 
natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance 
of government and of the greatest errors of administration.35 
 
Smith viewed government as a hindrance to the free exchange of goods. If industries 
were permitted to freely exchange goods, mid-nineteenth century free market advocates, echoing 
Smith, argued, nation-states would focus upon profit from trade rather than war. International 
free trade was equivalent to the maintenance of global peace. Free trade, as Paul Kennedy points 
out, “was hailed not just as an act of economic liberalization, but as a bonding together of 
peoples, their mutual dependency preventing future wars.”36 The notion that government was a 
hindrance to free trade was a hallmark of ICC rhetorical policy for the duration of the 1920s, as 
we will see throughout this dissertation. 
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The idea that trade created peace remained a strong belief well into the twentieth century, 
especially following the Great War. This sentiment was captured by ICC members, referring to 
themselves as “merchants of peace” and calling for “world peace through free trade” for the 
duration of the 1920s (we will see many more examples throughout this work). Prior to the Great 
War, however, trade was flourishing between and amongst the major powers that went to war in 
1914. Tariffs, recessions and depressions were not the root causes of the war. Rather, the war 
was caused by political, imperial rivalries accentuated by the intense growth of nationalism 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, which will be addressed below. First, we need to 
further explore the other major international trends of the nineteenth century that encouraged the 
creation of the ICC and the League. 
Concerns regarding peace, humanity and commerce created international organizations as 
early as the 1840s, thus providing a framework that later groups like the ICC would emulate. The 
World Anti-Slavery Convention, held in London in June 1840, was organized under the direction 
of the English Quaker Joseph Sturge and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. Before 
1840, modern era international gatherings tended to be “infrequent church councils,” meetings 
related to a war or “ad hoc conferences of diplomats dealing with a specific problem.”37 Though 
most of the World Anti-Slavery Convention delegates were from either Britain or the U.S., other 
nations were represented including France, Canada, Jamaica, South Africa, Haiti, Ireland and 
Barbados. The 1840s witnessed eleven total international conferences including another anti-
slavery convention as well as the First General Peace Convention in 1843, the Prison Reform 
Congress in 1846, the Free Trade Conference in 1847 and two more peace conferences by the 
end of the decade. 
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The ability to hold such international conventions revolved around the ease of 
transportation and communication as well as the realization of the power of public opinion. 
Travel times across land and sea were diminished greatly with steam travel. Joshua Leavitt, an 
American delegate attending the 1843 Anti-Slavery Convention noted: “It seems now to be such 
a trivial affair to cross the Atlantic, that [sic] occasions comparatively trifling might bring me to 
London.”38  By the middle of the decade, telegraph wires were strewn along much of the U.S. 
eastern seaboard. By the late 1850s, the Trans-Atlantic telegraph cable connected North America 
and Europe creating an even stronger trans-Atlantic nexus of communication. 
The importance of public opinion was also widely acknowledged by the 1840s. The first 
president of the American Peace Society, William Ladd, commented in 1840: “Already there is 
no civilized nation that can withstand the frown of public opinion.”39  Reverend William Jay 
stated during the same year: “This is an age in which Governments [sic], as well as individuals 
are amenable to PUBLIC OPINION [sic], whether foreign or domestic.”40 Pacifists, 
humanitarians, politicians, economists and the like felt that the “new power of public opinion 
governs the world in the long run.”41 
Transportation and communication networks created, from the standpoint of European, 
core leaders, a globalized world. This was a misconception. The world was ordered and 
controlled by European imperial powers. Notions of Western European racial superiority, global 
consciousness and industrialization coincided with a strong sense of nationalism. The bourgeois 
classes in Britain, France and the U.S. (among other nation-states) were able to erect a 
centralized state apparatus by commandeering ideations of ethnicity, religion, semiotics, 
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language and history to manipulate the masses. Nationalism was used as a social construct for 
social engineering.42 The elites ignited “proto-nationalism,” or primordial feelings of 
collectiveness. In the French Third Republic, for instance, government leaders encouraged the 
formation of a national language, as Eugen Weber discusses in Peasants Into Frenchmen, as well 
as a common economic system and requisite public schooling to indoctrinate the youth with the 
bourgeois creed. In the U.S., citizens were convinced that their nation was “exceptional” and that 
it was their “manifest destiny” to control the entirety of the North American continent. 
It is understandable, then, that ICC businessmen, representing the core powers, would 
perceive a globalized world. ICC leaders, as we will see, were locked in a myopic Eurocentric 
world view. This was the lens, historically speaking, with which they were most familiar. 
Etienne Clèmentel captured this sentiment during the 1920 Organizational Conference. “When 
the bankers, merchants and manufacturers of the United States,” Clèmentel stated, summoned 
[this] meeting “a year ago,” they “invited their colleagues of the Allied countries of Western 
Europe to associate themselves together to maintain that close cooperation which is 
indispensable in the restoration of the world.”43 
Clèmentel viewed Western European and U.S. cooperation and collaboration, like his 
ICC colleagues, as critical for the restoration of the global economy. Clèmentel’s statement 
exhibits an air of cultural superiority, reflective of the social Darwinist mentality of the first half 
of the twentieth century, which will be discussed below. Furthermore, even though the world 
required “restoration,” which was in reality due to a war caused by European avarice, those same 
nation-states were most qualified, in Clèmentel’s estimation, to right the ship. After all, the 
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Allied powers were the governors of the pre-war global political economy for roughly one 
hundred years prior to the culmination of the Great War. The long held core status of the Allied 
powers, and thus the businessmen of the ICC, allowed them to define the meanings of “free 
trade” and “globalization.” We will see throughout the chapters in this thesis that the ideals of 
Western superiority, laissez faire and the manipulation of labor, in the name of production, were 
prominent ICC characteristics. A brief analysis of the nineteenth century sugar industry will help 
us understand the roots of ICC participant social, political and economic belief systems regarding 
the aforementioned characteristics imperialism, labor control and production. 
The notion of global free trade, as well as laissez faire, was a misconception, operating 
under the auspices of British, French and, later in the nineteenth century, American economic 
manipulation undergirded by the realities of social Darwinism and imperialism. We can evaluate 
this argument through the lens of the nineteenth century sugar trade. As the profitability of 
slavery declined (Britain ended the importation of slaves to its colonies in 1807; it formally 
rebuked the global slave trade in the mid-1830s), Europeans began to shift their investments 
from sugarcane and slaves to newly emerging manufacturing industries. Wage labor in factories 
actually became cheaper, especially as the doctrine of free trade became sacrosanct for British 
politicians and European economists. For example, “the most distinctive feature” of the second 
Anti-Slavery Convention was a “vehement debate” regarding “the admission of slave-grown 
sugar into the British market.”44 Free traders such as Cobden argued that exposing the British 
market to foreign sugar would only further encourage the slave trade, thus harming the 
burgeoning wage labor manufacturing industry in the British metropole. 
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Sugar became a necessity for the laboring classes of the first industrial era.45 Slave-grown 
sugar supplied sugar and thus energy to the industrial laborers in the metropole. In 1807, the year 
Britain banned the slave trade to its colonies, it imported nearly three hundred million pounds of 
sugar and nearly four million gallons of rum for domestic consumption.46 The vast majority of 
this was produced with slave labor. As the will to work was increasingly linked with the will to 
consume during the mid-nineteenth century and as commodity prices decreased making more 
items available to the lower and middle classes, sugar consumption (as well as other 
commodities such as tobacco) remained high. Moreover, this worked to the advantage of the 
bourgeois factory owners who sought increased production in the name of profit. With the 
energy from sugar, workers worked longer hours while increasing the consumer base for 
manufactured goods as work was linked to consumption rather than pride in one’s craft. 
Sugar was a tool for the manipulation of the labor class in the name of production. For 
the duration of the nineteenth century, ownership’s demand for production superseded the 
comfort of the worker, contributing to labor unrest. Despite decades of labor uprisings well into 
the twentieth century, the ICC continued to regard production, rather than the well-being of the 
laborer, as sacrosanct. We will have a more detailed discussion of this topic in chapter four, but it 
bears a brief mention here as well. A resolution passed by the 1920 Organizational Conference 
stated that it was necessary to “marshal statistics regarding the world’s supply of food…and to 
place such statistics before suitable authorities to effect a just and appropriate allocation of such 
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food.” Without “appropriate allocation,” the resolution stated, “there can be no adequate 
production and no adequate commerce.”47 
Though British politicians spoke of free trade and ending protectionism by the 1830s and 
1840s, free trade sugar was not implemented until the 1870s as the government worked to 
convince the British populous to consume more sugar.48 Henry John Temple otherwise known as 
Viscount Palmerston, who would serve two terms as British Prime Minister in the 1850s and 
1860s, stated in 1841 that the British would not accept Brazilian sugar or coffee since they were 
products of slave labor. “We are men of principle,” Palmerston argued, “and our consciences 
will not allow us to consume the product of slave labour [sic].” However, Palmerston added, 
“We are also men of business.” Thus, he encouraged the Brazilians to sell their sugar to “some 
40,000,000 industrious and thriving Germans, who are not as conscientious as we are.” The 
Brazilians could then use their sugar profits to purchase “our cottons.”49  Moreover, Palmerston 
offered to “refine” the Brazilian sugar, for a fee, which would “cleanse it from part of its original 
impurity.”  Furthermore, Palmerston was willing to “Send it [Brazilian sugar] to the West Indies 
and Australia,” since these peoples were not “men of conscience” like those in Britain proper.50 
Palmerston’s understanding of so-called free trade, then, contained moral and ethical 
components based upon Western European conceptions of race and nation. This line of thought 
was reflected not only in Palmerston’s own words, but also in the words of prominent periodicals 
of the time. For instance, The Economist, a British periodical created in 1843 to advocate free 
trade, condemned France in 1847 for not immediately removing tariffs on foreign goods. “They 
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propose gradual [sic] alterations in nearly all the customs laws. To us that seems to imply a 
deficiency of faith in their principles.” The tariff laws of France were, in the opinion of The 
Economist, “morally wrong” and hence “delay the triumph of free trade.” Free trade is supposed 
to help “all classes of men,” and laws that prohibit free trade are “unjust.”51     
The views of The Economist do not necessarily contradict the trade practices 
recommended by Palmerston if we place race and nationalism into the equation. “Whiteness” 
was a transnational phenomenon of the mid nineteenth century through the early twentieth 
century. Anglo-Saxon males imagined a world in which they were the superior race; the only 
race capable of self-government, democracy and civilization. Moreover, such government, in the 
Anglo-Saxon mindset, was only feasible within the framework of a homogenous society, free of 
racial variation.52 
The intersections of racial superiority and free trade continued well into the twentieth 
century, as evidenced by the ICC proceedings. We will have a broader discussion regarding the 
ICC’s belief that it inhabited a higher cultural plain in comparison with the peripheral nation-
states in the next chapter. However, let us briefly view the 1920 Organizational Meeting to see 
the enduring legacy of core nation-state perceived preeminence. The chairman of the Italian 
delegation to the 1920 Organizational Conference, Vittorio Rolandi Ricci, lavished praise upon 
the conference’s directors, Britain and France, labeling Britain as “the world’s paragon of 
political civilization,” and France as “the birth place of generosity and chivalry.”53 British 
delegate Arthur Shirley Benn assured the conference that “America, France, Italy, Belgium and 
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the British Empire” had to “stand shoulder to shoulder” to “uphold international liberty and 
justice.” Should this camaraderie fail, Benn warned, “Europe will fall into anarchy” and 
“civilization will be wiped out.”54 The aforementioned powers were the harbingers of supposed 
free trade since they perceived themselves as the beacons of civilization. 
Nineteenth century white literary and political leaders, including Charles Pearson, James 
Bryce, and Theodore Roosevelt, among others, sought to maintain white global supremacy 
within the “climate zones” amenable to white settlement against the perceived onslaught of 
Chinese and Indian migration as well as the existence of other “inferior” races such as Africans, 
African-Americans, Native Americans and Aborigines. Furthermore, Anglo-Saxon’s feared the 
spread of technology to the “backward races” and the impact of a “smaller globe” upon white 
ascendancy. The goal of white leaders, “whose sense of self was constituted in relations of racial 
domination,” was the maintenance of “white men’s countries” through the use of segregation, 
immigration restrictions and imperialism.55 We can argue that the maintenance of “free trade,” 
which is itself contradictory to the semantics of “free trade,” was propelled by the white Anglo-
Saxon race for the benefit of that very same group. Evidence of the continuation of this mindset, 
as we shall see, is purveyed in the ICC proceedings. ICC ideals of “free trade” applied only to 
interactions between “civilized” nation-states. By default, those regions deemed “unfit” could 
then be manipulated and exploited by the Allied powers as they were not part of the free trading, 
white, civilized international sphere. 
Free trade and the destruction of trade barriers as harbingers of world peace, frequent 
points of discussion for the ICC, were topics of conversation at the Brussels Peace Conference in 
1847, as political and societal leaders continued to link free trade with global tranquility. The 
                                                 
54 Ibid, p. 71. 
55 Lake, Drawing the Global Colour Line, p. 110. 
38 
Congress was sponsored by The London Peace Society and The American Peace Societies. 
Essays were presented, which called for an end to war, methods for international arbitration and 
the formation of “a Congress of Nations.” Once again, orators linked free trade with world peace. 
M. Bouvet of the French National Assembly linked international peace with free commerce, 
stating: “Who does not see that commercial transactions are so spread abroad from one end of 
the world to the other that any commotion [war] instantly affects our national prosperity?”56 
War, Bouvet argued, required taxes, which hinder the prosperity of the general populous. 
Moreover, the conferees made clear what their general expectations for global free trade 
actually entailed: imperial control by white nation-states. The Advocate of Peace, the academic 
publication that published the proceedings of the conference, labeled the conference as 
“international” by pointing out that “All around the hall were hung the banners of Holland, of 
England, of Germany, of France, of the United States and of Italy.”57 Meanwhile, Governor 
Roberts, referring to treaties signed with “African tribes,” stated that British treaties had 
language inserted in them that kept war from breaking out “between those savage tribes for ten 
years.”  Peace could be fomented even amongst “such populations, whose ruling passion was 
war.”  We should bear in mind that by 1847, major European powers were penetrating the 
African continent and claiming large tracts of territory. These territories, as well as those in 
southern and southeastern Asia, were to serve as raw material producers whose natural resources 
would be brought to the European metropole for manufacture and then sold globally, often to the 
very peoples from whom the resources were taken. 
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We see the phrases “civilized world” and “civilized countries” stated three times in the 
1920 ICC Organizational Meeting proceedings. Marco Cassin of the Italian delegation, for 
example, in referring to the war, argued that Italy had joined the war to fight “under the impulse 
of brotherhood towards civilized countries.”58 Italy, he argued, knew “its duty toward the 
civilized world.”59 M. Georges Pascalis, President of the Paris Chamber of Commerce, in 
referring to reconstruction following the war, referred to French leaders as having “laid the basis 
of the economic reconstruction of the civilized world.”60 For the duration of the 1920s, ICC 
participants continued to refer to themselves as representing the leadership of the civilized 
nations of the world. Furthermore, in regard to the misconception of free trade, French 
representative M. Reibel believed that the ICC would pave the way to “the return to the normal 
interplay of economic laws and to freedom of trade,” which was interrupted by the war.61 The 
“freedom of trade,” however, existed between and amongst the imperial victors of the war. 
Hopes for global free markets, at least amongst the major European powers, evaporated 
in the midst of the strong sentiment of nationalism and imperialism that conveyed Europe by the 
1870s. The nationalistic and imperialistic spirit initiated a drive to imperialize Africa, Southeast 
Asia and other non-white lands, dashing hopes for both global peace and free trade. Possession 
of a vast empire was indicative of the prowess of the nation-state. “Free traders and the peace 
movement were shocked by the militarism of public opinion” as well as the “return to 
protectionism” that became prevalent by the end of the nineteenth century.62 Seeking imperial 
control as well as the desire to spread the nation-state’s ideological and cultural values led to the 
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rise of protectionism on a global scale. The so-called “New Imperialism” created nationalistic 
rivalries upon the European continent and international competition for empire. With the 
tensions of imperialism and nationalistic rivalry so prescient by the mid to late nineteenth 
century, nationalistic zeal and jingoism replaced the hopes of free traders and pacifists for world 
peace through unencumbered global commerce. 
European technologies such as steam-driven gun boats, machine guns and medical 
advances (quinine) became another motivation. The mid to late nineteenth century was marked 
by a process of “penetration, conquest and consolidation,” as Daniel Headrick argues.63 For 
example, the advent of steam powered ships necessitated the conquest of island bases for 
refueling. European powers, and later the U.S., acquired islands across the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans to facilitate their empires (eg. The U.S. and Hawaii, Britain and Diego Garcia, France 
and various Polynesian Islands, Germany, France and the U.S. in Samoa). The Second Industrial 
Revolution, buttressed by social Darwinism, incorporated political and economic power into the 
hands of the North Atlantic. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the international system was dominated by what 
Paul Kennedy terms a “European-centered pentarchy.” The old imperial order, with Britain, 
France and Germany leading the way, continued to create bilateral and multilateral economic and 
political agreements without dedicating their nation-state to any form of international 
organization. The 1885 Berlin Conference settled European competition over Africa, with the 
major powers divvying up the continent amongst themselves to avoid war. The major powers 
also formed numerous formal alliances across the European continent while bitter economic and 
imperial competition between Britain and Germany led the two nation-states to engage in a fin 
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de siècle arms race. By the turn of the century, the United States joined the network of powerful 
Western Europe imperial states, finishing off its conquest of the western half of the North 
American continent and, after the 1898 Spanish-American War, acquiring the Philippines, Guam 
and Puerto Rico. Though the international order, dominated by the West, was rhetorically based 
upon the ideals of the American and French Revolutions as well as laissez-faire capitalism, the 
realities of nationalism trumped hopes for a realization of international law or governance. 
Nationalistic zeal, imperial competition and the array of alliances all combined by 1914 to 
immerse the Great Powers in the Great War. 
It is necessary to pivot to a brief discussion of the League of Nations and the political 
economic issues faced by the ICC and the League in the immediate aftermath of the war. The 
League was viewed as the culmination of the spirit of international organization. It was to 
maintain peace and prevent another world war. The ICC would work in tandem with the League 
for the duration of the 1920s. Though the dissertation does not focus solely upon the ICC-League 
relationship, we would be remiss not to mention the League, since ICC members viewed it as a 
critical element to the perpetuation of the Allied imperial order. 
2.1 The Great War and the Call for a New International Order 
Woodrow Wilson, a devout Presbyterian, received a telegraph message in the midst of 
the Great War imploring him: “In the name of God and humanity, declare war on Germany!”64  
Not only did the contemporary domestic political realities of the nation prevent Wilson from 
seeking a declaration of war from the United States Congress until late in the war (April, 1917), 
but his own religious faith also guided his response to the anxious telegrapher: “War isn’t 
declared in the name of God; it is a human affair entirely.”65 “Human affairs” had brought the 
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globe of nation-states and colonies, or, more specifically, Europe and its colonial holdings, to the 
precipice of sheer and utter destruction in the cataclysm of World War I. By the time Wilson 
received his declaration of war, however, his mind was not so much focused upon the war as it 
was upon the peace. How could human affairs of war and destruction be avoided by future 
generations?  Perhaps the Great War was, as British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated, 
a “war to end all wars.” Wilson’s solution was a League of Nations that could protect “the world 
right to be free from every disturbance of its peace.”66 
The Great War shook the foundations of Western European global dominance, yet did not 
destroy its imperial edifice. Social Darwinism and notions of Western European cultural and 
racial superiority were shaken, but would remain until the end of the Second World War. 
Following the Great War, Britain and France looked to maintain their already profligate empires 
stretching from Latin America to Africa to Southeast Asia. Moreover, utilizing the newly 
established League of Nations and its protocols, Allied nations Britain and France erected 
“mandates” (to be discussed in the next chapter) in the former regions of the vast Ottoman 
Empire. Britain occupied Palestine, Jordan and what would become Iraq while France occupied 
Syria and Lebanon. Utilizing the argument that these regions were not yet “ready for 
democracy,” which had been a core Western ideation since the initiation of the New Imperialism 
during the mid-nineteenth century, Western powers facilitated an influx of multi-national 
corporations seeking to exploit oil resources. 
The Great War shifted the global economic hierarchy, making the U.S. a creditor for the 
first time in its history. Prior to 1914, “the United Kingdom, France and Belgium were at the 
center of the classical order, supplying capital and manufactured products to the rest of the 
                                                 
66 Ibid, p. 327. 
43 
world.”67 The United States filled this role following the war, after the destruction of the 
aforementioned powers. The U.S. government withdrew from what it considered potential 
entangling alliances with European powers, refusing to sign the Versailles Treaty (signatories, 
save for Germany, were automatically enrolled in the League of Nations). Meanwhile, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Edge Act in 1919, which loosened anti-trust laws while permitting U.S. 
banks to create syndicates to finance trade and various commercial endeavors abroad. Hence, the 
U.S. government restricted its own power to allocate foreign loans, whilst empowering the 
private sector to do so. Private U.S. based investors and bankers now had to work even more 
closely with other governments and their economic systems due to the isolationist economic 
policy of the U.S. government.68 
Wilson made his way to Paris, at the conclusion of the Great War, in order to engage in 
the peace talks that would inevitably become the disastrous Treaty of Versailles. Wilson was a 
social Darwinist whose foreign policy was committed to “moral imperialism.” Wilson, mirroring 
the Western political economic mentality, believed that by proliferating U.S. markets and U.S. 
capitalism, the U.S. was by default spreading freedom. In 1916, meeting with a group of 
businessmen, Wilson implored them to “carry liberty and justice” by selling goods “that will 
make the world more comfortable and happy,” and “convert” other peoples “to the principles of 
America.”69 Wilson launched more military incursions into Latin America, in the name of 
“moral imperialism,” than any president in U.S. history. On 4 April 1917, he asked the U.S. 
Congress for a declaration of war in order to make “the world safe for democracy.”  In reality, 
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the U.S. role in the Great War sought to “make the world safe” for Allied power, capital and 
market manipulation. 
The ICC, which would serve as an economic advisement committee to the League during 
the 1920s and become its chief economic advisor by 1927, lavished praise upon the League. 
Pascalis, speaking before the 1920 Organizational Meeting, called the League a “magnificent 
dream” along the lines of which “Jean Jacques Rousseau may have dreamed.” The League was 
“the logical goal of a progressive humanity advancing toward perfection.”70 M. Reibel, speaking 
after Pascalis, noted that, in tandem with the League, the ICC “will have to stimulate production, 
the only real source of wealth, and will have to promote competition, the necessary factor to 
progress.”71 
Pascalis and Reibel had captured an imperial spirit of international organization. The 
definition of “progress” was defined by those with authority, the Allied powers. The League, as 
will be discussed later, was a conduit for the continuation of imperial control by Britain and 
France. Political and economic rifts, however, developed between the Allied powers for the 
duration of the 1920s. Moreover, the League’s key players, Britain and France, worked in 
tandem with the ICC toward the “perfection” of market manipulation. As we will see in the 
remainder of this chapter, Britain, France and the U.S. did not see eye to eye on numerous 
political economic issues such as Allied war debts (to the U.S.) and reparations. Most 
importantly, the WWI allies did not agree upon the allocation and maintenance of natural 
resources. The ICC, as we shall see in the next chapter, would leave this to a system of 
collaboration between multinational corporations (MNC) and their respective governments. 
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Following the war, U.S. international political economic interests often did not align with 
the international interests of Britain or, more frequently, France. Though each speech given at 
the 1920 ICC Organizational Meeting, for example, was laced with laudatory tones of 
appreciation toward other members, the different ambitions and concerns of each was apparent. 
Though each participant, especially France, spoke of limiting “individuality” in favor of 
“altruism, concord and harmony” on an international economic scale, each delegation conveyed 
its national desires.72 
The British delegation at the 1920 ICC Organizational meeting was chaired by Sir Arthur 
Shirley Benn, President of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce. Speaking during 
the Fifth Session on 28 June 1920, he provided the British perspective on ICC formation and 
British membership. Benn provided a glimpse into the imagined globalized economic system of 
the early twentieth century, stating: “It is difficult to present an accurate view of the present 
economic position of Great Britain, as it changes from day to day and is vitally affected by 
conditions prevailing in other countries.”73 As opposed to the French delegate M. Georges Picot, 
who voiced concerns over Allied (Britain, France, U.S.) collaboration and rebuilding, Benn 
pointed out the necessity of finding “markets” for Britain “to sell her goods.” Also alluding to 
labor issues, namely unemployment in the coal industry, which would spring up in the form of 
the Ammanford anthracite strike in 1925, Benn discussed the importance of finding employment 
for millions of men and women who were formerly employed by the war industry. 
Germany, the U.S. and France feared labor unrest as well. By the end of the Great War, 
Germany, who was not given a voice during the Versailles Treaty negotiations nor permitted to 
partake in the formation of the ICC, had fallen into revolution. Numerous Right and Left 
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political groups formed, vying for power. Many supported and many feared the establishment of 
a communist government similar to the one that had just formed in Russia in 1917. The Leftist 
groups, chief of which was the Spartacus League led by communists Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, sought to bring a “Red Revolution” to Germany. They were opposed by the 
nationalist forces of the “Schwartz-Rot-Gold” revolutionaries. By 1919, the nationalists were 
able to form a loose coalition with the centrist Social Democrats (SDP) to quell revolution and 
draw up a new constitution. 
The Treaty parameters, from the German perspective, were unwarranted and punitive at 
best. “It was a catastrophe,” German historian Hagen Schulze argues, “that the first German 
democracy emerged as the product not of an elected parliament and strong political parties but 
rather of a general staff [the German Army under Generals Erich Luddendorf and Paul von 
Hindenberg] at its wits’ end.”74 The newly established Weimar Republic, created out of defeat, 
was viewed by the Germans as an illegitimate, weak political entity after agreeing to the harsh 
stipulations of the Versailles Treaty (mentioned above). The Weimar government, in the eyes of 
the German people, was a product of the “dictat of Versailles.” It was a pseudo-democratic entity 
forced upon Germany by the victorious, gloating Allied powers. Indeed, to the Germans, it was 
the “product of complex and painful compromise, of defeats and mutual concessions,” not the 
desires of the German people.75 
France, represented by newly appointed ICC President Clèmentel, among other 
prominent French business and government officials, was most concerned about the rebuilding 
process following the Great War. Germany could not be admitted to the ICC, Clèmentel 
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announced in his speech on 28 June 1920, “until she repairs the damages she has caused” and 
“cast off forever that cloak of Nessus-Prussian militarism.”76 Clèmentel was prepared to exploit 
the newly established ICC as a political and economic tool to manipulate Germany to abide by 
the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. Claiming that the Germans, by the middle of 1920, 
had yet to abide by treaty protocols, Clèmentel called for the Allied Powers (the U.S., France, 
Britain, Italy and Belgium) to “inform the German government that further postponement [of 
treaty obligations] will not be permitted.” These included the size of the German army, which it 
had not yet reduced to agreed upon levels, and German transfer “of coal and other supplies” to 
war torn France. The enforcement of German Treaty obligations was supposed to fall upon the 
League of Nations. However, Clèmentel was attempting to grant powers of treaty coercion to the 
ICC as well.77 
French delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, a year prior to Clèmentel’s speech before 
the ICC, were prepared to take a more aggressive stance against their former foe, Germany, than 
were the British or Americans. France approved of Wilson’s League of Nations. Leon Bourgeois, 
the French representative to the League Charter Commission, proposed that the League have “an 
armed intervention force.” When Wilson rebuffed this proposal, the French felt that the League 
was “a plan without real teeth.”78 Clemenceau sought French annexation of the Rhineland, but 
this proposal was rejected by both Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. 
Instead, the French delegation settled for a temporary fifteen year occupation of the Rhineland. 
Clemenceau biographer Jean-Baptiste Duroselle contends that “Clemenceau sacrificed the full 
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realization of his goals to the maintenance of an alliance which he considered more solid than it 
really was.”79 
The French, however, achieved many of their objectives at the peace table. Along with 
the fifteen year French occupation of the Rhineland, France regained the territory of Alsace-
Lorraine that it had lost nearly fifty years earlier to the Germans. To further augment French 
security, Germany could not have an army of over one hundred thousand troops and was strictly 
limited as to the amount of armaments it could use. Of the thirty four billion dollars in 
reparations required of Germany (or, one hundred and thirty billion gold marks), fifty-two 
percent were to go to France. France also received all Saar coal production for fifteen years, 
duty-free export rights to Germany with no reciprocation, and possession of former German and 
Ottoman territorial imperial holdings. 
French delegate Picot, addressing the Third Session of the Organizational Conference on 
28 June 1920, remained focused upon French war sacrifices, despite German concessions at 
Versailles the year prior. “We shall not forget,” Picot stated, “that we are among the countries 
that have suffered most from the war.” The “paralyzation [sic] of all means of production” and 
the mobilization of troops as well as the costs of munitions and arming of troops, Picot argued, 
formed “part of the burdens of war which the Allies had agreed to bear in common. Are they [the 
Allies] about to let France bear that burden all alone? Alone bear the expense of the 
reconstruction of the battlefields?  Ah, gentlemen, I feel sure your reply is ‘no.’”80 
The French, furthermore, understood the more favorable economic position of the British 
and the Americans. The U.S. had become the world’s largest creditor and most powerful 
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economy following the war, seeing a nearly threefold increase in manufacturing production 
during the war. In 1914, U.S. production stood at twenty-three billion dollars. By 1919, it stood 
at sixty billion dollars.81 Advocating free trade, the third point of his fourteen point peace plan, 
Wilson recognized the new U.S. global political economic position. “We have got to finance the 
world in some important degree,” he argued in 1919, “and those who finance the world must 
understand it and rule it with their spirits and with their minds.”82 Indeed, the U.S., which once 
exhibited more suspicion toward British economic imperialism as well as its strict adherence to a 
global gold standard, now embraced the rhetoric of free market capitalism under the auspices of 
nineteenth century liberalism. The U.S., with well-established domestic manufacturing industries 
prior to the war, was now able to expand “into overseas markets formerly regarded as the 
exclusive preserve of European manufacturers.”83 
The British-American relationship proved to be closer during the post-war period, 
beginning with the Treaty of Versailles, than either an American-French or British-French 
diplomatic relationship. Although the U.S. maintained its traditional international diplomatic 
approach of resisting foreign “entangling alliances,” it maintained especially cordial ties with the 
British Empire. Moreover, as Michael Hogan argues, there was indeed “a large degree of 
continuity in the foreign policies of the Wilson, Harding and Coolidge administrations.” U.S. 
post-war officials envisioned a global economy largely reliant upon the whims of U.S. “free 
market,” “open door,” global economic policies, revolving around the gold standard. Along with 
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this vision, U.S. financial and commercial interests often operated in collaboration with British 
interests, especially in the fields of “cable, radio, and petroleum policy.”84 
French and Belgian representatives sought “an Allied industrial front to promote 
reconstruction on the basis of reparations and military sanctions” during the 1920 ICC 
Organizational Meeting, while the British and American representatives sought “to ‘demilitarize’ 
national economies and restore the [pre-war] market system.”85 By 1921, however, British 
governing elites “began to regret the war and the Treaty of Versailles,” preferring to “liquidate 
the Treaty of Versailles, especially war-debts and reparations.”86 Anglo-American cooperation 
became readily apparent, for example, in Latin America during the inter-war era as the U.S. and 
British cooperated through “multinational monopolies” while espousing the rhetoric of an open 
door free market.87 
The French, in regard to German reparations, sought to implement the “London Schedule 
of Payments,” the plan laid out by the Allied powers in May of 1921, in order to clarify and 
uphold Articles 231 and 232 of the Versailles Treaty, which blamed Germany for the material 
and human destruction created by the war. The Reparation Commission, established by the 
Treaty of Versailles, set German war debts at one hundred and thirty two billion dollars in late 
April 1921. To understand the French perspective, including the divide between the Allied 
powers (the British and Americans on one side and the French on the other), it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the topic of reparations and the controversies and disagreements associated with 
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the implementation of reparation payments as reparations would remain a major issue for the 
duration of the 1920s. 
“France needed reparations not only to reconstruct, but also to pay its wartime debt to 
Britain and the United States.”88 The British viewed exorbitant German reparation amounts as a 
hindrance to British economic prosperity before the ink dried on the London Schedule. U.S. 
presidential administrations beginning with Warren Harding in 1921 adamantly held both Britain 
and France accountable for repaying war debts to American private and public coffers. For the 
British, a healthy German economy would mean a reestablishment of prewar trade patterns and 
prosperity and hence a greater ability to alleviate war debts and domestic unemployment. It is 
interesting to point out that although the U.S. did not participate directly in French and British 
reparation negotiations with Germany, the U.S. did ultimately receive some four hundred million 
dollars’ worth of gold marks and, until 1922, regular shipments of German dyes as part of the 
U.S. claim upon Germany to pay the U.S. six billion gold marks.89 Meanwhile, the U.S. 
remained adamant about repayment of French and British war debts for the duration of the 1920s 
as well as a degree of leniency toward Germany.90 
The London Schedule of Payments, which remained in effect until Germany began to 
default on reparations in early 1922, broke German reparation payments into three categories: A, 
B and C bonds. The Allied powers were well aware of Germany’s inability to pay the 
astronomical sum of one hundred and thirty two billion gold marks. The C bonds, which 
constituted the largest amount of the German war debt, were “deliberately chimerical,” and 
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publicized in an effort to enhance the image of the British and French side in the public eye.91  
The actual amount expected to be paid was contained within the A and B bonds, which 
amounted to roughly fifty billion dollars in gold marks. The Weimar government met the first 
one billion dollar cash payment in the summer of 1921. Germany made two small annuity 
payments by early 1922 but made no further payments until the establishment of the Dawes Plan 
in late 1924. By late 1921, Germany experienced rampant hyperinflation and the destruction of 
its currency. With Germany unable to meet its payment obligations, the French occupied the 
Ruhr Valley in January 1923 to take control of German coal reserves. 
2.2      Clèmentel’s Alternative Plan 
Clèmentel, who excelled in politics, also understood France’s position after the war. He 
had served the French government in numerous capacities prior to his ICC service. From 1900 to 
1919, Clèmentel was a member of the French National Assembly. From 1920 until his death in 
1936, he served as a senator. Throughout the majority of those years, he also served as the 
Minister of the Colonies (1905-1906), the Minister of Agriculture (1913), the Minister of 
Finance (June 1914, 1924-1925) and the Minister of Commerce (1915-1919). Like his ICC 
contemporaries, he was intertwined in business and political circles. His four year stint as the 
head of Commerce was, arguably, his most influential. 
Clèmentel’s willingness to take a hard line approach to Germany at the 1920 ICC 
Organizational Meeting was foreshadowed by his actions as the French Minister of Commerce in 
the two years prior. As Minister of Commerce, Clèmentel found himself immersed in the politics 
of both the Great War and the Paris Peace settlement. During the Great War, Clèmentel began 
drawing up plans for a post-war peace that would, in his estimation, avoid future wars. In 
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Clèmentel’s mind, “‘organization’ was a magic word. An ordered economy based on cooperation 
rather than competition had to replace the ‘anarchy’ of the free market.”92 Clèmentel called for a 
push toward corporatism for not only the French economic system, but also for an “Inter-Allied 
System” (IAS) made up of France, Great Britain and the United States. Such a system was 
necessary, Clèmentel argued, in order to restrain a potentially resurgent Germany. Early on in the 
1919 Paris Peace negations, Clèmentel’s plan was held in rather high esteem by French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau.93 
The IAS called for a “permanent economic bloc” with Allied control of global raw 
materials, not only to prevent German resurgence, but also to maintain the prewar international 
imperial political economic system of control. The bloc was to include a “system of preferential 
tariffs” amongst the French, British and U.S. empires, with France leading the way.94 
Clèmentel’s main motivation for such a plan, recalling that Germany had invaded France twice 
within 40 years, was a fear of Germany rising to prominence once again. Ideally, though, the 
plan would reintegrate Germany into the global economic system, without obliterating the 
German economy, while maintaining the global economic superiority of France, Britain and the 
U.S. 
The IAS was also part of a broader plan for the reconstruction of France itself. 
Germany’s thirty four billion dollars in reparation payments assigned by the Treaty of Versailles 
in 1919 was subsidiary to French reconstruction. In Clèmentel’s estimation, it was a “material 
impossibility for Germany to rebuild so many ruins” without eviscerating its economy and 
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leading to further hostilities.95 Moreover, even if Germany were able to pay such exorbitant 
amounts to the French coffers, it would likely lead to inflation in the French economy. Instead, 
as part of the IAS, Germany’s raw materials, especially those of the Ruhr Valley and Saar, would 
be pooled and redistributed by France within its role as leader of the IAS. These raw materials, 
Clèmentel believed, could be used by French industries to create French products (and hence 
maintain employment) for the global market. 
Clèmentel’s plan, however, clashed with Anglo-American plans for a global capitalist 
system. For the Americans and the British, the post-war order was to consist of a “community 
among the capitalist countries, one rooted in shared interests, common dedication to democratic 
values, and respect for the principles of liberal capitalism.”96 The U.S. was more than willing to 
encourage European raw material and resource collaboration, as laid out by Clèmentel. 
However, Herbert Hoover, Woodrow Wilson’s chief economic advisor during the Paris Peace 
talks, wrote to Wilson on 7 November 1918 that the U.S. “will not agree to any programme [sic] 
that even looks like inter-Allied control of our [U.S.] economic resources after peace.”97 Hoover, 
and Wilson, firmly rejected Clèmentel’s IAS, seeking instead the imagined free market system 
that operated during the pre-war global order. Clèmentel’s international economic scheme fell 
apart since it was to rely heavily upon the most prolific economy on the planet following the 
Great War, the United States. 
Clèmentel turned inward, hoping to ameliorate France’s economic situation through 
corporatism, which Charles Maier terms the key to understanding 1920s European political 
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economics.98 He sought a new relationship between business and government in France, calling 
for the creation of regional consortiums organizing prominent industries under a centralized 
governing apparatus. Dividing France into thirty-one economic regions, Clèmentel created 
“pyramids of interlocking associations based both upon regional bodies and industry-wide 
boards.”99 Each regional body was developed out of a local chamber of commerce whose 
representatives would form the “Federation Nationale des Syndicats.” Clèmentel also devised the 
“Confederation Generale de la Production Francaise,” for business managers and representatives. 
Clèmentel soon faced opposition from his own countrymen. A rift had developed by 1919 
between the government’s economic corporatist ambitions and the ambitions of the business 
culture that sought less government regulation. Louis Loucheur, a prominent French industrialist, 
munitions manufacturer and later ICC participant, increasingly gained a prominent position 
among French business and government leaders. During the war, Loucheur was appointed 
Minister of Munitions in September of 1917. Like Clèmentel, Loucheur believed the state would 
need to remain involved in the economy following the war. However, he believed, more so than 
Clèmentel, that the best way to economic recovery was “through private initiative.”100 Loucheur 
agreed with Clèmentel’s Allied resource pooling scheme until Loucheur realized that such a plan 
was untenable since it required American cooperation. By late 1919, it was Loucheur, who had 
been named Minister of Industrial Reconstruction during the waning months of the war, who had 
the ear of Clemenceau and the French leadership, as Clèmentel and his international corporatist 
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plan disintegrated. Clèmentel’s international and domestic economic ideas fell from favor within 
French cabinet circles. 
It is important to bring attention to Clèmentel’s plan. The debate amongst French 
business and government leaders concerning a corporatist state “reveals a certain lack of faith in 
the old [nineteenth century] liberal economic system of free markets and government non-
intervention.”101 Karl Polanyi argues there was an almost “universal conviction” following the 
Great War “that only the establishment of the pre-1914 system could restore peace and 
prosperity.” Moreover, as we will see, “the failure of this effort to return to the past” created the 
economic and political catastrophe of the 1930s.102 For a brief moment in time, Clèmentel sought 
to overcome the “haute finance” of the nineteenth century. His plan was thwarted by the desire 
of industrial capitalists in the U.S., Britain and France to maintain the only global economic 
system with which they were familiar: a system controlled and manipulated by European and 
American banking and industrial interests with the gold standard (to be discussed later) as the 
fulcrum of economic balance and stability. Moreover, Clèmentel’s plan also shows that France 
understood its lower position of power vis-à-vis the U.S. and Britain, following the Great War. 
The IAS was a power play that fell upon deaf ears in the face of the resurgent U.S. economy and 
the independent business interests of corporate leaders. 
There is a semblance of irony in the outcome of Clèmentel’s plan as well. His plan failed 
to come to fruition because it was rejected by the U.S., the major global economic power 
following the Great War. However, the inherent goal of the plan, to control the content and flow 
of the world’s most strategic natural resources, was the inborn goal of the U.S. and Britain as 
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well. We will see that all three of these imperial powers, despite their political differences and 
their rhetorical usage of the term free trade, had similar goals of controlling global commerce 
and resources. These goals were ascertained through the medium of multinational corporate, 
banking and governmental collaboration throughout the course of the 1920s. The ICC 
proceedings provide a glimpse into this collaboration. 
In closing, we return to the 1920 ICC Organizational Meeting, and take a closer look at 
Fahey’s words, which opened this chapter. On 23 June, 1920, Fahey stated: “More than ever the 
war has demonstrated the absolute interdependence of the people inhabiting every part of the 
globe.” There is “just pride in nationality,” Fahey continued, “but in no sense does true 
nationalism conflict with those international relationships which are absolutely essential if the 
world is really to achieve the blessings of peace and that happiness, prosperity and freedom of 
opportunity for its people which are its heritage. There is no class or group which can aid more 
than the business men of the world.”103 
Fahey was followed immediately by Clèmentel, who officially accepted his nomination 
to become the first president of the ICC. “The only merit I have,” Clèmentel stated, “is to have 
understood the importance of economic cooperation. The hour of individualism has passed, and 
it is not only a question of national cooperation within the different countries, but of international 
cooperation between different nations. The idea of cooperation is born. A bridge has been thrown 
over the Atlantic.”104 
Both Fahey and Clèmentel viewed the world as globalized. Fahey spoke of helping the 
“world,” locked in a state of “absolute interdependence,” achieve “peace” through reliance upon 
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“the businessmen of the world.” Clèmentel, who had abandoned his IAS plan only a year prior, 
spoke of “international cooperation between different nations.” Both men, however, also realized 
the imperial political economic order that had emerged from the war. Neither Clèmentel nor 
Fahey had experienced a change of heart regarding the powers that be. Their goal was to 
strengthen “the bridge over the Atlantic.” They realized an opportunity that had been in 
development for some time prior to the war: the empowerment of the business man on a global 
scale. Yet, as we shall see in the next chapter, the businessmen, and their multinational 
corporations, would rely upon the government interference they rhetorically disdained to help 
them gain a foothold in Latin America and the Middle East. 
3     CHAPTER TWO: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 
The ICC was a platform and sounding board for the businessmen of the Allied powers, 
forming an international intersection of business and nation-state interests. ICC participants 
demanded laissez faire policies for the duration of the 1920s. U.S. representative Willis H. Booth 
captured this sentiment during the 1920 Organizational Meeting. “Businessmen of the world,” 
Booth argued, “working under fundamental economic laws, should endeavor to aid in rational 
economic stabilization…entirely independent of government financial support.” Booth viewed 
the ability of the businessman to work independent of government interference as “a very 
definite factor in the world’s steady progress.”105 
W. J. Noble, Chairman of the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom, speaking 
shortly after Booth, was even more direct: The “revolting system” of “government control,” 
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Noble insisted, was “inseparable” and “paralyzing” because “it kills all initiative.”106 M. William 
Thys of the Belgian delegation insisted that “the Belgian temperament is opposed as a matter of 
principle to every description of government interference.”107 A unanimous resolution adopted 
during the June 1921 Conference in London stated: “Government control of or participation in 
industry and commerce discourages individual initiative and renders trade conditions uncertain 
and artificial.”108 The statements made by Booth, Noble and Thys a year prior, then, spoke to the 
spirit of laissez faire that became a rhetorical foundation of the ICC. Indeed, laissez faire 
sentiment echoes throughout the proceedings of the 1920s. 
In this chapter, we see ICC member interests and nation-state interests intersect during 
the 1920s despite ICC demands that laissez faire policies be adopted. The ICC meeting of 1921 
revolved around the topics of trade and taxation and trade law disputes and resolutions, since 
these issues were seen as the most pressing in regard to facilitating free trade and business 
independence in the imagined globalized world. Free trade, however, did not apply to regions 
that were deemed “uncivilized.” In these regions, industries relied upon political, economic or 
military government leverage, particularly in the Middle East and Latin America following the 
Great War. The businessmen of the ICC, with heavy political, business and banking connections, 
railed against government involvement whilst relying upon it, saying nothing in regard to the 
manipulation of markets and industries in the aforementioned regions. In the next chapter, we 
will see how governments helped multinational corporations (MNC) penetrate the economic 
systems of Latin America. In this chapter, we investigate the free market, laissez faire rhetoric of 
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the ICC and the British and French infiltration of the Middle East under the banner of the League 
of Nations mandate system. Using the League Mandates in Syria and Iraq as our examples, we 
will see that free market, laissez faire rhetoric did not apply to these regions, which were deemed 
“uncivilized.” 
Woodrow Wilson, following the war, openly advocated free trade within the context of 
his Fourteen Points with Point II, calling for “absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas” and 
Point III, calling for “the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers…among all the 
nations consenting to the peace.”109 ICC participants wished to perpetuate the free trade spirit of 
Wilson’s Fourteen Point program. They argued that the “task of business” was to “aid in the 
rational stabilization” of global commerce, which would be “‘helpful and profitable to 
Europeans, safe and remunerative to Americans,” and “a very definite factor in the world’s 
steady progress.’”110 “The world’s steady progress,” according to the ICC, hinged upon not only 
the rehabilitation of Europe, but also upon the protraction of Western European and American 
imperial economic strategies. By ensuring free commercial liberty on a global scale, ICC 
participants believed, future wars could be averted and the globe would find itself immersed in a 
protracted era of peace through free, unfettered trade. 
The first official, biennial meeting of the ICC was held at Central Hall, Westminster in 
London from 27 June to 1 July in 1921. Although thirty six countries were represented, only 
twelve were affiliated with the Chamber and had thus created National Committees.111 The 
meeting was presided over by A. J. Hobson, the President of the British National Committee and 
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the recently elected president of the ICC, M. Etienne Clèmentel of France. The agenda, which 
became protocol for ICC gatherings, was divided into five sections in an effort to facilitate 
discussion, permit debate on numerous topics and to allow men from various countries to share 
their interests and concerns. The meeting was public and reported upon by the London press and 
other national news agencies in attendance. 
The American delegation to the First Congress was particularly adamant regarding the 
removal of government forces in the face of international commerce. American delegate A. C. 
Bedford spoke of the liberation of trade during the conference’s first day. “There is a distinct 
feeling in America,” Bedford argued, “that the Government should, as far as practicable, refrain 
from interference with the normal development of business, and that in working out the tasks of 
economic reconstruction in both their domestic and international relations, private enterprise 
should have the utmost free play.”112 
The first Congress included prominent members of the economic and political systems of 
the respective countries in attendance.  This chapter focuses primarily upon the first official ICC 
meeting. Thus, we bring attention to the prominent businessmen in attendance because their 
business acumen and their perceptions of the way the world worked by the 1920s was 
fundamental not only to the founding of the ICC, but also its goals for the duration of the decade. 
These men headed corporations, served in various government positions, and advised political 
and banking leaders. Most of them will appear again in the pages and chapters that follow. 
Political, business and banking ties between members and their respective nations were 
readily apparent. The French delegation, for example, included Jean Coignet, a French Senator 
elected in January of 1920. Coignet was a former president of the Lyon Chamber of Commerce 
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and “a magnate of the local chemical industry.”113 Historian John Laffey describes the Chamber, 
referred to as the “Lyonnais,” as France’s “most effective local organization devoted to the cause 
of imperialism.”114 From the early 1900s to the early 1930s, the Lyonnais played a significant 
role in perpetuating French economic imperial endeavors in China, Southeast Asia and northern 
Africa.115 Coignet served in numerous French senatorial committees dealing with issues 
including mining, railway rates, taxation on French MNCs and legislation to favor local French 
businesses. 
Eugène Schneider, a prominent French businessman and politician, represented the 
French delegation. Schneider was the grandson of the great railway, banking and armaments 
magnate Joseph Eugène Schneider. Operating out of Le Creusot, the Schneider Company made a 
fortune from armament production during the Franco-Prussian War as well as from its near 
monopoly over the construction of government purchased railway networks. By the fin-de-siècle, 
the Schneider Company engaged in a fierce international competition with the German Krupp 
Family to sell military armaments on a global scale. 
Schneider, like his grandfather, served in the French Chamber of Deputies (from 1900 to 
1925). Beginning in 1902, Schneider entered a contentious competition with Krupp to sell rifles 
and other armaments to Brazil and then Argentina in 1906 and Chile in 1909. Defeated by Krupp 
in South America, Schneider and other French investors increasingly turned to Tsarist Russia and 
Eastern Europe as investment havens.116 In 1920, for example, Schneider’s bank, L’Union 
Parisienne, bought out Skoda, the prominent Czechoslovak armament industry, and later gained 
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control, through Skoda, of Czechoslovakia’s auto industry. Skoda’s tentacles spread into 
neighboring Hungary where it gained a strong financial interest in the Austro-Hungarian bank 
Kreditanstalt. Using this fiduciary connection, Schneider loaned money to the Hungarian 
government that it was unable to pay back. The French government then arranged for a 
government loan official to loan the money to Hungary through the Banque de France, which 
then reimbursed L’Union Parisienne.117 Like Coignet, then, Schneider indeed represented more 
than just his nation at the first ICC congress. 
The British representatives exhibited a similar demographic pedigree, linking business, 
politics, and banking interests. Sir Arthur Shirley Benn served nearly a quarter of a century in the 
British Parliament (1910-1935 with a brief absence from 1929 to 1931). Prior to his legislative 
career, he served as the British Vice-Consul in Mobile, Alabama. He had many “connections 
with British trade bodies” and urged expanded trade within the British Empire and with the 
U.S.118 During his time in the U.S., Benn also invested in the lumber industry, forming Hunter, 
Benn and Company in the mid-1880s. He was managing director of the company while serving 
as the British Vice-Consul in Mobile. In the 1920s he was the head of the British Chambers of 
Commerce and by 1927 became the president of the ICC. 
Booth, a prominent U.S. ICC delegate, was the vice president of the Guaranty Trust 
Company of New York, owned by J.P. Morgan & Co. since 1909. Booth was an example of the 
individual and state interests represented at the ICC conference: banking, big business and 
political interests wrapped around a reverence for the gold standard with a free market mentality. 
Prior to his time with the Guaranty Trust Company, Booth had entered the family business, L. 
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Booth & Sons, as its treasurer. The machining company consolidated with the Smith Machinery 
Company (Smith-Booth-Usher Company) in 1908 and became the industry leader on the Pacific 
Coast. In the meantime, Booth also helped organize the Pacific Electric Heating Company, 
which by the mid-1910s had branches across the U.S. Midwest and Canada. 
Booth had a plethora of experience in the business world and, by 1923, would be acting 
president of the ICC. After nearly monopolizing trade in machine parts on the American Pacific 
coast during the fin-de-siècle, he later became vice-president of Guaranty Trust Company. He 
also served as the president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce after 1909. Additionally, 
he served as vice-president of Guaranty Trust Company from 1918 until 1941 as well as a 
director of International Business Machines (IBM) from 1922 until his death in 1958. 
Owen D. Young, an American ICC representative throughout the 1920s, and future 
president of General Electric (GE), founded RCA in 1919, at the government’s behest, as a 
subsidiary of GE. Between 1919 and 1929, RCA’s annual profits grew from $2 million to $182 
million.119 He later became president of GE in 1922, and founded the National Broadcast 
Corporation (NBC) in 1926. He would prove instrumental in the mid-1920s in delineating the 
Dawes Plan (1924) to reduce German reparation payments. In 1929, he was named Time 
magazine “Man of the Year” for his role in creating what would be dubbed the “Young Plan,” 
which further reduced German reparation payments and created an annual installment plan.120 
Alfred C. Bedford, mentioned earlier, was elected president of the Standard Oil Company 
in December of 1916. His uncle had been a founding member of the Standard Oil group. Bedford 
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had been with the company since 1882 working in its “manufacturing” sector.121 In 1910 he 
became the company’s treasurer. Bedford, however, had cosmopolitan business acumen. While 
treasurer of Standard Oil, he also represented Charles Pratt & Co. as a “director of the Long 
Island Railroad.” He also served as president of the Portland General Electric Company (in 
Portland, Oregon) and was director and secretary of the Ohio River Railroad Company. By the 
time he was elected to head Standard Oil, he belonged to numerous prestigious business clubs 
including the Metropolitan, Bankers and Downtown Association of New York. Thus, Bedford’s 
defense of business in the face of potential government regulation and interference is 
understandable. 
Bedford worked to defend the ethical face of the business world as well. On 22 October 
1923, for example, Bedford addressed the Presbyterian Social Union of New York. “For the 
most part,” Bedford claimed, “business men in this country are not credited with having 
ethics.”122 
They are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t. But that is because 
the public does not understand the underlying motives of the business man 
of the country today. There was a period not long ago when business was 
charged, with the railroads, of charging what the traffic would bear. But 
today the rule of ruthlessness is giving way to generosity. Increasing 
responsibility is being felt by business men for standards that more closely 
approach the Christian ideal…  Big business can no longer concern itself 
with solely selfish methods…Government interference will diminish as 
business is based on higher standard [sic] of business ethics.123 
 
Bedford, writing in 1923, saw business as a benevolent, benign force for the common 
good of mankind. Interestingly, he references railroads only “charging what the traffic would 
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bear.” His home country, however, witnessed the vast monopolization of the railroad industry for 
the duration of the late nineteenth century. The U.S. railroad industry was able to cross the 
American continent utilizing government military intervention to wipe out Native American 
tribes. Moreover, the U.S. government, which established “the highest tariffs of any major nation 
in the world” from the Lincoln Administration to World War II, heavily subsidized railroad 
construction to assist the development of private corporations through land grants and tax 
breaks.124 Once the railroads gained immense monopolistic power by the late nineteenth century, 
the government often sided with owners, especially via the judicial system, rather than labor, 
breaking strikes and refusing to address demands for higher wages. 
U.S. government commissions, set up in the heart of the U.S. to monitor railroad prices 
during the late nineteenth century, often proved ineffective. A critic of the California Railroad, 
writing in 1895, complained: “The curious fact remains that a body created sixteen years ago for 
the sole purpose of curbing a single railroad corporation [the Central Pacific] with a strong hand, 
was found to be uniformly, without a break, during all that period, its apologist and defender.”125  
Indeed, federal and state governments “played from the start a very active role in the growth of 
American capitalism: Legislation in all jurisdictions was lenient on businesses declaring 
bankruptcy, and harsh on workers resisting exploitation.”126 State and federal court decisions 
often favored big business over labor and the consumer until the early twentieth century. The 
capitalist class, consisting of political elites as well as business owners, coalesced in “a wide 
variety of local civic, social, and cultural organizations” and “national institutions” that worked 
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to “stimulate U.S. exports” while shunning labor unions.127 The ICC, formally created by 1921, 
institutionalized this political-business collaboration at an international level. 
Bedford, apparently, felt that the era of “big business” using “selfish methods” had 
diminished by the 1920s. His ICC colleague, F. E. Smith, introduced during the 1921 ICC 
conference by his noble title, Viscount Birkenhead, would not have agreed with Bedford’s 
characterization of the businessman. “No view could be more superficial than that which from 
time to time is attempted in this or any other country in the world to censure the capitalist,” 
Birkenhead stated during the General Meeting on Monday 27 June. “The capitalist is not, never 
has been and I most sincerely trust never will be a philanthropist.”128 Philanthropy was best “left 
to other channels,” because the “vague influences of benevolence” distract the “mind of the 
“capitalist.” A distracted businessman, whose mind “is influenced or deflected by other 
considerations,” endangers “the whole [free market] system upon which capital depends” and 
thus endangers “the very cause of civilization itself.”129 
Birkenhead and Bedford captured the essence of the condition of the businessman by the 
dawn of the early twentieth century: men who were endowed with the long imbued orthodoxy of 
free trade, social Darwinism, Allied imperialism and manliness, combating Progressive Era 
ideals of government surveillance and oversight of the political economy with the goal of 
perfecting the human condition. How could the international businessman, they may have 
pondered, enhance “the very cause of civilization” when confronted with government regulation 
of commerce? The ICC was created in the wake of the Great War, which witnessed direct 
government control of major industries. Working in tandem with the League, the ICC could 
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return civilization to the pre-war organization of international trade, which they believed was a 
free trade system. Their ideas of civilization, however, played a central role in determining the 
satisfactory level of government involvement in global commerce. We will explore ICC notions 
of civilization later in this chapter. Now, let us return to the 1921 conference to better understand 
the political economic conditions of the perceived world and the foundations of ICC participant 
reasoning. 
The globe experienced a brief economic boom between 1919 and 1920 prior to the 1921 
conference. Eminent historian and economist Charles Kindleberger contends that this was due 
principally to “a scramble for goods to replace the inventories drawn down during five years of 
war.”130 “Pent-up financial accumulations were let loose on limited stocks, and prices soared.”131 
By mid-1920, however, this economic boom had fallen drastically into an economic depression 
marked by extreme deflation, a drop in wholesale prices and increases in unemployment in the 
Allied nation-states. We will see a deeper discussion of the ICC reaction to the 1920-1921 
depression in the next chapter with our discussion of the gold standard. Regardless, it is 
important to give passing mention to the depression here since it influenced the thought 
processes of ICC participants during the 1921 conference in regard to export credits and trade 
liberalization. 
The reinvigoration of trade was paramount in the minds of the ICC participants in the 
wake of the 1920-1921 depression. An ICC brochure published just prior to the London 
conference urged “Production and Export are the means of economic recovery.”132 A key 
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component for the reinvigoration of trade included the establishment of an international export 
credit system under the aegis of an “International Credit Interchange Bureau.” The original idea 
for such an organization was initiated at the Brussels Economic Conference the prior year. The 
ICC argued that “manufacturers, when working at full pressure to constantly renew their stocks 
of raw materials, require a large floating capital, and consequently have not the financial capacity 
for granting long credits.”133 An international system of export credits, the ICC believed, would 
alleviate this issue. At the most basic level, an export credit is one that is opened by an importer 
with a bank in an exporter’s country in order to finance an export operation. Essentially, the 
credit acts as an insurance policy and capital infusion to facilitate the movement of goods. The 
ICC proposed three “schemes” for establishing a system of export credits: “Solutions Due to 
Government Initiative,” “Solutions Due to Private Initiative,” or a combination of each. 
A governmental board would consist of “a Commission or a Council created by the 
government to study the different points of the problem.” Corporations would work through the 
government with the state national bank. Since 1919 the British Board of Trade had operated 
under this type of system under the Overseas Trade (Credits and Insurance) Act. “As soon as the 
money lent by the Board of Trade to an individual [corporation] was repaid, it could be applied 
immediately for a subsequent credit elsewhere.”134 The Board would decide to which countries 
such practices may be applied. The Board would advance “the whole sum required, provided that 
the exporter assumed responsibility for one-fifth of the risk involved.”135 
This scheme, the ICC reported, “Met with disappointing results.” Under the scheme, the 
British Parliament voted for twenty six million pounds to be “devoted to the creation of an 
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insurance fund.” However, the government disagreed with the exporters’ desire “to keep profits 
realized by the working of the scheme.”136 The British Parliament, after discussion with the Bank 
of London, passed further legislation in early 1921 to find a more symbiotic solution to the 
export credit issue. However, like the ICC, the Parliament issued a new system that would meld 
with the recently proposed Ter Meulen Scheme, to be discussed in a moment. 
The ICC presented an example from the U.S. regarding “solutions due to private 
initiative.” In 1919 U.S. Representative Walter Evans Edge, a wealthy newspaper publisher and 
advertisement executive, proposed legislation that would come to be called the Edge Act. An 
amendment to the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, the Edge Act permitted U.S. national banks to 
engage in international banking. Banks could form a “corporation,” which could then “grant 
credits for exports.” The corporations “are authorized to receive money on deposit for the United 
States in all countries, but they can only accept this money for the purpose of devoting it to 
transactions with foreign countries, or with American colonies.”137 However, these corporations 
were not necessarily independent of the U.S. government. The corporations “are prohibited from 
carrying on trade in goods, even in an indirect manner.” Moreover, “the Federal Reserve Board 
has a certain right of verification and control over the work done by these corporations.”138 
An export credit hybrid solution presented by the ICC came from a French example. The 
French National Bank for Foreign Trade (Banque Nationale francaise du Commerce Exterieur) 
was “a private organization originating in government action and organized under its 
supervision.”139 Bank bonds are to be registered and “cannot be made payable to the bearer 
without a decision of the General Meeting and authorization of Ministers of Finance and 
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Commerce.” A Board of Directors, who “must be French citizens and of French birth,” were to 
administer the bank. “The Directors may not be members of the French Parliament.” The bank 
was to be subsidized by the government to the amount of twenty five million francs. Twenty 
percent of the profits were to be paid to the state. However, the bank itself “has absolute freedom 
in carrying on its business.”140 
The Ter Meulen Plan, however, seemed to incite the most excitement amongst members 
of the ICC. This international export exchange and international commerce scheme was 
proposed by M. C. E. Ter Meulen of Messrs. Hope and Co., Bankers in Amsterdam. It was 
studied and adopted by the Provisional Economic and Financial Committee of the League of 
Nations in late 1920. A prominent industrial financier, Ter Meulen presented his international 
exchange rate plan at the 1920 Brussels Finance Conference, held under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, in September of 1920. The plan included “a combination of government and 
private security.”141 Governments were to issue bonds to their importers based on “the gold value 
of the underlying securities.” Thus, the plan maintained the gold standard mentality, to be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The bonds would be “issued in whatever currency 
the lender may require.” 
An “international committee of experts” was to determine the gold value of the 
underlying securities.142 The committee was to “consist of bankers and businessmen of 
international repute, appointed by the League of Nations.”143 The League of Nations was only 
directly involved in commercial interactions “in the event of defalcation in the redemption of the 
bonds, and only then in case the guaranteed fund is not adequate to take care of the defaulted 
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sum.”144 Ideally, international traders would maintain confidence in the plan since it was backed 
by the League. Moreover, confidence would remain high since the international committee was 
to be “impartial.” 
The ICC’s main goal, more broadly, was to “remove all restrictions on commerce and 
trade.”145 The international economic crisis of late 1920-1921 was caused, in the ICC’s 
estimation, by the “unmethodical restrictions imposed on commercial liberty and especially on 
the free circulation of capital in all its forms.”146 Furthermore, by ameliorating the situation of 
international commerce, war, according to the ICC, would be avoided in the future. It was 
critical for governments to make tariffs “moderate” to “avoid the erection between peoples of 
barriers that are obstacles to peace and the progress of civilization.”147 
The ICC discussions in regard to the establishment of export credit systems and the Ter 
Meulen Scheme to improve global commerce are quite revealing in regard to how the ICC 
viewed the League of Nations. ICC participants, who held free trade and laissez faire in high 
esteem, saw the League as a benevolent, global free agent. I use the term “global” here in 
reference to the previous chapter, which discussed the misunderstanding amongst ICC members 
in regard to globalization and internationalism. The League, in the ICC’s estimation, transcended 
the bounds of government control. The League, according to the ICC, had the ability to 
overcome selfish nation-state tendencies and deliver the globe into a universe of protracted 
tranquility. Hence, the ICC rejected the British, French and American plans for the export credit 
system, which involved those governments more directly. 
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Export credit systems were not only to be monitored by a committee of experts appointed 
by the League, but violations of the credit export system were to be handled by a group of 
“impartial experts” appointed by the international institution as well. The ICC and the League 
itself, however, failed to acknowledge that both institutions were dominated by British, U.S. 
(though not a member of the League) and French interests. “The League itself was an entirely 
Victorian institution, based on the notional superiority of the great powers, an instrument for a 
global civilizing mission through the use of international law and simultaneously a means of 
undergirding British imperial world leadership.”148 The League, like the ICC, was a vestige of 
European imperialism, seeking to uphold the pre Great War European imperial order. 
The Finance Group, which met on 28 June 1921, addressed numerous issues related to 
the facilitation of global trade including double taxation. Participants argued that double taxation, 
or the levying of a tax by two or more jurisdictions on the same declared income, “places a 
heavy burden on international trade.”149 To alleviate the problem of double taxation, the Finance 
Group recommended pressuring governments to treat “all taxpayers, both citizens and 
foreigners” without prejudice in regard to what they called a “super tax.”150 Treating the 
corporation as an individual, a common practice in U.S. legal circles during the fin-de-siècle, the 
committee asked for “companies and partnerships” to be treated “in the same manner as to 
individuals” in regard to the super tax. 
The committee further addressed the issues of Export Credits, Foreign Exchange, the 
Treatment of Foreign Banks and Bills of Exchange, calling for the use of private enterprise and 
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little to no government regulation. In regard to foreign exchange, for example, the committee 
recommended “the creation of national and international organizations for export credits be 
actively undertaken by private enterprise with the support of Governments.” They argued that 
“the greatest possible liberty be granted in all commercial and financial transactions,” a position 
that foreshadowed the International Monetary Fund’s core philosophy by some thirty years.151 
The committee also called for “industrial and commercial liberty.” Government should refrain 
from “participation in industry and commerce,” since government intervention “renders trade 
conditions uncertain and artificial.”152 The committee, echoing the overriding theme of the 1921 
conference, recommended that “Government control of industry and commerce be discouraged 
and private enterprise encouraged in all lines of industry and commerce.” 
The amelioration of these issues, as stated previously, was considered the solution for 
eliminating future conflicts on the scale of the Great War. Prior to WWI, European 
commentators argued that “the commercial and financial linkages between countries” were “now 
so extensive that no rational country should contemplate starting a war.”153 ICC President 
Etienne Clèmentel captured this sentiment during the first ICC meeting in London in 1921. The 
ICC, Clèmentel urged, would create “mutual fellowship between nations and individuals, in the 
birth of a truly international spirit, and in the creation of one controlling purpose which aims at 
the bettering of a common lot of mankind.”154 
The “common lot of mankind,” however, was a selective reference. The ICC proceedings 
suggest that ICC members viewed the world in a social Darwinist lens, distinguishing the 
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“civilized” world from the “uncivilized” world. Western Europe, especially Britain and France, 
and the U.S. constituted the enlightened globe. Thus, government intervention by the Allied 
powers in the economies of uncivilized nation-states was a valid practice. Below, we look at the 
League Mandate System, which will provide evidence of the aforementioned assertion. 
3.1 The League of Nations, the ICC and the Mandate System 
The English Review, a British magazine, held an essay contest during the first half of 
1918. A £100 prize was to be given to the author of “the best short study of the idea of a League 
of Nations.”155 The winning author, H. N. Brailsford, who had written a book critical of 
European imperialism and balance of power politics just four years prior, determined that 
“economic cooperation” was central to peace and hence the formation of a league of nations. He 
viewed the war itself as a prelude to economic international integration. “The rationing among 
the Allies of essential food supplies and raw materials implies a community of interest that is, 
even in war, a new fact in international life.”156 He argued that “commercial rivalry must 
diminish,” and that the Allied powers must realize, after the atrocity of war, that the rationing of 
materiel is central to peace and economic exchange. 
Brailsford’s essay shows the visceral effects of the war upon the general population. Like 
Clèmentel a year later, Brailsford envisioned wartime cooperation as equivalent to peace time 
economic cooperation. Brailsford, and later Clèmentel with his IAS plan (see chapter one), 
envisioned the war as the wake-up call that would convince nation-states to surrender a portion 
of their sovereignty, in this case control over their own natural resources, for the sake of 
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maintaining global peace. Brailsford argued: “The purely national era in history has been 
transcended.” 
The ICC believed, like Brailsford, that the “national era in history” had been 
“transcended.” ICC spokesmen naively assumed a level of superiority and near infallibility in the 
League. M. Reibel, for example, representing France at the 1920 ICC Organizational Meeting, 
saw the ICC as a “useful” catalyst, “once the world again finds its [economic] equilibrium,” for 
the League. The ICC, Reibel confidently asserted, “will powerfully help to introduce into the 
sphere of reality the fundamental idea of the League of Nations.”157 
The ICC was to assist the League’s mission of globalization in an era that was, in their 
view, in the process of transcending nationalism. Countries who wished to join the ICC would 
first have to be viewed as “eligible” by the League.158 The League, British ICC representative 
Arthur Shirley Benn argued, would “facilitate the restoration of confidence” for “all 
countries.”159 Frenchman Eugene Schneider, discussed above, waxed romantically at the ICC’s 
Organizational Meeting: “We private men, we individuals, we workers whose task it is to create 
and exchange for the profit of mankind the riches that are the fruit of the toil of our brains or 
hands have in us the spirit of the League of Nations and happen what may, it is sure not to 
die.”160 
The ICC indeed captured the “spirit” of the League. However, the spirit was one of 
nationalistic imperialism, not globalism. Efforts to help “mankind” and to assist “all countries” 
regain their “confidence” fell upon deaf ears in the League Mandate System. The ICC never 
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directly discussed the mandate system, which was a fundamental aspect of the maintenance of 
the pre-war imperial political economic international order. The ICC continued its free trade 
mantra while Britain and France consolidated imperial control over the Middle East, 
manipulating its resources and political and economic systems. 
On 28 March 1921, the King of the Hedjaz, Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, sent a 
telegram to Geneva (headquarters of the League of Nations) accusing the Great War victors of 
duplicity. An agreement was made between European authorities for Arab rule to cease in the 
region of Aintab-Orfa. The Sharif claimed: The “direct agreement to abandon Aintab-Orfa which 
is absolutely contrary to Mandates makes Allies saying very far from facts and forces Arab to 
mistrust Allies’ declarations and especially those of Great Britain because of the unsatisfactory 
results which will come out and which injures our mutual interests and Allies.’” As will be 
discussed below, the League mandate system and French and British economic interests usurped 
notions of self-determination and the maintenance of a free market in the Middle East. 
The British army occupied the whole of Palestine, Syria and present-day Iraq shortly after 
the Great War. The fading Ottoman Empire, the ruler of the aforementioned provinces, could no 
longer hold on to its Middle Eastern regions. The Ottoman Empire was officially defunct by 
1923 with the much smaller state of Turkey as its only descendent. This left the Levant, present-
day Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman and Iraq, temporarily free for self-determination. However, it 
was the determination of Britain and France that these provinces were simply not yet “able to 
stand alone” for sovereign rule. Therefore, under the official League of Nations mandate system, 
Britain established mandates in Palestine (including present-day Jordan), present-day Iraq, 
Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar while France established mandates in Syria and 
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Lebanon by 1920. The mandates for the former Ottoman Empire were established according to 
the League Covenant, Article twenty-two, Paragraph four: 
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have 
reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as 
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.161 
  
The ICC proceedings do not include a direct discussion of, and thus agreement or 
disagreement with, the League Mandate system. We can, however, detect approval of the League 
mandate system in the ICC’s discussions regarding civilization. By understanding how the ICC 
perceived civilization, we see that the ICC viewed free trade as applying only to those nation-
states and peoples whom it deemed “civilized.” Free trade was reserved for those countries 
deemed economically, politically and culturally capable and urbane. In chapter one, we saw 
references to the term “civilization” during the 1920 Organizational Meeting. References to the 
“civilized world” by the ICC continued throughout the 1920s. 
Hobson, mentioned previously, made civilizational distinctions quite clear during his 
speech to the General Meeting on 27 June 1921. Referring to the Organizational Meeting and its 
participants the year prior, Hobson stated that “In founding this International Chamber they did 
not build for any exclusion of other nations, they built rather with a view ultimately to include all 
civilized nations within its scope as a truly international institution.”162 Those nation-states 
wishing to join the ICC had to also be members of the League. 
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At the time of the 1921 conference, Argentina, Bulgaria, Spain, Haiti, Japan and a host of 
other nations were in negations to join the ICC. Therefore, distinctions by the ICC regarding 
civilization were not solely racial. Distinctions, rather, revolved around the perception of the 
greatness of the institutions of the Allied powers. “There are three great systems of law in the 
world,” Hobson continued, “Roman Law, the Code Napoleon, and British common law, which is 
the common heritage not only of ourselves but of our cousins across the Atlantic.”163 These legal 
systems, European in origin, were viewed by the ICC as the most viable and successful systems 
of law and thus applicable on a global scale for use in commercial interactions. Other nation-
states would have to adopt these standards in order to participate in the free trade system. 
Viewed through the biased lens of the perceived superiority of European international 
jurisprudence, then, the British and French mandates in the Middle East were justifiable and thus 
not worthy of debate for the members of the ICC. Let us now look at French Syria and British 
Iraq as examples of not only the mandate system, but also as continuing vestiges of Allied 
imperialism. 
Britain and France had political, social and economic interests in Syria well prior to the 
war. The French funded the construction of the Societe Ottomane du Fer Damas-Hama et 
Prolongements railway in Syria, which opened in 1895. Moreover, “Christians under French 
patronage resided” along Syria’s Mediterranean littoral. Indeed, the French remained concerned 
for the duration of the war that the British would invade Syria, adding it to the already enormous 
British Empire.164 Syria was to act as a French base (and later “military air route”) and conduit 
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for its southeast Asian empire while strengthening its “position as a Mediterranean power and a 
world power.”165 
French and British concerns over the Middle East resulted in the secret Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, which was hammered out by British Conservative and diplomatic advisor Sir Mark 
Sykes and French diplomat Francois Georges Picot in May 1916. The agreement created spheres 
of influence for the British and French empires following the likely demise of the Ottoman 
Empire after the war. An Arab state was to be created “under the suzerainty of an Arab chief” 
who turned out to be Hussein bin Ali, quoted above, although he was not informed of the 
agreement since this would have likely ended “his alliance with Great Britain.”166 The new, vast 
state (covering the territory “from Aleppo to Rawandaz and from the Egyptian-Ottoman border 
to Kuwait”) was to also be carved into “spheres of influence” for each of the Western European 
empires so that both Britain and France would have “‘priority of right of enterprise and local 
loans.’”167 The secret agreement was publicly disclosed by the nascent Soviet Union in 
November 1917, just three weeks after the Balfour Declaration that promised the Zionist 
Movement its own nation-state in Palestine. The Arab Revolt began as a response to both 
agreements in September 1918. By 1919, the British were seeking to “undo the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement,” as they were increasingly concerned with French ambitions in Syria.168 
The British and French worked to alleviate the turmoil created by the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement and Balfour Declaration. They issued a joint declaration on 7 November 1918, 
agreeing to the “definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks,” as well as 
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the encouragement of the creation “of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and 
Mesopotamia.” Moreover, they worked to further allay fears during the Versailles Peace 
Conference with the creation of the League mandate system. Both Britain and France sought to 
have the U.S. oversee a mandate in Palestine. However, because Wilson was unable to garner 
support for the League of Nations with Congress, let alone get Congress to agree to U.S. 
involvement in the mandate system, Britain and France were left to their own devices in deciding 
to allocate Middle Eastern territory to one another under the mandate system (Italy had 
withdrawn from the conference as it faced its own political problems by the early 1920s). 
Picot, in his only appearance before the ICC, presented a speech during the 
Organizational Meeting on 28 June 1920. In his speech, he spoke of France’s war sacrifice and 
the necessity of the Allies, as well as Germany, to share the burden of the costs of war.169 
Interestingly, the man who had covertly assisted in the creation of the Sykes-Picot just four years 
prior, pointed out that “We [the French] are aware that the critical state of the exchange, natural 
as it is in a country where all the productive forces have been concentrated for more than four 
years in the creation of products destroyed by the war as soon as produced, cannot be adjusted by 
artificial means. It originates a disturbance in the economic balance. It is this balance that must 
be reestablished…through labor and production.”170 
Picot failed to mention the mandate system, although the mandate system was, 
realistically, an “artificial” contrivance of the League that permitted the near monopolization of 
Syrian and Iraqi exports (this will be laid out more clearly below). How could the French and 
British call for a natural restoration of the balance of economic exchange whilst establishing and 
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stubbornly clinging to new de facto colonies in the Middle East? As mentioned earlier, European 
jurisprudence on the international stage was considered orthodoxy. Middle Eastern nation-states 
were simply “not ready” for a level of governance on par with Anglo-Saxon political and 
economic administration. Moreover, the imperial model of administration was for centuries 
ingrained in the minds of British, French and U.S. officials and, therefore, ICC and League 
participants. The Great War only rattled the cage of the imperial model. It did not destroy it.    
The official League Council created written stipulations for the administration of the 
mandates. The official mandate for “Syria and the Lebanon” consisted of twenty articles, 
enforced through Article twenty-two, Paragraph four of the League Covenant, mentioned above. 
The preamble of the mandate claimed that France was “charged with the duty of rendering 
administrative advice and assistance to the population.” Part of this mission, as stipulated in 
Article I, was to create “an organic law” for Syria, based upon the “rights, interests, and wishes 
of all the population inhabiting the said territory.”171 No specific timetable for the expiration of 
the mandate was provided. Instead, France was to “facilitate the progressive development of 
Syria and the Lebanon as independent states.”172 
The mandates were viewed rhetorically by Britain and France, and for that matter the 
League, as sincere attempts by the Great War victors to “assist” Middle Eastern “administrations 
freely chosen by the populations themselves.”173 In reality, David Lloyd George and Georges 
Clemenceau viewed Wilson’s idea of polling public opinion for consent regarding the mandate 
system in the Middle East as “totally unacceptable.” Though they “played along” with Wilson’s 
idea, Lloyd George and Clemenceau “spared no effort to bring about” the “quick demise” of the 
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mandate system.174 Not only did they view the Arab populous as incapable of self-government, 
but they also understood the economic benefit of the mandate system, as will be discussed 
below. 
Mark Mazower depicts the mandate system as part of “a worldwide ‘awakening of race 
consciousness.’” He argues that the British Empire, for example, was concerned about “threats 
such as Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islam.”175 Many white, European and American 
commentators likely shared Sir Mark Sykes opinion of Arabs, or, for that matter, non-whites 
more generally, as being “cowardly, vicious, rapacious, greedy animals.”176 However, 
Mazower’s depiction of the European fear of “pan-Arabism” is short-sighted. As David Fromkin 
points out, prominent British leaders such as Lord Kitchner viewed the Arabs as easily 
manipulated if the British could simply control the caliphate. Their greatest fear regarding the 
Arabs was “a Moslem Holy War” should another power such as the Bolsheviks get control of the 
caliphate.177 Thus, the British administration felt that Pan-Arabism was potentially controllable. 
There is little doubt of the veracity of racism toward non-Europeans by the early 
twentieth century. And certainly, the Europeans felt that the Arabs were “not yet ready” for self-
government due to their “inferior” racial status. Therefore, Mazower’s points regarding race are 
well taken. However, the French and British desire for a mandate system itself involved much 
more than race. Economic interests, as well as a fear of Bolshevism, and the desire to control and 
manipulate Middle Eastern markets played a fundamental role as well. France’s intentions were 
abundantly clear when they agreed to permit Emir Faisal, the third son of Hussein, to rule over 
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Syria under the French mandate. Political scientists Efraim and Inari Karsh lucidly spell out the 
mandate terms: 
Syria would become a de facto [sic] French mandate: France would 
recognize and uphold the independence and territorial integrity of Syria, 
within borders to be determined by the peace conference, in return for 
which France would gain economic, political, and diplomatic preeminence 
in the country including control over its foreign policy and the exclusive 
right to provide the advisers, instructors, and technical personnel required 
for the running of the state’s civilian and military affairs.178 
  
Syria was, from the French perspective, to be annexed and administered like a colony.179 
Though Syria and Lebanon (included under the French Syrian mandate) were not rich in 
natural resources, France still benefitted economically and politically from its mandate over the 
territories. Under the mandate, Syria became a major supplier for French consumable goods, 
namely wool, olive oil, silk, silk textiles and various agricultural products. Wool, olive oil and 
silk, among other materials, appeared on the 1921 ICC list of “raw materials” that the ICC 
argued should not receive an “export tax,” since such taxes hinder “the rapid restoration of the 
world’s commerce” and “are obstacles to peace and the progress of civilization.”180 The ICC 
made clear that “colonies” under British control (including “the Indian Empire”) “are entitled to 
representation in the International Chamber of Commerce,” and therefore “the British Delegates 
place on record that they are not in a position to speak for the Colonies possessing the right of 
imposing taxes.”181 “The delegates of other Nations,” the ICC clarified, “make the same 
reservation.” The mandates, however, were not official colonies and were thus not mentioned. 
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Syria became an importer of French coal and manufactured goods under the French 
mandate.182 By the 1940s, Syria served as a major conduit for Iraqi oil flowing into France 
through the Mediterranean. Politically, France sought to protect Catholics in Lebanon as well as 
build schools in the name of political and religious proselytization. France bombed the center of 
Damascus in 1925 to put down a nationalist rebellion to French rule, even though the Mandatory 
[France] was only permitted to station its troops in Syria for Syria’s “defence [sic].”183 This “was 
hardly an advertisement for the standard of civilization” nor a billboard for free market 
capitalism.184 
The British relationship with Iraq was similar to the French relationship with Syria in 
terms of maintaining order in the name of British economic vitality. The 1920 Iraqi nationalist 
revolt was put down by British bombardment with Winston Churchill urging that ‘“mustard 
gas”’ should be used against ‘“uncivilized tribes” ‘in India and Mesopotamia.’”185 The British 
assembled the Iraqi nation in 1921 “according to great power (mainly British) strategic 
calculations rather than with a view to creating a coherent, functional, self-sustaining state.”186 
Britain placed Hashemite Amir Faisal, who had a few years prior lobbied the French for a 
kingship of Syria, upon the Iraqi throne even though Iraq’s official mandate stipulated that 
“Iraqis alone shall be entrusted [with] government appointments.”187 In July 1921, the British 
manipulated a supposed Iraqi national referendum in which Faisal received an unheard of ninety-
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six percent vote of approval.188 Ironically, a man who had never previously visited Iraq was 
placed upon the throne while, fittingly, a military band played Britain’s “God Save the King.”189 
Birkenhead, during his 1921 ICC conference speech referenced above, urged that “the 
present economic situation of the world” had nothing “to be gained by the ostracism from these 
discussions of any nation—any nation.” The “businessmen of the world,” Birkenhead argued, 
had “a certain special duty imposed” upon them to approach the global economic situation “with 
our minds unaffected by the prejudices and the passions of the last few years.”190 The prejudices 
to which Birkenhead referred were those that led to the Great War, specifically nationalism. 
He was unable to see, however, the prejudices of the Allied powers in regard to the 
peripheral players in the world economy. The mandates, which he did not mention, could not be 
willing economic participants on the global stage. His insistence upon not ostracizing any nation 
from ICC discussions was more likely in reference to Germany than non-European states, as the 
British were more concerned with reestablishing and reintroducing the German economy to 
world trade than the French, as we saw in the previous chapter. Iraq, however, was not part of the 
civilized political economic sphere. Birkenhead more accurately portrayed the goals and mental 
frameworks of the ICC, League and Allied powers in the heart of his speech, pointing out that 
the businessmen of the ICC had the opportunity to “speak on behalf of all the great countries in 
the world.”191 
Iraq was to pay half of the costs of the British mandate, granting a large amount of 
economic control over Iraq to Britain. Most important for the British, however, was the emerging 
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Iraqi oil industry. Britain moved to keep the oil-rich Mosul region, heavily populated by ethnic 
Kurds seeking an autonomous state, as part of Iraq. Despite domestic pressures in Britain to 
withdraw forces from Iraq, the discovery of more proven oil reserves in 1925 convinced British 
authorities to continue the mandate. Britain did not allow for Iraqi League membership or 
independence until 1932 and, even then, not until the Iraqi government agreed to oil concessions 
favorable to the Turkish Petroleum Company, a British MNC, and access to military bases in 
Iraq.192 We will delve into MNCs and oil interests in the next chapter. 
The Allied core’s economic global imperial mentality dominated the political economy of 
the 1920s. As we have seen in this and the previous chapter, the precepts of the ICC were built 
upon the Allied powers’ illusions of globalization and free trade as well as Western European 
conceptions of civilization. Discussions concerning taxation, bills of exchange, export credits 
and the Ter Meulen scheme were in reference to exchanges between the core Allied powers and 
the perceived civilized world. Nation-states on the periphery were not included in the free trade 
discourse. The free exchange of goods, prescribed by ICC leaders as a panacea for global peace, 
rang hollow through the course of the political and military actions of Britain and France, as 
shown in the example of the League Mandate System. 
The creation of the ICC and the League of Nations revolved around the empowerment of 
the core Allied powers vis-à-vis the “other.” ICC leaders believed the world was transforming 
into an era of globalization, in which nationalist desires would be usurped by the logic of free 
trade. Western ideals of free trade, however, applied to interactions between “civilized” nation-
states, while others, deemed unfit were not viewed as part of the free trading, white, civilized 
international sphere. The peripheral, uncivilized sphere was to be trained in the Allied discourse 
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of political economy to prepare it for entrance into the civilized global economy. These 
aforementioned themes remained for the duration of the 1920s. Now, we transition to a 
discussion of the gold standard, the Allied core’s hallmark of economic civilization and fiduciary 
exchange, and the penetration of American multinational corporations into Latin America. 
4 CHAPTER THREE: THE BANKERS 
The ICC held its second biennial meeting in Rome, Italy in March of 1923. Participants 
lavished praise upon not only historic Rome, but also upon Italy’s nascent dictator, Benito 
Mussolini. Mussolini entered the Fine Arts Building, where the conference was being held, 
“flanked by a platoon of Blackshirts.” ICC President Etienne Clèmentel applauded Mussolini 
and his government, stating: “No man could devote himself more wholly, with all the ardour 
[sic] of an enthusiastic and a generous heart, to the restoration of his country.” Clèmentel was 
proud of “the progress made each day” in Italy under the tutelage of El Duce.193 Clèmentel, 
calling himself “a brother Latin,” labeled Italy “as one of the great forces of the present,” and 
“one of the great reserves of the future.”194 
Praise for the dictatorial regime of Mussolini by the ICC seems out of place at first 
glance. Why would the ICC, a staunch advocate of free trade and economic liberalization, extol 
the virtues of a fascist state? The answer to this question lies in the interests of the ICC as 
enunciated during the 1923 and 1925 conferences held, respectively, in Rome and Brussels. Like 
Mussolini’s rigid political economic reorganization of Italy, the ICC looked to systematize 
commerce and labor on an international scale under the auspices, though not explicitly 
enunciated, of the Allied powers. 
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The aforementioned conferences focused upon global economic organization in the 
aftermath of the Great War. Whilst rhetorically demanding free trade and laissez faire on a global 
scale, the 1923 and 1925 proceedings indicate that ICC participants believed the standardization 
of exchange, through the reestablishment of the gold standard and empowerment of British, 
French and U.S. banking systems, and the control of labor and migration were keys to the 
reinvigoration of trade and thus global order. The penetration by Allied multinational 
corporations (MNC) into Latin America and the Middle East was also a part of the process of 
standardization. We will investigate the latter topics, labor and migration, in the next chapter. In 
this chapter, we focus upon the ICC’s ideas for the international systemization of business 
economic interaction and currency stabilization as well as government assistance to MNCs in 
their efforts to penetrate foreign markets as part of a global civilizing process. 
The 1923 ICC gathering consisted of three major conference groups: Transportation, 
Industry and Trade, and Finance. Each group, as in 1921, concerned itself with the strengthening 
and maintenance of international trade. By 1923, however, the ICC also moved toward the 
creation of a system of universal commerce. The Transportation Group met on Monday and 
Tuesday, 19 -20 March, 1923. The committee was chaired by British steel magnate Sir Arthur 
Balfour. Balfour was an exceedingly wealthy steel manufacturer from Sheffield, Yorkshire. 
During the 1923 ICC conference, he represented the Association of British Chambers of 
Commerce. He had been Chairman of Arthur Balfour & Co Ltd., which he bequeathed to his son, 
Robert, who was also in attendance, representing the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce. 
The Transportation Committee addressed numerous issues, including flag discrimination, 
air transportation, railway transportation and a host of other topics that were considered crucial 
for global commerce and trade standardization, during the Plenary Session held on Tuesday, 20 
90 
March. Representatives from the U.S., Italy and France gave their opinions on the ICC stance 
regarding flag discrimination (the favorable treatment of ships from particular countries), and 
freedom of the seas during the morning session. The ICC resolution declared “opposition to all 
flag discrimination by the nations,” and recommended “that any attempt to restrict the carriage of 
goods or passengers between different countries on vessels sailing under the flag of any nation 
should be strongly opposed.”195 It was proposed that a committee would be convened that could 
“from time to time, crystallize and express the rules” that express the ICC flag discrimination 
policy. 
U.S. ICC representative H. B. Smith, the commercial attaché to Warsaw, reinforced the 
Wilsonian call for “freedom of the seas.” Smith claimed, “As the sea is the great barrier between 
the nations of the world, so the fundamental question of international commerce is the freedom 
of the seas, and a resolution that declares unequivocally against restriction in the carriage of 
goods and passengers by sea expresses judgment upon what is the very foundation of 
international trade relationships.”196 Smith, however, had to temper his support of the ICC flag 
discrimination resolution by pointing out that the U.S. policy toward immigration was “in a state 
of flux,” as Congress was on the precipice of passing the most restrictive immigration legislation 
in its history (the 1924 Immigration Act). We will return to the topic of the transnational 
movement of peoples in the next chapter. 
The U.S. Merchant Marine Act, passed in 1920, would seem to have further tempered 
Smith’s enthusiasm for unfettered trade across the seas. This legislation “authorized the sale of 
government-owned vessels to private shipping companies at bargain prices.”197 The Act created 
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a shipping board of seven commissioners with broad powers. In a 1921 article from the 
American Foreign Trade Relations Series, the author conveys the rising economic nationalism of 
the U.S., arguing that “Men of the greatest ability, the widest experience, the most unyielding 
firmness and the most intense Americanism, men moved by the spirit and purpose of the act, 
must be put on this board.”198 In essence, the author argued, the U.S. government could subsidize 
and insure overseas shipping carried out by American citizens. 
Nationalist policies like the U.S. Merchant Marine Act, the types of regulation the ICC 
hoped to transcend, highlight a key conundrum for the ICC. The ICC was an international 
advisory and lobbyist organization, not a governmental institution capable of creating legislation 
and enforcing the law. Furthermore, the representatives of the U.S., Britain and France, 
representing the globe’s strongest nation-states, were not apt to criticize the policies of their 
fellow core members. Recall, as well, that ICC leaders did not actually live in the globalized 
world they imagined. Rather, theirs was an imperial, international world, dominated by the 
Allied powers following the war. Therefore, even nationalist policies like the Merchant Marine 
Act were not necessarily a hindrance to global trade, since such policies were administered by 
the core powers. 
British ICC representative Sir Alan Anderson, Vice-President for the Chamber of 
Shipping for the United Kingdom and Director of the Bank of England, seconded the flag 
discrimination resolution, but pointed out the issue of port taxation and its hindrance to trade. 
“Freedom of the seas,” Anderson argued, “depends absolutely on freedom of the ports. It is an 
absurdity,” Anderson continued, “to call the ocean free if the ports are not free.” As was 
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common parlance for ICC members, Anderson then linked trade with peace, stating that “the 
intercourse of nations” via trade creates “guarantees for the peace of the world.”199 
Anderson’s presence at the assembly, as well as his concerns, was a reflection of his long 
standing business pedigree as well as a microcosm of the Allied international plutocracy that 
linked business, government and banking. Anderson’s father was a shipping magnate during the 
late nineteenth century and creator of the Orient Steam Navigation Company. Anderson joined 
his father’s company in 1897. By 1911, Anderson engaged the British railway industry, and 
became director of the Midland Railway Company. During the war, he served the British 
government as a liaison between Britain and the U.S. for food distribution. After the war, he 
entered the world of finance, serving on the board of the Bank of England (a position he would 
hold until 1946), and serving as its Deputy Governor under Bank President Montague Norman 
from 1925-1926. He became Acting President of the ICC in 1927. 
Leaders like Anderson, who had strong political, business and banking ties, dominated 
the ICC in its early years. These ties, as we will see later in this chapter with our discussion of 
multinational corporations, permitted the ICC to look the other way as American MNCs and 
banking organizations penetrated foreign markets with the assistance of their respective 
governments. Let us return to our discussion of the ICC’s international standardization efforts. 
The Industry and Trade Group met on Monday 19 March, 1923. The gathering was 
chaired by Frenchman M. Paul Roger, who was also the president of the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce. The committee focused upon a fundamental aspect of the ICC: influencing and 
lobbying governments, especially in regard to tariffs, in efforts to facilitate world trade. M. J. 
Marcotty of Belgium argued “we are here for the purpose of making suggestions to 
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governments.” Marcotty made the statement in rebuttal to Roger, who had claimed “that the 
Congress should not enter into questions of subsidies, which were entirely a matter for 
governments and not a commercial question.”200 Marcotty argued that ICC recommendations “be 
published promptly” and also presented to “an international organization,” namely the League of 
Nations. Marcotty was suggesting that more powerful organizations such as the League should 
lobby the international economic endeavors of states. Furthermore, his insistence on not 
questioning government subsidies reflected the general ambivalence of the ICC in regard to the 
government’s role in manipulating trade, especially when government interference ameliorated 
the station of Western European and U.S. industries and core international commercial 
domination. 
The committee, continuing the discussion for the systematization of trade, then addressed 
a set of “15 questions and resolutions,” which were to be presented to the Congress on Customs 
and Regulations to be sponsored by the League of Nations in Brussels in October of 1923. They 
called for the “publication in each country of a general index and explanatory notes in 
connection with customs tariffs.” Ideally, this would lay bare the tariffs of each state and 
perhaps, through international pressure, compel states to lower or eliminate duties. The group 
dealt with the remaining issues during their afternoon session. By far the most contentious issues 
revolved around production and labor. We will return to the topics of labor and production in the 
next chapter. 
4.1 Brussels 1925 
The Third Congress of the ICC, which met in Brussels in 1925, was under the tutelage of 
its new president, Willis H. Booth. It continued the trend of the 1923 conference, focusing upon 
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the establishment of universal commerce rules. Furthermore, the congress looked into emerging 
technologies in air and land travel. The three major committees consisted of the Finance Group, 
the Industry and Trade Group, and the Transportation Group. Overall, the meeting focused upon 
“a general attack upon trade barriers.”201 Reports created the year prior and presented before the 
conference emphasized “that the erection of customs barriers invariably leads to reprisals, 
thereby causing the rapid spread of protection” in the form of tariffs and customs regulations.202 
The Finance Group, chaired by Alberto Pirelli of Italy, and son of Giovanni Pirelli, 
founder of the international tire producer Pirelli & Co., focused upon laws governing 
international cheques, double taxation, tax evasion, and international credits. Addressing the 
issue of international cheques, the committee sought to universalize the understanding of and use 
of the cheque. Ideally, then, the “cheque itself” would become “a medium of payment which 
replaces cash.”203 Thus, the committee had to deal with the actual interpretation of the term 
“cheque” amongst ICC member countries. Two resolutions were proposed, calling for a “Cheque 
Committee” to begin the process of universalizing cheques with the hope that this would also 
unify “the different national laws.” The second resolution proposed “the unification of laws 
governing Bills of Exchange,” which would be pursued with the creation of an international 
conference. This latter resolution, the committee agreed, would need “the assistance of the 
League of Nations.”204 
The topic of “international cheques” became a heated topic. Mr. W. Westerman, 
chairman of the Rotterdam Bank of the Netherlands, proposed the use of “an international 
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cheque, which could be universally understood.”205 There was a limited global understanding of 
monetary units of exchange, especially between the Anglo-Saxon cheque model and the “Latin” 
model (“Latin” here refers to Latin America; he also referred to Eastern European states as the 
“continentals”). Ideally, Westerman argued, the League of Nations would assist in universalizing 
international cheques. This was ideal since the national committees in attendance represented 
“the interests of bankers, industrials and traders in their respective countries.”206 
The British banker and financier Sir Felix Schuster disagreed with Westerman. Seeking a 
“universal cheque” was a futile endeavor in Schuster’s mind. Representing the British 
delegation, Schuster argued “it was no use going for a thing which could not possibly be 
attained.” In British legislation, Schuster argued, “a so-called ‘international cheque’ could not be 
distinguished” from bills of exchange. Instead, as we will see later in this chapter, Allied bankers 
focused upon altering the economic systems of Latin American countries to more accurately 
mimic Western banking and fiduciary systems.207 
The Industry and Trade Group met Tuesday 23 June 1925. The committee concerned 
itself with international postal packages, customs discrimination and the granting of licenses, 
industrial property and bankruptcy. It continued the trend and goal of the conference to not only 
diminish trade barriers, but also facilitate trade through the universalization of commercial 
techniques and rules. The topic that garnered the most discussion was that of “industrial 
property.” 
The 1925 congress, overall, worked to create a spirit of internationalization, within the 
constraints of their imagined globalization, in business and market transactions while respecting 
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the sovereignty of the Allied states. For example, they discussed in detail “industrial property,” 
namely the protection of intellectual property. The Chairman of the Industrial Property 
Committee, M. Albert Capitaine of Belgium, argued that industrial property included “the 
protection of trademarks, patents, and models, and protection against unfair competition.”208 The 
committee recommended the creation of a “comprehensive library” of patents that could provide 
“information concerning patents in every country.” International patent rules would include 
“eighteen months” of protection from foreign incorporation of the particular idea. 
The committee put into ICC law that “any person desiring to take advantage of the 
priority of a previous application for a patent or utility model must make a declaration giving 
particulars as to the date of such application and the country in which it was made.” The ICC 
also moved to influence nation-state law in regard to patents, calling for an allowance for 
“foreigners” to be permitted patent rights. “Nationals are not allowed to enjoy rights refused to 
foreigners, and in particular are not permitted to antedate their rights under a patent to a date 
prior to that of the original deposit.”209 Hence, the ICC was attempting to facilitate global 
commerce by instilling trust in the international system. 
We gauge from these efforts an attempt to bridge nation-state gaps on the international 
political economic stage. The ICC was part of a post-war (imperial) internationalization effort, 
along with the League, that placed the necessity of global trade above domestic, individual 
nation-state economic sovereignty. ICC members were convinced that international law was on 
the verge of influencing and perhaps usurping national law: “International customs are gradually 
being formed which are beginning to influence the laws of various states.”210 Moreover, still 
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shocked by the war even as late as 1925, the ICC felt, as did the League, that the liberalization of 
trade would harbor global peace. Charles S. Haight, a Manhattan admiralty lawyer representing 
the U.S., captured this sentiment, stating: 
Foreign offices and diplomats are essential, but the merchants and the bankers and 
the carriers who are engaged in the world’s commerce, if organized, can become 
far more useful. And if the International Chamber [of Commerce] can succeed, 
even in part, in organizing the world’s commercial interests, so that they really 
work together for the common benefit [sic], we shall have done more towards the 
establishment of peace than has ever been accomplished by any peace conference, 
since the world began.211 
 
Many problems existed that would hinder such grandiose expectations. The ICC itself 
was an interstitial institution, stuck between the more powerful League of Nations, with a 
stronger international influence and, arguably, the even more powerful anarchy of independent 
nation-states with their own domestic economic agendas. For example, Haight’s own country, 
the U.S., maintained high tariffs and political intransigence in regard to European affairs 
throughout the decade. Furthermore, as indicated in previous chapters, Anglo-Saxonist, social 
Darwinism remained rooted in both the League and the ICC, which was further exacerbated by 
the close relationship between the U.S. and Britain as opposed to other nation-states involved in 
each international organization. The standardization of trade was to serve the interests of the 
Allied powers, though the homogenization of trade relations was imagined by ICC members as a 
global, universally beneficial effort. 
M. Roberto Pozzi of Italy, in a speech to the Industry and Trade Group, captured the 
sentiment of internationalism and the conflicts inherent in negotiating the ground between 
nation-state sovereignty and international law. In discussing the role of the exequatur in relation 
to international affairs, Pozzi pointed out the “delicate” character inherent in international law: 
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Pessimists might imagine that international law is merely a universal striving 
towards an ideal of international justice, but that in the present state of various 
legislations, this ideal has no practical or real value. This universal wish to 
establish an efficient legal procedure by which penalties might be enforced 
irrespective of national barriers, is at the very basis of the science of law. Law 
alone can make it really possible to develop international relations by basing them 
on the mutual protection of legitimate interests which is one of, if not the only, 
means of ensuring peace. The International Chamber of Commerce considers it its 
duty, in the interest of business men in general, to endeavor to conciliate the 
principle of justice with that of national sovereignty.212 
  
Pozzi pointed out, in other words, the domino effect of international institutions such as 
the ICC. Once one or two states adopt procedures for international trade, other states feel 
compelled to adopt similar rules and procedures in order to participate in the global commercial 
arena. Commerce, Pozzi argued, can be standardized via international law under the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, an organization supposedly independent of nation-state rule. Additionally, Pozzi 
referred to the “science” of law. This is an important distinction. The ICC, created in the midst of 
the Progressive Era’s broader emphasis upon the perfection of humanity through scientific 
objectivity, believed that its rules were objective, absent of bias. We will analyze the ICC within 
the Progressive Era framework further in chapter four. 
Pozzi, unsurprisingly, would serve as one of the first members of the Standing 
Committee of the ICC Court of Arbitration. Pozzi suggested that international laws, conceived 
by non-governmental organizations such as the ICC, were influencing nation-state laws rather 
than the other way around. Pozzi also suggested, then, that MNCs, following the Great War, 
were losing the nationalist tinge that contemporary business historians argue remained for the 
duration of the decade. Indeed, MNCs were losing their nationalist tinge. Nation-states, however, 
were not. We will return to nationalism and the MNC later in this chapter. 
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The Transport Group was chaired by Sir Albert Balfour and convened on Monday 22 
June 1925. The committee addressed sea, highway, railway and air transportation. Like the other 
committees, the Transport Group agreed that “the main thing was to obtain uniform regulation” 
for shipping merchandise.213 A key point of contention arose regarding the York-Antwerp Rules, 
which were shipping regulations that had been in place since the 1890s, but amended over the 
course of the twentieth century. The ICC looked to alter the rules by making clear “that 
governments carrying on trade in their own ships must realize that they are exposed to the same 
risks as private individuals.” The U.S. refused to ratify this addendum since it may have 
conflicted with the U.S. “Harter Act,” which was U.S. legislation protecting U.S. citizens during 
the goods shipment process. 
The members of the 1925 Transportation working group also discussed the “new 
transportation medium” of highway travel in relation to international trade. Roy D. Chapin of the 
U.S. presented a long speech on the topic of highway systems, their replacement of railway 
systems, and their economic importance. His speech acknowledged the growing significance of 
automobile travel while placing it in an international context: 
A distinct social change has come over the American people. Their vision is no 
longer circumscribed by their immediate surroundings. So it will be everywhere 
as the motor vehicle comes into general use. A free flow of people within their 
own country is one of the best promoters of a truly national spirit. Similarly, an 
easy movement of people across international borders breaks down 
misunderstanding between countries. This national or international flow has a 
great economic influence since it increases trade and lessens the friction which 
often occurs where people do not know each other. I am safe in saying that with a 
wider use of motor travel by the peoples of the world and the friendly contacts 
that come about thereby, there are few things that can better promote international 
peace.214 
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The excerpt above from Chapin’s speech is a glimpse into the emerging realities of the 
1920s regarding travel and modernization. Americans were able to more easily traverse borders, 
both intrastate and interstate, on their own accord. The demand for better roads and highways, 
Chapin argued, provided “a real opportunity in the study of this new expenditure for bankers, 
economists, public officials and others to help direct the spending of these sums to secure the 
greatest possible good to the people.”215 A taxation system for cars had not yet emerged. Chapin 
urged that the ICC work with nation-states to create such a system. Furthermore, he pointed out 
the problem of accidents created by this new technology. “These accidents,” Chapin argued, 
“present an economic problem because, outside of our humanitarian interest, each human life has 
a distinct value which all countries must heed.”216 And, finally, Chapin reflected the ICC motto 
of “world peace through world trade,” arguing that travel by vehicle would not only increase 
revenues for businessmen, but would also facilitate global peace. 
Chapin founded the Hudson Motor Car Company in 1909 (with a capital infusion from 
Joseph Hudson of Detroit) along with Howard E. Coffin and served as president of the National 
Automobile Chamber of Commerce. The relationship of Chapin to the government was a 
microcosm of business-government relations during the 1920s: demands by big business for 
laissez faire policies, yet calling upon or relying upon government to help industries establish not 
only their foundation, as we will see in this chapter and the next, but also profit maximization. 
Many ICC delegates such as Chapin, as we witnessed in the previous chapter, operated in 
a revolving door system, serving on and off again as corporate leaders and government officials. 
Chapin was a major advocate of government subsidized road construction for the duration of the 
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decade. The U.S. passed its first federal highway act in 1921, providing government funding for 
the construction of roads across the country. Chapin met frequently with U.S. President Calvin 
Coolidge and later served as Herbert Hoover’s Secretary of Commerce. Standardization and the 
facilitation of emerging profitable industries, then, also relied upon governmental assistance. 
Government-business relationships were neither at odds nor connected at the hip. Rather, they 
were symbiotic. 
The 1920s government-business symbiotic nexus contradicts the arguments of eminent 
business historians Geoffrey Jones and Mira Wilkins who argue that MNCs became more 
“nationalistic” following the Great War. “Capitalism and business enterprises,” Jones states, 
“acquired and retained sharper national identities” during the 1920s.217 Jones and Wilkins imply 
the empowerment of government over business, which did indeed occur during the First World 
War. The ICC proceedings, however, show that MNCs did not display “sharp national 
identities.” The ICC was the rhetorical catalyst of the movement to avoid the interlocking of 
government and business, especially in the aftermath of government nationalization of industry 
in Britain, France and the U.S. during the war. Nationalism was, at best, secondary to profit 
maximization. Granted, MNCs did rely upon government for market infiltration, as we will see 
in the last portion of this chapter. Once business operations were consolidated domestically or 
internationally, however, government became more of a nuisance than a partner. Businesses, 
economically, and governments, both economically and politically, benefitted from their 
cooperative association. 
The ICC, following the war, viewed government, in regard to trade, as an international 
policing power of last resort. Preferably, the Court of Arbitration, founded by the ICC in 1923, 
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would deal with trade disputes. The purpose of the court was to settle “in the quickest and 
cheapest way possible, disputes which arise between traders in different countries.”218 Ideally, 
the organization would uphold “the universal axioms of morality” and “jurisprudence” in 
everyday business transactions, upholding the sanctity of contracts to make “commercial 
intercourse between nations easier and more certain.”219 Clèmentel believed the Court was part 
of “the quickening of a truly international conscience” upon the globe “in this great body 
corporate that the world is becoming.”220 
The Congress formed in 1921 to discuss rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration 
recommended that arbitrators should be chosen and cases should be decided upon “without 
distinction of nationality.” Moreover, “the procedure in legal arbitration should be uniform in all 
countries.”221 Acting as an independent arbitrator, the ICC was to find the “best means for 
repressing unfair competition.”222 In other words, businessmen rather than governments were to 
act as arbitrators in trade disputes. 
It is important to consider as well the sheer number of independent industrialists who 
attended ICC meetings from 1920 to 1925. The organizational meeting of 1920 was attended by 
thirty-three industrialists (the term “industrialist” refers to men who directly owned or 
represented their company as opposed to other delegates who represented local chambers of 
commerce, academia, or various trade associations). The 1921, 1923 and 1925 conferences each 
averaged 102 industrialists from the U.S., Britain and France alone. These corporate leaders 
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sought international representation and protection for their industries. They did not attend in 
order to show some affiliation or patriotic allegiance to their particular nation-state. 
It is important to point out, however, that the Court of Arbitration was a vestige of Allied 
control. Although ICC sessions throughout the 1920s included representatives from non-Allied 
states including Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, “Indochina” (sent representative in 1923, although 
Southeast Asia remained under French colonial control), Japan, Mexico, Persia, Peru and Siam, 
Western Europe and the U.S. remained firmly entrenched in leadership positions. During the 
1923 session in Rome, for instance, the chairmen of the various committees hailed 
predominantly from the U.S., Britain and France. Roberto Pozzi of the Italian delegation made 
the notion of Western cultural superiority clear in stating: “The cause of arbitration had made 
great progress in countries with Anglo-Saxon legislation.”223 The arbitration process was to be 
based upon the legislative traditions of the “great American organizations” and Western 
European law.224 Industrialists, bankers and other ICC participants advocated independence from 
governmental interference. The rules, however, were to be governed by traditional Western 
jurisprudence. 
ICC members spoke of a new post-war internationalism that was permeating the global 
political economy. Clèmentel, the out-going president of the ICC during its 1923 Rome congress, 
argued that the creation of the ICC Court of Arbitration was reflective of “the quickening of a 
truly international conscience.” The ICC participants were imagining globalization and 
international unity. The world, according to Clèmentel, was becoming one, through “the creation 
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of common thoughts and common purposes.” The ICC Court of Arbitration created “the means 
to avoid all that may create division” by creating “unity.”225 
The world remained divided amongst European and American imperial powers for the 
duration of the 1920s. Britain continued its imperial ownership of India, Burma and large swaths 
of Africa. France, Belgium and Italy remained firmly entrenched in Africa as well. Furthermore, 
with the end of the First World War, the former Ottoman Empire, especially Iraq and the Levant, 
remained under British and French Mandates as discussed in the previous chapter. The U.S. 
continued to rule the Philippines, while Latin America remained on the political economic global 
periphery, dominated by the economic whims of the U.S. government and American 
corporations. 
Air travel was another critical emerging technology of the 1920s. Two years prior to 
Charles Lindberg’s famous trans-Atlantic solo flight, the ICC discussed “international 
legislation” regarding air travel and the transportation of goods by aircraft during its 1925 
conference. M. Pierre Etienne Flandin, who would later become Prime Minister of France (1934-
1935), presented a resolution calling for the standardization of international laws regarding “air 
mail transport,” and “civil air law.” Air mail transport was a key focus of the resolution since it 
“would be one of the most powerful stimulants to international trade.”226 “The Air Postal 
Service,” Flandin urged, “must be truly international” in character. The Frenchman called for an 
international “political campaign,” led by the ICC, to convince “states” to provide financial 
support for air companies. “Various states might combine,” Flandin stated, “to finance 
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international companies which could form and work the lines from one end to the other.” 
Governments should financially support “big air routes…in common.”227 
The airmail discussion shows how the ICC viewed the role of government in regard to 
industry. Since its inception, the ICC called for “free trade,” absent of government regulations 
such as tariffs. Yet, we see the organization calling for government subsidization of the 
burgeoning industry in the name of MNC profit maximization. Once again, government should 
interfere when it is advantageous to the business world, in this case, to assist in the development 
of a new industry. Six other speakers followed Flandin, discussing the topic of air mail transport. 
None raised an objection to government subsidization. 
Flandin argued that “Under present conditions, it is impossible to advocate the 
development of air transport unless air companies receive financial support from their respective 
states.”228 States, the committee argued, should fund their own lines. Once again, this highlighted 
a common thread to international business in the 1920s: if a so-called private industry could not 
stand on its own fiduciary feet, it had to be subsidized by the government until it could stand 
alone. Thus, although organizations such as the ICC called for “free trade,” they did not shy 
away from government intervention when they viewed it as advantageous to profit-making and a 
broader international reach. 
The committee, in regard to “private air transport,” raised the issue of insurance for 
international transportation by airship. They called for “international legislation,” which would 
avoid the “serious danger of conflicting judgments in the civil courts” of independent states.229 
The legislation was to help determine “the responsibility of the air carrier” regarding both 
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passengers and goods. Indeed, this was in the name of international “free trade” and profit. 
However, it would require government assistance, compliance and culpability as well. Thus, 
British representative A. L. Silverwood Cope, in his speech before the committee, discussed the 
“desirability of greater governmental co-operation with a view to encouraging the full 
development of an international air-mail service, whose benefits to trade would be 
incalculable.”230 
We see, in essence, a government-business nexus that was viewed with chagrin in ICC 
rhetoric, yet readily accepted when it helped Allied companies infiltrate Latin America and the 
Middle East. Even the fascist Mussolini regime, mentioned at the outset of this chapter, was 
acceptable since it “disciplined labor” and stabilized the Italian currency. In discussing issues in 
international commerce that concerned ICC delegates in 1923 and 1925, they remained steadfast 
in their commitment to internationalization and belief of globalization, yet deemed it necessary 
for government to act as a control in regard to patents, air mail, and trade insurance. The ICC 
leadership itself remained firmly in the grasp of the war victors as well, as many members 
participated in a revolving door of experiences in industry, government and finance. 
4.2 Bankers 
Banks played a fundamental role in the standardization of trade as the British, French and 
Americans sought to place central bankers back “in control of the international trade and 
payments system.”231 U.S. banking interests had been freed up with the passage of the Edge Act 
in 1919. An amendment to the 1913 Federal Reserve Act, the Edge Act permitted private U.S. 
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banks to “form syndicates to finance American trade abroad.”232 The flow of private U.S. capital 
into Europe following the Great War was even higher than the flow of private U.S. capital 
immediately following WWII.233 
U.S. investments in Latin America surpassed Britain’s by the 1920s. Investors and 
prominent U.S. businessmen such as ICC participant Willis H. Booth had recognized after the 
war the potential for U.S. investments abroad. In a 1919 essay entitled Foreign Trade and the 
Interior Bank, Booth argued that “the time has come for the interior bank [private U.S. banks] to 
realize that its business is the same as all others--that the biggest thing it has to sell is service 
[sic], and that at the present moment one of its greatest opportunities for service is to aid in the 
development of American foreign trade.”234 This would allow for the “American manufacturer 
and merchant” to “cultivate the foreign field,” and, with “a constant flow of overseas trade,” U.S. 
industries “can run full time all the time.”235 
International banking remained high on the list of topics for discussion during the first 
three ICC sessions. On average, thirty-four bankers attended each of the ICC meetings in 1921, 
1923 and 1925. Major firms and government banking institutions were represented including 
American Express, Mutual Life Insurance Company, Booth’s Guaranty Trust Company, 
National City Bank, the Bank of England, Banque de France and numerous others from various 
nation-states. 
The U.S., Britain and France, as well as the ICC and the League of Nations, relied 
heavily upon international bankers, so-called international “money doctors” in the 1920s, to 
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improve the economic systems of the Allied powers as well as peripheral states in Latin 
America. The interim year of 1924, for example, prior to the ICC conference held in Brussels in 
June 1925, proved crucial for reinvigorating international trade. Remaining high on the list of 
issues hindering world trade was the foreign debt owed by Western European nations to the U.S. 
as well as the debt still owed by Germany to its Great War enemies. Increasingly, by 1924, the 
U.S. relied upon private bankers and investors to loan money to Latin America and Europe. J.P. 
Morgan, Jr. worked closely with Montagu Norman, head of the Bank of England, to restore 
Western Europe’s economy.236 Moreover, the Bank of England held increasing sway over the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations. The U.S., focused more upon its commercial 
interests in Latin America, sought to avoid official political entanglements with Western Europe 
while allowing the Western Europeans to concern themselves with bailing out Eastern Europe.237 
Private bankers, with the encouragement of the U.S. government, were asked to help fix the 
Allied economies. 
The most crucial private banking initiative fell to Charles G. Dawes, a wealthy American 
banker and ICC delegate who would later serve the U.S. as Vice President under Calvin 
Coolidge (1925-1929). Early in 1924, representatives from the U.S. (private citizens only) met 
with European representatives to find a way “to stabilize Germany’s economy and reintegrate it 
into Western European capitalism.”238 Dawes was joined by Owen D. Young, also a prominent 
ICC member and an American industrialist who had founded the Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) as a subsidiary of General Electric in 1919, Edwin Kemmerer, who had helped rebuild 
nation-state economies in central Europe and South America, and American banker Henry M. 
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Robinson. The U.S. government, then, was working in a subsidiary, advisement role with private 
banking industries (Coolidge had actually chosen the bankers to create the plan) to bolster the 
global economy. As Akira Iriye argues, this was “an early example of U.S. corporatism” on a 
global scale.239 
The Dawes Plan, funded by an injection of two hundred million dollars from the Morgan 
Bank, created a new, independent Reichsbank as well as a new currency system for the failing 
German economy. Moreover, it set up a new reparation payment schedule at a lower rate. 
Finally, the plan also set up a foreign financial advisor, the “Agent General,” to oversee 
“Germany’s budgetary process.” The U.S. funds “purchase[d] German industry’s cooperation 
with the Weimar regime, thus enabling new coalitions to form governments without socialist 
participation.”240 The Dawes Plan was, then, a bulwark against socialism despite its corporatist 
origins. The Agent General was a non-governmental associate of the Morgan Bank. By the end 
of 1924, “Germany had beaten back hyperinflation and began to grow.”241 
The ICC resoundingly accepted the Dawes Plan. “We regard the adoption of the Dawes 
Plan as the most constructive development during the period under review,” claimed an official 
organization brochure from June 1925.242 In the ICC’s estimation, the international systemization 
of trade could not be accomplished with German debt and, hence, French debt, hanging over the 
head of the international system of commerce. The Dawes Plan relied upon a group of private 
American bankers, through the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, to loan money to Germany 
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that would then be used to not only stimulate the German economy, but also be used by France 
to repay inter-ally debts to the U.S. 
Private bankers, in the aftermath of the Great War, were the revered, chosen healers of 
the global economy. For example, during the ICC Organizational Meeting in 1920, Parisian 
Chamber of Commerce president M. George Pascalis praised U.S. banker Thomas W. Lamont, a 
prominent J.P. Morgan partner since 1911, as an “apostle” for his work in assisting France with 
its post-war debt and banking reorganization shortly after the war. 
Nation-states also threw their trust behind bankers. The U.S. government, for example, 
formed a close bond with banking MNCs to facilitate their incursion into Latin America and the 
Middle East. Lamont, who was a U.S. representative at the ICC formative meeting in 1920, was 
an important cog, for example, in U.S. dollar diplomacy in Mexico a few years prior to his 
attendance at the ICC Organizational Meeting. Lamont’s international banking experience began 
when Woodrow Wilson decided to use dollar diplomacy in Mexico to “bring [Mexican 
president] Carranza to heel and quash Mexico’s revolutionary nationalism.” The State 
Department contacted J.P. Morgan to assemble an “international banking consortium” to loan 
money to the heavily indebted Mexican government. In return, the banks would supervise 
customs revenue as well as a new central Mexican bank. Moreover, they would “secure property 
guarantees for foreign enterprises in Mexico.”243 
Wilson, seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party just five years prior as the 
Governor of New Jersey, lambasted the Republican Party and U.S. banking trust during a speech 
to an audience of New York bankers including Pierpont Morgan, arguing that “banking was 
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founded on a moral basis and not on a financial basis.”244 Regardless, Thomas Lamont, who had 
been with J.P. Morgan and Company and held in high esteem by the Morgan family since 1910, 
was now placed in charge of the consortium that would seek to control Mexico’s economic well-
being and reorient its economy to favor U.S. capital endeavors.245 U.S. banking MNCs, with 
encouragement from the U.S. government, would continue the trend of altering and supervising 
economic and banking systems across Latin America for the remainder of the 1920s. 
French representative M. Georges Pascalis acknowledged the high regard given to 
bankers during the 1920 Organizational Meeting. “There are among your [U.S.] delegates many 
representatives of banks,” Pascalis stated. “We may congratulate ourselves on this from every 
point of view. The union of banking and commerce is as useful, necessary and indispensable as 
that of science and industry.”246 Pascalis’ decision to laud U.S. bankers was likely born of the 
numerous loans granted by U.S. banks to France and other European countries both during and 
after the war. U.S. international banking firms, by war’s end, became the world’s creditor. With 
the U.S. government reluctant to bind itself politically to European economic restoration, 
American bankers were trusted to lead the way. 
The banking community was also characterized, like the ICC and League of Nations, by 
an air of social Darwinism and notions of Anglo-Saxon superiority. Edwin Kemmerer, another 
prominent “money doctor” who received his PhD at the age of twenty-eight from Cornell 
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University and who by 1912 was an economics professor at Princeton University, specialized in 
international finance and a dedication to the gold standard. He was assigned by the U.S. 
government in 1903 to put the recently acquired Philippines on the gold standard and in 1911 to 
help organize the Federal Reserve System. This was the beginning of a long relationship between 
the U.S. government and Kemmerer that would eventually see Kemmerer become the U.S. 
government’s “money doctor” of the post WWI era in Latin America and Central Europe. 
Kemmerer’s mission to the Philippines provides an illustrative example of Allied 
political economic thought that reverberated through the practices of the ICC and the League. 
Kemmerer published an article in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science in July of 1907 that made his political economic philosophy abundantly clear. Kemmerer 
viewed his mission in the Philippines as needing to develop a culture of “thrift” amongst the 
Filipino people. “No one acquainted with the Filipino people need be told that they are deficient 
in frugality and thrift,” Kemmerer wrote. This deficiency may have been due, in Kemmerer’s 
estimation, to their “Malay stock which is proverbial throughout the Orient for thriftlessness 
[sic].”247 It would be no quick or easy task, according to Kemmerer, to “transform” the Filipino 
“into a frugal and thrifty Anglo-Saxon.”248 
Kemmerer was also, as were many of his contemporaries, a strong proponent of the gold 
standard. He, along with other “money doctors” such as Jeremiah Jenks, sought to “create a gold 
dollar bloc, centered in New York,” to not only eviscerate the demised silver standard of non-
Western states, but also to supplant Britain as the caldron of fiduciary international prestige.249  
The U.S. sought to replace Western European powers in Latin America by taking on Latin 
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American debts and realigning their banking and fiduciary systems of exchange to mimic the 
U.S. system. U.S. economists and Allied political leaders alike viewed the U.S. as a benevolent 
imperial power whose encroachments would ameliorate rather than exacerbate the economic 
systems of Western Hemispheric states. 
Kemmerer, for the duration of the 1920s, worked closely with Benjamin Strong, the 
chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve and prominent ICC member, to restructure financial 
systems in Central Europe, especially Poland, and numerous nation-states in South America. 
Kemmerer, then, was an intermediary for the economic redevelopment of the international 
economy under the tutelage of the Allied powers. The businessmen of the ICC, whose 
understandings of political economy revolved around notions of Allied racial and political 
supremacy, leaned heavily upon the gold standard as a panacea for inflation and a systemization 
of international exchange, as we will see below. 
Charles A. Conant, a journalist and avowed imperialist, believed that the U.S. had 
“reached a point where the nation’s economic development and abundant capital limited the 
profitability of new investments” as early as the 1890s.250 Falling in line with the prevailing 
heuristic of international political economy of the day, Conant argued that “the fundamental 
character of foreign trade is an exchange of commodities” based upon adherence to a gold 
standard.251 He worked to integrate new U.S. imperial possessions, namely the Philippines, into 
the realm of U.S. dollar diplomacy. Ideally, his “capital investment imperialism” would work to 
buttress rising U.S. domestic wages “without diminishing the rates of return.” Investing in other 
regions, however, required that Western European nation-states and the U.S. alchemize the 
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“monetary, banking, and tax systems that facilitated foreign exchange” in non-Western, typically 
non-gold standard, countries.252 The beliefs of bankers and imperialists such as Lamont, 
Kemmerer and Conant were foundational to the economic approaches and ideologies of the 
League and the ICC. 
U.S. financiers worked to restyle the economic systems of direct U.S. imperial assets in 
Latin America for the duration of the 1920s. This rather abrasive, dictatorial financial approach 
would not wane until the early 1930s and was in fact perpetuated by international organizations 
such as the ICC and League of Nations as well as MNCs, especially those emanating from the 
U.S. Men such as Kemmerer and Conant exemplified the imperial, social Darwinist ideologies of 
businessmen and bankers who looked to reorder the political economy of the globe through the 
ICC. We will analyze American MNC penetration of Latin America and the ICC’s role shortly. 
First, let us finish the discussion of ICC and Allied efforts of international standardization with a 
discussion of the gold standard. 
4.3 The Gold Standard 
The first ICC Committee on Foreign Exchange met in June 1921. The committee was 
convinced that a key hindrance to world trade was “the depreciation of exchange,” the “wide 
fluctuation in exchange,” and the “general lack of confidence in, and knowledge of,” this 
depreciation and fluctuation.253 Inflation of currency, as made plain in the ICC proceedings, was 
an evil international spirit haunting the world of finance and commerce. Of course, this should 
not be surprising considering that the ICC membership consisted, in essence, of the globe’s 
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creditors. The report of the Exchange Committee, prepared by M. Roger Picard, a Parisian 
college professor, displayed the most compelling solution to the specter of inflation: the gold 
standard. 
The Foreign Exchange Committee of the ICC report argued that “the only way to 
improve present conditions is to increase production, to put an end to inflation of currency and to 
remove all restrictions on free exchange of commodities.”254 The War, the report concluded, had 
upset “the equilibrium of the exchanges.” Most countries were, the ICC report argued, 
experiencing “depreciation” in exchange values of their currencies mostly due to the uncertainty 
of the convertibility of bank notes to gold. Since 1914, the report pointed out, “the issuing of 
notes by the state or by banks has steadily increased.”255 In other words, inflation was the main 
culprit hindering the flow of international trade. This inflation also brought “into play 
psychological factors, such as fear, distrust and disillusionment,” the report claimed.256 A return 
to the gold standard was seen by Allied political, economic and business leaders as not only 
necessary to revive the economies of individual states and to rehabilitate international trade, but 
also necessary in that the gold standard was the mark of an economically sound, scientifically 
advanced civilization. 
The report recommended deflation and limited government interference as prescriptions 
for enhancing international trade: 
It is essential to reduce the paper currency and, above all things, not to increase it 
further. Deflation should be carefully proceeded with so as to avoid too sharp a 
fall in the prices and a sudden decrease of fiscal revenue; but this deflation is 
essential, in order to restore a sounder proportion between the circulation and the 
metallic reserves of the banks, which will mark the end of the abnormal crisis of 
the exchanges. And the sooner the several governments, the chief borrowers from 
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the banks, contrive to reduce their requirements, the sooner it will be effected 
[sic].257 
 
The gold standard undergirded the economic thinking of businessmen, government 
officials, merchants and bankers alike well prior to and following the Great War. It consisted of 
what Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin label as the “gold standard mentality (GSM).”258 The 
GSM had a quite long ingrained derivation. The international use of a gold standard was a 
British invention that began with Sir Isaac Newton’s decision, as master of the mint, to 
standardize English currency and use gold as a base for the measure of the British pound’s value 
at the dawn of the eighteenth century. Britain, however, “was virtually alone as a gold 
monometallic country” until the late nineteenth century.259 Countries such as Germany and, later, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the U.S., adopted the gold standard, following the lead of 
Britain as the world’s strongest empire. The majority of industrialized countries were on the gold 
standard by 1879. The gold standard “served to reinforce Victorian virtues of economy and 
prudence in public policy.”260 
The gold standard functioned as “a decentralized, multipolar system,” whose well-being 
did not stem from “stabilizing intervention by one dominant power.”261 The gold standard 
actually revolved around trans-Atlantic “credibility and cooperation” with Britain, France, 
Germany, and later, especially after the war, the U.S., as the main officiators.262 The GSM had 
taken such a strong hold by the fin de siècle that even “schoolchildren learned the gold standard 
rates of exchange between the pound and the mark, the franc and the dollar and other 
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currencies.”263 The banks of major gold standard countries stood ready to “let gold go when it 
was needed.” The “Bank of France stood ready to lend gold to the Bank of England or to 
purchase sterling bills when the British gold parity was endangered.” Similar relationships 
existed between Russia, Germany, the U.S. and smaller western GSM countries such as Belgium, 
Norway and Sweden.264 Indeed, the gold standard, for the world’s major bankers, merchants, 
investors and political elite, held a cultural value as it “was revered with an almost religious 
fervor.”265 By the 1910s, the GSM had become “the social manifestation of a natural order.”266 
The central component for the standardization of the global economic system was, in the 
opinion of the Allied powers and the ICC, a rebirth of the gold standard system of exchange. The 
ICC Rome Finance Group Session took place on Wednesday 21 March 1923, chaired by U.S. 
representative Willis H. Booth. The representatives of numerous countries in the Finance Group 
discussed the financial situation of their particular nation-state. Austrian representative Dr. Eric 
Pistor, director of the Vienna Chamber of Commerce, for example, discussed Austria’s currency 
struggles and natural resource shortages. However, the group’s top concern by far was the 
reestablishment of global trade, which hinged upon a rejuvenation of the gold standard. 
The Finance Group turned its attention toward international currency stabilization and 
systemization in order to bolster world commerce. The business leaders of the ICC, as well as 
political leaders from the Allied states, for the most part, remained steadfast to the reincarnation 
of the pre-war gold standard. Not only was it the system with which they were most familiar, but 
it was also the system in which they placed the most faith. The GSM, emanating especially from 
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Wall Street and the Bank of London, was seen as “the most respectable and soundest” method 
for maintaining global financial interaction and economic balance.267 
British ICC representative Stanley Machin, the former president of the London Chamber 
of Commerce, initiated discussion on the restoration of international trade during the 1923 ICC 
Rome conference. First, he acknowledged the interconnectedness of the globe, stating: “In 
commerce as in other things, each nation is largely dependent upon another for its 
development.”268 Britain was experiencing this “dependency” first hand by 1920 as its exports 
were thirty percent less than in 1913.269 With the growth of import substitution industrialization 
in Canada, India and other regions along with increasing tariffs from the U.S. and the growth of 
manufacturing industries in Japan, Britain’s export industry was hit especially hard. In fact, prior 
to the war, Britain’s “manufacturing as a whole depended on overseas sales for forty five percent 
of its markets.”270 The businessmen of the ICC, however, were convinced they could reverse this 
economic trend. Essentially, they turned their backs to the organic process and impact of 
globalization, favoring instead a return to the pre-war, Allied controlled political economic order. 
Machin stressed a return to the gold standard as a critical initiation point for getting the 
British and, in their estimation, the world economy, back on track. “We, in England—quite 
possibly other countries—would prefer to see the gold basis returned to,” Machin stated.271 “We 
know there are many nations absolutely dependent upon help,” Machin continued. “Other 
nations are in a possibility to help, and I strongly believe that these nations will help provided 
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that confidence is re-instated.” The “confidence” to be “re-instated” revolved around a 
reissuance of the gold standard. By returning to gold, Machin reasoned, “nations” could “place 
their own houses in order,” and “stop further inflation, balance their budgets and show that we 
[Britain] can give them credit without undue risk.”272 
Inflation continued to escalate in Germany and Austria following the war. In 1914, the 
German gold mark was valued at four point two to the dollar. When the war came to an end in 
November 1918, the gold mark had inflated to fourteen to the dollar. By the summer of 1922, the 
ratio was four hundred and ninety three to the dollar and by January of 1923 it was nearly 
eighteen hundred to the dollar.273 The Austrian crown, by the summer of 1922 registered a ratio 
of eighty three thousand six hundred to the dollar. The contagion of inflation had spread to other 
parts of the former Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, as Bulgaria, Greece and Poland also 
suffered rampant inflation. Even France, hoping yet failing to reinvigorate its economy by 
occupying the German Ruhr Valley in 1923 to enforce reparation payments, suffered inflation of 
the franc (forty to the dollar in 1923) until finally stabilizing at twenty five and a half to the 
dollar by 1926.274 Rising prices led to major riots in Germany and Austria in 1921. The issue of 
inflation, and its hindrance to world trade, then, occupied the minds of ICC attendees in Rome in 
1923. The reestablishment of the gold standard, in the estimation of ICC participants, was the 
panacea for inflation and global stability. 
The gold standard, however, was the province of the Allied powers. An economy 
dedicated to the gold standard was deemed “civilized.” Thus, the gold standard was part of the 
Anglo-Saxon, social Darwinist mentality of superiority. Moreover, Allied exports found 
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difficulty in competing with non-gold standard producers such as Argentina, Brazil and China. 
Both the racial connotation of the gold standard and the fear of competing with non-gold 
standard countries were captured in a statement from Edward Majoribank, Winston Churchill’s 
uncle and member of the British House of Lords, during the late nineteenth century: “The yellow 
man using the white metal holds at his mercy the white man using the yellow metal.”275 
Attempts to join the gold standard by other countries prior to the war often proved 
disastrous. For example, after recovering from the economic depression of the 1870s, the 
Argentine government was able to increase its exports as well as domestic employment. Like 
other countries, both Western European and non-Western European (or, core and periphery), 
Argentina looked to gain financial credibility with the British Empire, namely with its 
international merchant banks. Indeed, Argentina’s economy began to flourish in the 1880s 
through an expansion of trade with Britain, which by 1889 provided forty one percent of 
Argentina’s imports (compared with twenty eight percent in 1880). Argentina’s commercial and 
investment image was predominantly enhanced by President Julio Roca’s decision to place the 
country on the gold standard. The gold standard worked “to satisfy foreign investors, who 
demanded gold earnings to preclude losses on exchange.”276 
Argentina abandoned the gold standard in 1885 after a brief recession. However, new 
provincial banks were created after the passage of legislation in 1887 that could only “issue 
paper currency in exchange for an equal sum of gold deposited with the National Bank of 
Buenos Aires.” The legislation sought to reduce the massive foreign debt the government and 
Argentine investors had accrued from the 1880s Argentine railway boom. However, the regional 
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banks borrowed gold from foreign creditors to maintain gold stockpiles and, by 1890, the 
regional banks accounted for some thirty five percent of Argentina’s foreign debt, which had 
increased from twenty three million gold pesos in 1885 to sixty million by 1890.277 Foreign 
investment plummeted by 1890, further decreasing gold supplies and reducing export earnings 
by twenty five percent. With unemployment, inflation and poverty soaring, the Revolución del 
Parque (Revolution of the Park) erupted. 
The issue of the gold exchange became a contentious debate during the 1923 ICC 
session. The tension may have been due to the volatile history of the gold standard. Professor and 
economist Gustave Cassel of the University of Stockholm, representing Sweden, issued a strong 
rebuttal to Machin’s speech, discussed above. Cassel pointed out the 1921 ICC meeting in which 
he argued that a return to the gold standard would not ameliorate the world economic depression. 
He reiterated his stance in 1923. “There is a prevalent belief that a return to the pre-war gold 
parity is necessary or desirable for its own sake. We [Sweden] are inclined to think that a return 
to the gold parity involves too heavy a strain upon production.”278 He argued that currency 
stabilization must revolve around domestic decision-making in individual countries. Countries 
must balance their own budgets, and maintain peaceful “political conditions.” Pinning currencies 
internationally to gold, Cassel argued, created deflation and impeded international trade. 
Cassel was part of the emerging school of economic thought that wished to eliminate the 
gold standard as a measure of fiscal vitality. John Maynard Keynes’s A Tract on Monetary 
Reform, published in late 1923, called for an end to the “barbarous relic” of the gold standard.279  
During his oration to the Finance committee, Cassel foretold similar ideas: “The popular idea 
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that a currency, in order to possess a definite value, must be covered by some fund of gold or 
securities, is a mistake.” Cassel argued that “the real value behind the currency is the mass of 
commodities and services that can be bought for a unit of it.”280 “Even under present 
circumstances,” Cassel continued, “the accumulation of a gold fund is no necessary condition for 
a stabilization.”281 
Keynes, however, did differ from Cassel in that Cassel sought to use the “old gold 
parities” [pre-war] to restore the value of currencies in 1923. At that point, then, states could 
generate paper notes based on that parity, but “should be able to create a stable currency” on 
their own accord.282 Moreover, nascent states such as Austria, Czechoslovakia and others in 
Eastern Europe could proceed with currency creation based upon the currencies of states that 
were on the gold standard prior to the war, such as the U.S. and Britain. Keynes, on the other 
hand, sought “no fixed link between sterling and gold at all.”283 Keynes argued that the value of 
gold itself fluctuated “in response to variations in demand and supply” and therefore was not a 
reliable basis for currency valuation. Keynes supported a paper monetary system, arguing that 
“Western governments were now mature enough to be trusted with the operation” of such a 
system.284 “Maturity,” however, was not the issue for the businessmen of the ICC. The issue at 
hand was one of power. Consider, for example, that the totality of gold available by the 1920s 
was enough to “fill a modest two-story town house,” the vast majority of which was held in 
British, American and French bank vaults.285 A gold standard system, dominated by the U.S., 
Britain and France, could be used to manipulate global currency exchanges. 
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“A long discussion ensued” (this phrase is actually stated in the proceedings at the outset 
of the ICC gold standard discussion) following Cassel’s oration. Giuseppe Bianchini, the 
Director of the Italian Banking Association, adamantly disagreed with Cassel on his assertion 
that countries created after the war need not stabilize their currencies to the gold parity. 
Bianchini argued that “there is a psychological aspect to this question” of gold parity. “The 
ambition of nations,” Bianchini argued, their hope, perhaps their illusion to bring back their 
currency to pre-war value is a great incitement to them to make the necessary efforts to balance 
their budgets.”286 Gold, in Bianchini’s estimation, and in the opinion of most ICC businessmen 
and banking representatives, was the basis for international economic peace of mind and 
stability. Gold was a long-held consolidated economic mentality of the Allied nation-states. 
British representative Walter Leaf of the London Banker’s Association echoed 
Bianchini’s words. Leaf agreed with Bianchini’s “psychological objection” on the matter of 
maintaining the gold standard to reinvigorate trade. However, Leaf took the argument one step 
further stating: “Professor Cassel’s speech reminds me of the words which were written over the 
door of Dante’s Inferno: ‘Cast hope aside, all ye who enter here.’”287 The opportunity for nascent 
countries to join the gold standard in order to balance their currencies, Leaf believed, would 
“inspire hope.” 
The “gold standard orthodoxy” remained “the dominant guide to government action” 
throughout the Interwar period. It is important to point out, however, that economic theory, 
following the Great War, was “in flux.”288 Prominent economists such as Irving Fisher and John 
Maynard Keynes wrote adamantly about the short-comings of the gold standard while other 
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well-known economists such as Friedrich von Hayek and Joseph Schumpeter “remained 
advocates of the full orthodox trio of gold standard supremacy, prewar exchange rates, and 
deflation.”289 Indeed, the arguments of the latter remained dominant amongst core governments 
and the ICC until the crash of the stock market in 1929 and the onset of the Great Depression for 
the duration of the 1930s. 
The ICC discussion of the GSM is illustrative on many levels. The ICC consisted, in the 
1920s, of a cohort of businessmen and bankers who were locked in the pre-war political 
economic mentality of imperialism, social Darwinism, and the sanctity of Western European 
jurisprudence. These were the schemas with which they were most familiar. Over the course of 
at least the previous seventy plus years, Europeans eviscerated traditional economies in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, turning them into “underdeveloped” economic systems.290 The use of 
a gold standard as a fiduciary technology further consolidated Allied economic domination. The 
gold standard became the economic as well as the linguistic medium for exchange among the 
international governments of “haves” and “have-nots.” It was both rhetoric and international 
political economic reality, enforced by the Allied business and political elites. Countries abiding 
by a gold standard created their own political, economic club that was able to dominate non-gold 
standard countries from Latin America to Africa and across the great expanse of Asia. 
The years 1925 and 1926 marked a thawing of relations with Germany and a reversion to 
the pre-war economic system. On 6 November 1925, Germany was officially admitted to the 
ICC. A year later (10 September 1926), it was admitted to the League of Nations as a “council 
member.” A series of five separate treaties were signed in Locarno, Switzerland by Germany, 
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Britain, France, Belgium and Italy. The treaties guaranteed Germany’s western borders, which 
had been a point of contention since the end of the war, especially with France’s occupation of 
the Ruhr valley. Moreover, the treaties stipulated that all five countries agreed to “resolve future 
international disputes peacefully.”291 
Economically, by 1926, “industrial production and real wages in most of the continental 
nations” had returned to prewar levels.292 Inflation and currency depreciation “came to an end 
with stabilization.”293 France, Belgium and Italy experienced a “rapid growth of exports” by 
1926. That same year, Britain and a host of other European states rejoined the gold standard. For 
the previous five years, European states, especially Britain and France, sought devaluation of 
their currencies in an effort to increase exports to the U.S.294 Moreover, “currency 
undervaluation could be exploited either by gaining a competitive edge through lower prices 
expressed in dollars or other foreign currencies, or by accepting the international price and taking 
the benefit in higher domestic prices and increased profits.”295 Political and economic 
stabilization in both Britain and France by 1926 increased business confidence and investment. 
Wages became a larger share of national income during the middle of the 1920s than they had 
been before the war. It appeared as though the return to the gold standard was a beneficial 
decision. However, “the profit and/or rent share of income was reduced.”296 The return to the 
gold standard would serve to exacerbate this trend for the remainder of the decade. 
Allied domination of the global political economy, we should indicate, was not part of 
some esoteric cabal or conspiracy. The industrialists, bankers and political leaders of the U.S., 
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Britain and France believed in the efficacy of their endeavors. We see in the ICC proceedings 
that these men believed that they lived in a globalized world that required standardization under 
the tutelage of the U.S., Britain, France and other Western European nation-states, which they 
believed were the most coherent, civilized and stable. This was their governing logic. Thus, 
codifying international trade under the auspices of traditionally “Anglo-Saxon legislation” or the 
convention of the gold standard required little contemplation; it was common sense. Criticisms 
of the gold standard, and critics of the gold standard such as Cassel or Keynes, went against the 
grain of generations of fiduciary policy and rationality. When ICC participants referred to 
“assisting the world,” their myopic world view permitted them to believe they were engaging the 
globe and assisting all nation-states. The spread of Allied MNCs played a fundamental role in the 
aforementioned engagement. 
4.4 Multinational Corporations 
Allied, mainly American, MNCs practiced foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than 
portfolio investment in Latin America and the Middle East. FDI is “‘investment abroad made for 
business purposes, with the investors intending to control or having the potential to control the 
foreign operations.’”297 In other words, an individual or company in one country invests money 
directly into a company in another country through either buying the company or expanding the 
operations of the original company into another country. This differs from portfolio investment, 
which involves a private investor who is not necessarily interested in or involved in the daily 
operations or management of the company. 
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It is also important to point out the general mentality of the business world prior to 
investigating particular FDIs. The First World War provided an opportunity for Allied nation-
state businessmen and government officials to collaborate in an effort to win the war. They 
considered this a “service,” which “became synonymous with the community effort of winning 
the war and continued as the single most important slogan of the business community in the 
postwar years down to the Great Depression.”298 American businessmen in particular exhibited a 
confidence in the “righteousness” of U.S. overseas investments and business ventures. Economic 
and political initiatives carried out by the U.S. or by companies emanating out of the US were 
automatically deemed as “civilizing” or “uplifting” and thus beneficial for all humanity.299 As we 
have seen, the ICC held similar views. We turn our attention to U.S. electricity and oil 
companies and their FDI in Latin America and the Middle East to see prescient examples of 
Allied social Darwinist imperialism, supported by the businessmen and bankers of the ICC. 
4.4.1 Oil  
Collaboration between oil companies and Allied governments was part of what historian 
Gregory Nowell labels the “world hydrocarbon cartel.” This cartel was a crucial pivot in the 
world transition from coal to oil as the main natural resource for operating the machines of the 
late second industrial revolution in the early twentieth century. Nowell contends that the cartel 
dictated policy to the state rather than the reciprocal. The cartel was part of what Nowell labels 
“transnational structuring,” which tells the story of the oil industry from a global perspective 
rather than a nation-state perspective. In France, for example, “it was not the state that controlled 
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the energy market, but the actors in the energy market that controlled the state.”300 The oil cartel 
was indifferent to the “core” or “periphery” status of world regions or to the realities of “strong 
state” and “weak state” geopolitics.301 
The ICC proceedings, however, show that Allied nation-states collaborated with major 
oil companies to penetrate potential oil markets. Hence, it was not necessarily the empowerment 
of one entity vis-à-vis the other. As stated earlier, the relationship between 1920s MNCs and 
Allied governments was symbiotic. Nation-state-petroleum company collaboration for the 
duration of the 1920s was due in large part to fears of a global oil shortage. “A fear of imminent 
depletion of oil resources—indeed, a virtual obsession—gripped the American oil industry and 
many in government at the end of the Great War” and well into the 1920s.302 The fear was made 
tangible during the war and then remained an emotional reality well into the 1920s with the 
expansion of the automobile industry. The number of registered vehicles in the U.S. increased 
from 1.8 to 9.2 million between 1914 and 1920.303 The 1920s witnessed a tripling of annual 
automobile production in the U.S. alone, from 1.5 to 4.8 million.304 The shortage fear, then, by 
default, linked government and oil MNCs as both held a compelling interest to infiltrate foreign 
markets; governments in the name of security and MNCs in the name of profit in a climate 
perceived to be fiercely competitive. 
The prominent ICC U.S. representative A.C. Bedford published an article in Foreign 
Affairs entitled “The World Oil Situation” in March 1923. Bedford discussed with chagrin the 
                                                 
300 Gregory P. Nowell, Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel, 1900-1939, Cornell Studies in Political 
Economy (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 2. 
301 Ibid, p. 1. 
302 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, Free Press trade pbk. ed. (New York: Free 
Press, 2008), p. 178. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty!. An American History Volume 2, from 1865 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), p. 
760. 
129 
nationalization of private oil industries by Mexico and the Soviet Union, the world’s second and 
third largest petroleum producers at the time, respectively. Bedford indicated the critical 
importance of oil, made plain during the Great War, to warn of the dangers of global oil 
depletion and competition between nation-states over scarce oil supplies. This competition, he 
warned, could lead to another war.305 
The key, Bedford argued, was to permit “the spirit of the pioneer, even the adventurer” to 
seek out oil reserves. The oil business, Bedford urged, should “not take on the character of a 
public utility.”306 “The [oil] industry has flourished,” Bedford maintained, “due to conditions of 
free competition.” Bedford argued that free competition, between oil companies rather than 
nation-states, must remain sacrosanct. Furthermore, the petroleum industry could be trusted 
because “the very nature of the industry precludes any artificial price-fixing effort.”307 
It is not surprising that Bedford would stand up for the oil industry. He began working for 
Standard Oil in 1882. By 1907, he was the director of Standard Oil of New Jersey (known today 
as Exxon), the president by 1916 and by 1917 he was chairman of the board of directors. His son 
also joined the leadership hierarchy of the organization in the early 1900s. Bedford was also 
heavily involved in the ICC, serving as a U.S. representative during the 1920 Organizational 
Meeting and 1921 London Conference. By the time of the 1923 ICC Rome Conference, Bedford 
was the president of the U.S. committee and an acting vice-president of the ICC. 
U.S. oil companies made substantial investments in South America as well as the Middle 
East with the assistance of the U.S. government. For example, in early 1925, the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company (known as British Petroleum today) sought to enter into a political agreement with 
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the Argentine government for oil drilling rights. Bedford’s Standard Oil of New Jersey, the 
largest U.S. oil producer, feared British monopolization of Argentine oil (the controlling interest 
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was owned by the British government). U.S. Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes intervened, telling the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires that “such 
action would ‘cause considerable prejudice to American interests [so] you may therefore render 
appropriate assistance to Mr. Heath, Manager of the Standard Oil Company’s subsidiary in 
Argentina, without of course taking part in negotiations.’”308 
The ICC’s stance regarding oil company and nation-state relations was made clear during 
the 1925 Brussels Conference. The ICC brochure “Progress in Economic Restoration,” 
specifically discusses government subsidization of the oil industry, using Britain as an example: 
Real subsidies to certain industries are disguised by government participation in 
certain undertakings in which it invests capital without claiming interest. The 
English petroleum industry benefits by support of this kind by government 
participation in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In spite of this protectionist 
tendency…England being a center of distribution for the whole world, the 
manufacturers who profit by this fact are specially [sic] anxious to be able to 
obtain supplies wherever they may find it most profitable to do so.309 
 
The aforementioned ICC brochure focused upon European economic restoration, thus 
there was no mention of U.S. government-petroleum company collaboration. The ICC, however, 
could have similarly characterized the U.S. as it had Britain, especially since the U.S. was the 
globe’s largest producer of oil at the time. Since both Britain and the U.S. were major “centers 
for distribution for the whole world,” as we see in the above quote, government assistance for the 
oil industry could be disregarded. Hence, although organizations such as the ICC called for a free 
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market, laissez faire approach to world trade, this stipulation was only appropriate when it was 
convenient to and in the interests of a particular Allied nation-state. 
The U.S. government was heavily involved in Latin American oil investments mostly 
because oil was such a strategic interest for the state as a whole. William L. Cooper, director of 
the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce with the Department of Commerce put it 
succinctly in 1930: ‘“the development of petroleum refining abroad is of intimate concern to 
American industry, since exports of petroleum products rank second in value among all United 
States exports.’”310 Although the companies were privately owned, this was of no consequence 
to the U.S. government. It felt compelled to intervene in the name of empire maintenance. By 
1929, Jersey Standard, a subsidiary of Standard Oil New Jersey, was the ultimate refiner in Latin 
America, surpassing Royal Dutch Shell, with refineries in Argentina, Peru, Colombia and 
Venezuela.311 
The U.S. government worked closely with oil companies for investments in the Middle 
East as well. In 1921, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover recommended “a syndicate of 
American companies be formed to operate in” the Middle East.312 The consortium of companies 
was put together by Jersey Standard president Walter Teagle. A wealthy oilman from Ohio, 
Teagle was a former associate of John D. Rockefeller. Teagle became the oil liaison for the U.S. 
government in securing what would come to be called the “Red Line Agreement,” discussed 
below. 
The Americans called for an “open door” in regard to oil exploration in Mesopotamia 
during the early to mid-1920s. Theoretically, this meant all countries would have equal access to 
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oil rights in the region. In practice, once U.S. companies, collaborating with the U.S. 
government, were able to gain a foothold, “the door swung shut.”313 Oil tycoon Calouste 
Gulbenkian, who participated in the Red Line Agreement negotiations, put it best, writing in his 
memoirs: “There could not be a more closed ‘Open Door’ policy than the one followed by all the 
oil groups to collar every possible concession from the Iraq Government in order to prevent other 
competitors to apply for the same.”314 
The 1925 ICC “Report of the Committee on Economic Restoration” addressed the topic 
of “Government and Business.” The committee agreed that governments should “encourage 
individual business initiative in contrast to uneconomic…public ownership and operation of 
industries.”315 “In its regulatory functions,” the report continued, “government should not 
interfere with freedom of individual action so long as there is no infringement of the rights of 
others.” Government, the report added, should only “touch the processes of production and 
distribution after cautious investigation, taking care to preserve that free flow of commerce 
which is necessary to world progress and prosperity.”316 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
however, the Middle East remained under League mandates. Thus, we can likely conclude that 
Allied business ventures in the Middle East, though not mentioned in the ICC proceedings, were 
tacitly approved. 
The aforementioned report, a reflection of the ICC’s stance on business-government 
relations, also elucidates the themes of this chapter. In terms of oil MNCs, the British, French 
and American governments were not, per say, “interfering with the freedom of the individual.” 
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Rather, the Allied governments were “encouraging individual business initiative.” Furthermore, 
because standardization of global trade, discussed above, applied only to the core players on the 
world stage, and since global oil supplies were “scarce,” government-oil MNC collaboration was 
logical. As we saw in chapter two’s discussion of the Mandate System, “the rights of others” 
were indeed infringed. The infringement, however, was subsidiary to the preservation of the 
“free flow of commerce” under the auspices of the Allied powers. The oil industry, collaborating 
with core governments, had, by default, and ironically, created a microcosm of Clèmentel’s 
original IAS (see chapter one). 
The July 1928 Red Line Agreement was signed by the partners of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company (known today as the Iraq National Petroleum Company). The partners were bound by 
a “self-denial clause,” which kept each of the partners from competing with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company. In other words, consortium partners could not outbid one another for oil 
rights within the former Ottoman Empire. It is said that Gulbenkian took a red pencil and drew a 
line around the northern border of Turkey through the Suez Canal and around the Arab peninsula 
along the eastern border of present-day Iraq (Kuwait was excluded as it was a British 
concession). In 1928, the Americans (Standard Oil operating under the name “Near East 
Development Company”), French and British (Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian, 
respectively) split the shares of the region into quarters (23.75%) with another five percent going 
to Gulbenkian. The cartel would act as a “faucet,” lowering or increasing oil supplies, 
increasingly in competition with Soviet and Venezuelan oil exports, to manipulate world oil 
prices.317 
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The year 1928 witnessed a spike in oil production on a global scale. Soviet, American, 
Venezuelan, and other oil suppliers flooded the market with increasingly cheap oil. Fearing the 
dilemma of overproduction and hence lower prices, the major global oil moguls met once again 
in August 1928 at Achnacarry resort in Scotland. Henri Deterding of Anglo-Persian met with 
Teagle, under a mandate from the British government, to make arrangements for Anglo-Persian 
and Standard Oil to not compete against one another on the global market. The meeting was ‘“to 
allay their [Standard Oil] jealousies and show that we [Anglo-Persian] are not out to quarrel.”‘318 
Moreover, this meeting was held just weeks after Anglo-Persian had made a similar agreement 
with Royal Dutch-Shell over oil concessions in Africa. The oil cartel, consisting of Jersey 
Standard, Anglo-Persian, Petrofina (French) and a few smaller companies, used the term “local 
arrangements” to determine how to “compete” with one another in what they termed “local 
markets.”319 Bedford’s assertion five years prior that oil companies could be trusted to not “fix 
prices” did not come to fruition. 
4.4.2 Electricity 
An article from The Economist dated 16 February 1929 heralded: “The American 
invasion of the public utility field in South America continues.”320 Indeed, “foreign investment in 
electric utilities comprised the largest single component of U.S. foreign direct investment in the 
last half of the 1920s.”321 As with oil, the U.S. government collaborated with utility corporations 
to assist in their infiltration of Latin America. State Department official Huntington Wilson 
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stated at the start of the decade: “Any student of modern diplomacy knows that in these days of 
competition, capital, trade, agriculture, labor and statecraft all go hand in hand if a country is to 
profit.”322 As Daniel Headrick and Pascal Griset point out, international utility companies “have 
almost always been hybrid creatures: private in appearance and by law, but intimately tied to 
their home governments.”323 
Government ties with utility companies, in a similar vein to the oil industry, were a 
product of the Great War. Allied governments created government institutions to fund the spread 
of electricity in their respective countries during the war in the name of national security. For 
example, the British government, through the British Ministry of Munitions, provided £3.15 
million for power stations and electricity transmission within the United Kingdom during WWI. 
The Ministry of Munitions even created a “Department of Electric Power Supply” in 1916 to 
coordinate “the role of electric power within the ministry,” as well as establish “priorities of 
supply” and encourage “munitions factories to electrify for more efficient fuel use.”324 
The U.S. government provided forty one million dollars to American utility companies 
through the War Finance Corporation. Following the war, governments were reluctant to severe 
their ties with utility companies since electricity was quickly becoming a geopolitical strategic 
military interest. The war “demonstrated the ‘necessity of organization and rational utilization’ 
of all resources.”325 
Electric MNCs were well represented at the 1923 and 1925 ICC conferences. L. A. 
Osborne, the president of the Westinghouse Electric International Company and Edward 
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Kilburn, the company’s vice-president, attended the Rome conference. The General Electric 
Company sent its U.S. representative from Paris, Edgar Carolan, to both conferences. Overall, 
the Brussels Conference had six delegates representing the electricity industry. None of these 
men, however, spoke during the conferences. Their burgeoning industry, however, was booming. 
FDI in public utilities during the latter half of the 1920s surpassed oil by some 319 
percent.326 Public utility investment, during the last half of the 1920s, made up almost 40 percent 
of the total increase in FDI during that time. The largest of the public utility investors was The 
American & Foreign Power Company (AFPC), a subsidiary of Electric Bond & Share, which 
was created by General Electric in 1905. By the end of the 1920s, AFPC “furnished 90 percent 
of Cuba’s electric power, 75 percent of Chile’s, 30 percent of Mexico’s, 15 percent of Brazil’s, 
and 13 percent of Argentina’s,” while also supplying power to parts of China and India as 
well.327 
The U.S. federal government, in a fashion similar to the government relationship with the 
oil industry, approached General Electric’s subsidiary Electric Bond & Share in an effort to 
merge business and government interests. The U.S. government encouraged Electric Bond & 
Share to purchase electrical properties in Panama in 1917 to gain a stronger foothold in the 
Panama Canal region. Not only would this assist with U.S. war aims, but it would also help the 
U.S. gain another market for electric machinery built in the U.S. Thus, the U.S. government was 
collaborating with business in the name of maintaining employment within the U.S. The U.S. 
government saw this as an opportunity “to maintain a better understanding between the United 
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States and the Latin-American republics.”328 Indeed, the Western Hemisphere was to remain a 
satellite of the U.S. empire within the government-business nexus. Following the war, the U.S. 
government contacted Electric Bond & Share once again, this time to secure properties in 
Guatemala seized from Germany during the war. 
Utility investments in the Western Hemisphere continued to soar throughout the 1920s. 
In 1920, Electric Bond & Share, in collaboration with International General Electric, constructed 
an electric railway and hydroelectric plant in Brazil. In 1922, Electric Bond & Share acquired 
properties in Havana, Cuba, creating the Cuban Electric Company. Cuba would contain the 
largest amount of holdings for Electric Bond & Share by the end of the decade.329 In 1924, the 
company created AFPC as a vehicle to spread its influence and business into more international 
markets. AFPC assets totaled one billion dollars (the equivalent of nearly $14 billion in 2012 
dollars) by 1930, with investments in Ecuador, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, India and 
Brazil. In Argentina alone, AFPC supplied electricity to 156 towns, serving some 204,470 
customers.330 
Owen D. Young, the chairman of General Electric from 1922 to 1939 who would later 
devise the Young Plan in 1929 to address German reparation payments, was a member of the 
American ICC subcommittee that created the “Report of the Committee on Economic 
Restoration,” mentioned above. As his company essentially monopolized the electrical grids of 
nation-states across Latin America, his committee urged that “new or less advanced countries of 
the world should proceed more rapidly.” The report laid out the method by which to proceed: 
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There is need for freedom of opportunity therein for the capital and business 
enterprise of all nations and for more concert of action among the leaders of 
business, with a sympathetic encouragement of government, to secure to such 
countries the conditions which are required to attract capital and capable 
management. This should be emphasized by business organizations.331 
  
These were likely words of encouragement to corporate leaders such as Young. The ICC 
believed that Allied industries were the benevolent force that could uplift the peripheral, “less 
advanced” nation-states of the globe. The ICC’s ideas regarding standardization, then, did not 
apply simply to trade practices or finances. The businessmen of the Allied powers sought to 
standardize the periphery in the mold of Western imagined modernization. 
Germany had invested heavily in utilities in Argentina prior to the war. The German 
government, however, became weary of overseas investment following the war. German bankers 
and businessmen came to the realization that ‘“any investment of German capital outside 
Germany must, for political reasons, be handled with utmost caution, inasmuch as the Allies 
would be quick to point out that, if Germany can find foreign exchange for foreign investment, 
she should also be able to do so to meet her reparations bill.’”332 In 1920, Deutsche Bank sold its 
Argentine electric company Überseeische Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (DUEG) to a Spanish 
banking consortium. The Spanish consortium also acquired DUEG assets in Chile and “an 
electric tramway operation in Uruguay.” 
The British company S. Pearson & Son, which already had heavy investments in Mexico, 
took over other German utility interests in Chile following the war. The company was owned by 
Weetman Pearson (later known as Lord Cowdray). Pearson had been heavily invested in the 
Mexican oil industry under Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz. When Diaz was overthrown in 1911, 
Pearson sold his oil interests to Gulbenkian. Pearson was also involved in politics in Britain, 
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serving as a Liberal Member of Parliament after his election in 1895. During the war, David 
Lloyd George asked Pearson (by this time, Lord Cowdray) to serve as President of the Air 
Board, holding the position for six months. 
Connections between S. Pearson & Son and the British government, however, did not end 
there. In 1921, the British Parliament passed the Trade Facilities Acts. The acts permitted the 
Treasury to guarantee the principle and interest on loans as long as the money was then used to 
purchase British goods. “These loan guarantees were often associated with British overseas 
investments in electric utilities.”333 Following the war, the British government continued the 
capital controls it had enacted during the war. Ideally, the government sought to encourage 
foreign direct investments that would enhance the purchase of British exports. 
The ICC’s mission during 1923 and 1925 was one of standardization. The concept of 
standardization, however, took on numerous meanings. Allied industrialists and bankers, with 
their mindsets locked in the generational ideology of social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxon 
superiority, at a prosaic level, sought to standardize the terms and practices of world trade with 
new rules regarding international cheques and patents. On a more complex level, the ICC 
addressed new technologies, especially air travel, hoping to use government to standardize travel 
routes and oversight in the name of profit maximization. Though business collaboration with 
government was viewed with hesitation by the ICC, collaboration was welcomed, hypocritically, 
when it could be used to establish fledgling industries. International currency exchange was to be 
systematized under the patronage of a rejuvenated gold standard, controlled by the Allied powers 
under the tutelage of an international consortium of private bankers. Finally, Allied MNCs were 
crucial to the homogenization of global commerce, since they were the progenitors of core 
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nation-state conceptions of modernization. To fulfill its mission of faux globalization, however, 
the ICC would need to address the fundamental issues of labor and migration. We now turn our 
attention to the ICC’s endeavors to reign in the workers and migrants of the world. 
5 CHAPTER FOUR: LABOR AND MIGRATION 
Trade, reparations and recovery from the war played center stage in ICC deliberations 
during the organization’s first years, and the means to mend these issues were debated and 
resolutions were passed to address the political economic situation of the globe shortly after the 
Great War. ICC delegates also fervently discussed the issues of labor and migration. The ICC 
was greatly concerned with unions and the trans-national movement of laborers, especially in the 
wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and strict U.S. immigration policies. This chapter 
analyzes ICC discussions regarding international labor, migrant workers, social democracy and 
trade unionism from 1920 to 1925. Though there was some disagreement between the ICC and 
the U.S. in regard to U.S. immigration policies, the organization remained dismissive in regard to 
American manipulation of labor and markets in Latin America. ICC discussions regarding labor 
and migration, as well as the maintenance of a global free market, were wrapped in Allied 
interpretations of modernity and progress, which they linked with production. Therefore, the free 
market was, in reality, an international economic scheme controlled by the core powers 
represented in the ICC. The Great War victors, as harbingers of political economic augmentation 
on a global scale, viewed themselves as agents of modernity and human progress. 
ICC participants focused upon production as a critical avenue for the restoration of global 
trade following the economic dislocations caused by the Great War. First Viscount of 
Birkenhead, Frederick Edwin Smith, introduced in chapter two, represented Britain and provided 
the opening address for the General Meeting held on 27 June 1921. Birkenhead was a 
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Conservative politician and lawyer who prided himself on his opposition to Irish home rule. One 
contemporary called him “the best all-around brain in Britain.”334 The “conditions of exchange” 
on the global market, he believed, hindered the main “possession” of the working class, which 
Birkenhead identified as “their labor.”335 Birkenhead confidently asserted: 
I say there will be no prosperity, there will be no contentment, there will be no 
order and there will be no harmony in this life which we have to build up from the 
shipwreck of the war, until the maximum trade possible under existing conditions 
or the conditions that can be attained to, is created in the world—until, in other 
words, there is the maximum production in the world which the actual economic 
conditions render possible.336 
 
Unfettered channels of trade, Birkenhead believed, created prosperity and contentment. 
Production, Birkenhead thought, rather than worker satisfaction, was central to the rehabilitation 
of the global economy. Recall our discussion of Birkenhead in chapter two, in which he argued 
that the businessman did not have the time or the need to practice philanthropy. Indeed, 
philanthropy was a “distraction,” according to Birkenhead. Furthermore, the man regarded as the 
“best all-around brain in Britain,” as we also saw in chapter two, was an arch social Darwinist 
and nationalist. Thus, his assertion that the mission of the ICC was to “maximize trade 
conditions,” was likely in reference to trade between and amongst the Allied powers. The current 
“conditions of exchange,” Birkenhead insisted, “paralyzed” the worker whose most “valuable 
commodity” was “the capacity of their labor.”337 Birkenhead reflected, in his speech, the stated 
motto of the ICC: “World peace through world trade.” The members of the ICC were thoroughly 
convinced that free trade, as they imagined it, was the ultimate guarantor of global stability. The 
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maximization of production, along with open channels of trade, would, the ICC argued, 
automatically facilitate labor’s demand for a decent standard of living. 
Karl Marx argued in his Manifesto of the Communist Party some seventy years prior to 
the establishment of the ICC that “labourers [sic], who must sell themselves piece-meal, are a 
commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the 
vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.”338 Marx argued that “the past 
dominates the present in bourgeois society.”339 The bourgeoisie, in this case, the victors of the 
Great War represented in the ICC, saw no other way to develop the future political economy than 
by constructing it based upon past principles, augmented by the contemporary advantages of 
machine driven mass production. Past principles included the gold standard (discussed in the 
previous chapter), social Darwinism, and Western jurisprudence. The Allied powers’ conception 
of modernity was linked intrinsically with production. Moreover, Marx argued that the drive for 
capital creation usurped the importance of the well-being of the worker. ICC notions of 
modernization, production and political economic global stabilization reveal to us the realities 
Marx discussed in 1848. Allied and thus ICC ideas, forged in the annals of imperial domination, 
were not just sacrosanct; they were international governing logic. 
Birkenhead argued that the ICC must “apply” itself “scientifically with goodwill, 
harnessing to the purpose all the resources of civilization, and not merely working discordantly 
as separate countries.”340 Birkenhead’s statement echoed the systematic, modernizing nature of 
the early twentieth century, as well as the spirit of internationalism (as defined in chapter one). It 
is important to view ICC discourse through the lens of scientific efficiency. Eminent historian 
                                                 
338 Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d ed (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 479. 
339 Ibid., p. 485. 
340 International Chamber of Commerce, International Chamber of Commerce: First Congress (London: June 27-
July 1), p. 33. 
143 
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that “Scientific culture became the fraternal code of the world’s 
accumulators of capital.” Scientific culture “served first of all to justify both their [the capitalist 
elites] own activities and the differential rewards from which they benefited. It legitimated the 
harsh elimination of barriers to the expansion of productive efficiencies.”341 ICC businessmen 
put “great emphasis on the rationality of scientific activity.” However, “this was the mask of the 
irrationality of endless accumulation.”342 
The ICC was created in the midst of the Progressive Era and the burgeoning industrial 
system of mass production. Progressive reformers sought to perfect the social, political and 
economic order. A vast consumer economy developed in the U.S., which became the world’s top 
consumer, as a cornucopia of goods flooded department stores while advertisements for goods 
connected consumption with the freedom to purchase a variety of merchandise. Business leaders, 
tapping into the consumer market, organized production through “scientific management,” a 
factory system developed by Frederick Taylor in the late 1880s and advanced by Henry Ford’s 
assembly line in 1913. Ideally, scientific management was created to simplify and speed up 
production, control costs and systematize the assembly process to increase profit. Laborers, 
operating under the scientific management scheme, were automatons. Worker bodies were to 
“perform more like machines, maximizing the efficiency of workers’ movements.”343 The 
scientific mechanization of production also drove a wedge between worker and owner, as we 
will see later. 
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Mass production required not only a dedicated labor force, but also mass consumption. 
For the duration of the 1920s, however, annual wages for full-time, non-agricultural sector 
employees in the U.S., the world’s leading consumer of manufactured goods, remained stagnant. 
The average full-time, non-farm employee made $1,532 per year in 1920. By 1928, the same 
worker made $1,534. Compare this to the previous nine years, in which an employee in 1911 
earned $632 per year and $1,293 per year by 1919.344 Meanwhile, the top ten percent of the U.S. 
population controlled forty-four percent of the nation’s wealth by 1929.345 
Prices for consumer goods, due in part to the advent of mass production, remained stable 
for the duration of the 1920s. The cost of a new automobile, for example, decreased by nearly 
one-third between 1920 and 1928.346 Food prices remained steady for the duration of the 1920s. 
These positives, however, were a façade. Residential rent, in the U.S., increased between 1920 
and 1928 by nearly six percent. The majority of U.S. families, for the duration of the decade, had 
no savings. Moreover, due in part to the advent of scientific efficiency, the number of workers in 
the U.S. manufacturing sector declined by five percent.347 By 1929, despite the mass production 
of consumables, so adamantly supported by the businessmen of the ICC, seventy-five percent of 
U.S. households did not own a washing machine while another sixty percent did not own a 
radio.348 
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The businessmen of the ICC, focused myopically upon production, did not consider 
consumption. How much could the average worker consume if his wages remained stagnant? 
They also did not consider the point at which production reaches an equilibrium with 
consumption. In other words, they did not consider how many goods needed to be produced to 
meet consumer demand. The ICC, which by the mid-1920s was the main economic advisory arm 
of the League of Nations, issued dozens of trade reports during the decade. The 1921 ICC 
brochure “Foreign Exchange” was the only ICC report between 1920 and 1925 that mentioned 
individual income. A table on page nineteen of the brochure gives the “estimated present 
national income per head” for the U.S., Australia, the U.K., Canada, France, Germany, Italy and 
Japan.349 The column to the right lists the “Estimated present governmental expenditure per 
head.” 
The purpose of the statistical table, as described in the brochure, is telling. “In order to 
obtain an idea of the financial burden of each nation,” the report states, it is necessary “to 
compare the rate of state expenditure with that of the average income per head.”350 The goal of 
the report was to project the rate of economic recovery for each aforementioned nation-state 
following the war and the economic recession of 1920-21, by looking at the amount of money 
each state spent on each of its citizens. There are no statistics in regard to spending power or 
consumer demand. The ICC, however, as an international body, was concerned with the 
rehabilitation of international trade on a macro level. Of course, this is to be expected of an 
international organization. However, the ICC’s call for production as a solution to the 
rehabilitation of international trade required micro-level knowledge of individual demand, 
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spending power, and economic disparities. The organization’s mandate for production, without a 
micro-level economic analysis of individual income in individual countries, was a blind, futile 
command. 
Representatives continued to hone in on the harsh conditions of the global economy 
following the war during the 1921 ICC conference. U.S. representative A. C. Bedford indicated 
to his European counterparts that the U.S. was not necessarily as well off economically as the 
Europeans may have thought. Speaking shortly after Birkenhead, Bedford argued that America, 
despite claims that it had “profited enormously from the war,” was “suffering the most acute and 
widespread financial depression in half a century.” 
At least three million of our workmen are unemployed, many of our largest 
industries are shut down, our farmers have suffered disastrous losses, and our 
security markets have registered an extraordinary liquidation in values. The 
situation has been very grave in America. Let no one believe that conditions in 
America today are easy; let no one think that effort to extend material assistance 
to the world does not mean real sacrifice by America.351 
  
The “real sacrifice by America” was in reference to not only America’s military efforts, 
but also America’s loans to Britain and France during the war. For the remainder of the 1920s, 
the U.S. government remained adamant, to the chagrin of Britain and France, that they repay 
these funds. Bedford was also likely responding to critics who condemned manufacturers and 
businessmen who prospered from the material output of the war. Over a decade later, Western 
European and American armament makers were lambasted in the book Merchants of Death.352 
For businessmen such as Bedford and Birkenhead, however, production was not a portent of 
death. Production was the solution to international commercial malaise. Luckily, for the 
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businessmen of the ICC, war would not need to be a precursor for production for the duration of 
the 1920s, thanks in large part to the burgeoning industries and consumables of the modern era. 
Thus, the “Merchants of Peace” needed only to reconstruct the global marketplace by installing 
Allied political economic regimes, including banking, commercial and production systems, in the 
non-Allied world. As we will see, however, the installation of the aforementioned systems also 
required Allied manipulation of labor. 
Bedford’s reference to the “grave situation in America” at the start of the decade was 
sincere. By 1921, unemployment amongst the non-farming labor force in the U.S. was over 
sixteen percent with nearly five million unemployed.353 Unemployment in the U.S. more than 
doubled between 1920 and 1921. Not until 1923 did U.S. unemployment decrease below double 
digits. By 1926, however, U.S. overall unemployment was as low as three percent (four percent 
amongst the non-farm labor force), and reached its lowest point in 1929 at just below three 
percent (four percent of non-farm labor force). Average unemployment in the U.S. for the 
duration of the decade was a shade under five percent. The combined average of unemployment 
in Britain, France and Germany for the same time period was nearly double the U.S. rate at eight 
percent.354 
The agricultural sector in the Allied nation-states began to suffer within two years after 
the war. Although yields remained high for farmers in Europe immediately after the war due to 
high output as part of the recovery process, by 1920 prices greatly diminished due to increased 
acreage and competition from foreign competitors.355 Moreover, without the huge demand for 
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foodstuffs provided by the war, there was less need for food production. Wheat acreage in 
Europe, the U.S., Canada, Australia and Argentina, for example, increased by fifty percent, 
causing an oversupply of the commodity and hence a precipitous decline in prices. Wheat 
consumption, for the duration of the decade, steadily decreased.356 By the late 1920s, European 
wheat exports accounted for only thirty nine percent of the global supply compared to fifty six 
percent before the war.357 
Allied governments, as well as the ICC, were greatly concerned with the economic 
contraction of the post-war period. The French and German governments responded to falling 
prices and increased competition by increasing tariffs, further stifling international agricultural 
trade. The U.S. agricultural sector suffered similarly. Prices for food staples such as potatoes, 
sugar, flour, eggs and other commodities decreased by as much as fifty percent. The U.S. 
government responded to the decline with farm credits, amounting to five hundred and seventy 
five million dollars in 1920, six hundred million dollars in 1921 and nine hundred million dollars 
in 1922.358 Thus, free trade, advocated by Allied ICC participants, was not a reality in the 
agricultural sector. The economic contraction of the post-war period, however, heightened the 
importance, for the ICC, of economic growth, free trade and the control of labor markets. 
The topics of labor and production created heated discussions during the 1923 ICC Rome 
Conference. Julius H. Barnes, the American representative for the Industry and Trade 
Committee, spoke about the importance of increasing production by “inducing those who work 
to work to their fullest capacity.”359 Barnes stated: 
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America realizes with due humility that great natural resources were bestowed on 
it by nature. It recognizes the freedom of experiment afforded it by a state of 
social relation free of age-old traditions and prejudices which might otherwise 
hamper its ready adaptation. But while recognizing these conditions, which favor 
it beyond many other peoples, America also claims with due pride that it has 
developed most largely the service of enlarged production in its contribution to 
human progress and, therefore, to human happiness.360 
 
For Barnes, like his fellow ICC businessmen, production was a key to “human 
happiness.” With more production, Barnes continued, would come more “possessions” and 
hence a rising “standard of living.” Conspicuous consumption became a hallmark of the 1920s, 
especially in the U.S., as consumers purchased new goods such as radios, vacuum cleaners, 
toasters and a plethora of other items, often on credit. French contemporary Andre Siegfried 
observed this trend in 1928 noting that America had developed a “new society” in which 
Americans considered their “standard of living” a “sacred acquisition, which they will defend at 
any price.”361 Increasingly, individual fulfillment came in the form of consumption. For the 
businessmen of the ICC, then, more production was required to fulfill the consumptive 
tendencies of the American public. The term “production” appears in the 1920 and 1921 
proceedings a combined total of two hundred and eighteen times. We will see later in this 
chapter, however, that ICC delegates imagined that production required government intervention 
to acquire the cheapest labor possible. 
Barnes pointed out the relatively new industries that had come to fruition by the 1920s 
including “the automobile, the motion-picture, the electrical industry and the chemical industry.” 
These industries could be exploited for production and hence consumption. They would serve to 
“furnish the livelihood” of millions. Barnes argued: 
The history of this great social development displays that enlarged production, 
and especially enlarged production per individual, itself creates and enlarges its 
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own market, both by the economy of costs which follows such production and by 
the enlarging buying-power resulting from the earnings which increased 
competitive employment, accompanying increased production, affords the 
worker…No truth has been so clearly demonstrated as that this practical 
philosophy of enlarged production contributes directly through human service to 
enlarge the means of human happiness.362 
 
Once again, Barnes linked production to human happiness. “Enlarged production” was an 
established “truth” and a “practical philosophy” that, according to Barnes, automatically created 
more consumers. As we saw above, however, annual wages for producers remained stagnant 
during the 1920s. Moreover, like his fellow businessmen, Barnes sought the most production 
possible from the fewest workers possible. These lines of thought help explain why Barnes then 
began to rail against labor unions: 
The man who in his normal hours of work restricts and reduces the amount of 
effort and the amount of product which during those hours he can sustain; the 
organization of men which designate and limit a day’s work to the laying of 300 
bricks when a fair workman could lay 1200; the organizations of men, which, by 
the power of concerted action, force observance of arbitrary rules requiring 
several men in the discharge of tasks, otherwise performed by single workers; the 
men or organizations of men who oppose in this short-sighted deadly social 
fallacy the introduction of scientific appliances which release men to other 
productive industries—these men and these organizations are the active enemies 
of human progress.363 
 
The “organizations of men,” to which Barnes referred, were labor unions. Unionized 
labor, in Barnes’s assessment, was a hindrance to “human progress.” He believed, even more 
insidiously, that unions were enemies. Labor unions opposed the modern, scientific discourse of 
production propagated by management and ownership. Unions, in Barnes’s estimation, simply 
did not understand the progressive, modern, mechanized 1920s world. “Their attitude,” Barnes 
argued, “is a direct social injury to every man, woman and child.” They were resistant to 
progress that served the well-being of humanity. Unions were organizations of Luddites, 
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resisting the natural and beneficial course of humanity. Barnes believed that unions made 
workers resist what was actually beneficial to their own cause. “This story of limitation of 
output,” Barnes stated, “is especially a blow at the opportunity of their fellows, for workers 
require more and more articles for common use, which are brought more and more, by the 
inevitable economics of intensified production, within their reach.”364 
Barnes called for fewer workers performing greater individual output. Realistically, 
Barnes’s views toward labor were derived from the myopic standpoint of the business owner. 
His train of thought and business insight, reflective of the wider capitalist, business acumen, 
could not address unemployment and, moreover, the plight of the “fair workman.” The 
international businessman’s stance instead exposed an inherent contradiction between ownership 
and labor; labor seeks employment, fair wages and a safe work environment while ownership 
seeks production and profit from the fewest workers possible. 
Barnes’s speech was met with much support from his fellow participants. M. Marco 
Cassin, chair of the committee, replied to Barnes’s speech: “After the notable speech we have 
just heard, I think we can vote the resolution.” Immediately below Cassin’s statement, the 
proceedings state: “The resolution was adopted unanimously without discussion.”365 The desire 
for fewer workers, however, was contrary to ICC calls for production, which was intrinsically 
linked to consumption. With fewer workers earning an income, consumption would decline. A 
decline in consumption would then necessitate a decrease in production. These maxims came to 
fruition during the final years of the 1920s. 
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Julius H. Barnes, who was frequently described as a “rugged individualist,” had been the 
head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce from 1921 to 1924.366 In 1924 he published a volume 
entitled The Genius of American Business. In it, he argued that “the gifts of nature should be 
converted to human use as rapidly as possible, not by drudgery of bent backs, but by the mastery 
of mind over the forces of nature and the service of invention, thus enlarging the product of 
every pair of worker’s hands.” Moreover, Barnes argued, government must “maintain fair play 
and equal opportunity for each individual to work out his own pace.”367 Ideally, then, Barnes 
wanted efficiency. It seems, though, that this approach would not avoid labor via the “drudgery 
of bent backs.” Barnes contended that the amelioration of technology would prevent the physical 
exploitation of the worker. Yet, if machines were to replace the back-breaking nature of human 
labor and permit fewer workers to create more products, what was to be said for those whom the 
machines displaced? 
Barnes linked “labor problems” to education during a speech before the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and serving as its chairman in the spring of 1923. “If all schools and colleges should 
imitate the few pioneers who are now teaching the basic facts and principles of labor problems,” 
Barnes argued, “it would become vastly easier to understand business cycles, to retain prosperity 
[and] to prevent strikes.”368 By simply knowing the ups and downs of “business cycles,” labor 
strife could be avoided, Barnes believed. Barnes’s belief system was indicative of the separation 
between labor and ownership during the 1920s. Wealthy industrialists such as Barnes did not 
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have to concern themselves with daily subsistence like the common worker. Thus, production, 
rather than worker well-being, took precedence. 
Production, mechanization and scientific management were part of the early twentieth 
century’s discourse of modernity, mainly propagated by the political leaders and businessmen of 
the Allied core. The term “modernization implies a kind of necessary progression, an implicit 
assumption that modernity is to be preferred to tradition, rationalism to religion, industry to 
farming.”369 Radio, film, automobiles, airplanes and other recent innovations worked to create an 
informed, global mass culture. The fin-de-siècle was marked by “the triad of rapid 
industrialization, sprawling urbanization, and massive immigration,” especially in the U.S.370 
The industrialization trend continued in the U.S. and Western Europe following the war. 
Furthermore, prior to the war, Henry Ford’s assembly line introduced the concept and practice of 
mass production. The mechanization of production and the anesthetization of the laborer created 
an ever widening wedge between owner and worker. 
Competing modernities, for example communism, emerged as well, which challenged 
Allied political systems. The Russian Revolution encouraged the empowerment of labor over 
owner. Thus, the ICC addressed this situation with much vigor during the 1920 Organizational 
Conference. Prominent French industrialist Eugene Schneider, discussed in chapter two, railed 
against communist sympathizers during a long speech before the Organizational Committee. 
Discussing communist agitation in France, Schneider referred to striking workers and communist 
leaning labor leaders as “hotheads” and “madmen” whose “revolutionary prank” failed in the 
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face of the French worker’s desire for free market capitalism and democracy.371 The failure of 
the 1 May 1919 Bolshevik movement in France, Schneider claimed, “consigned Bolshevism to 
the limbo of superannuated scare-crows and proved that this Asiatic pest cannot thrive in our 
Gallic country.”372 
Bolshevism was not discussed again by the ICC through 1925; save for a Belgian 
representative in 1920 who said that bolshevism was not an issue in Belgium since “we do not 
believe in it.”373 Perhaps the lack of discussion was due to the efforts of Allied governments to 
crush communist disturbances in their respective countries. By the end of the war, the West was 
rocked by worker strikes. Worker demonstrations gripped Germany in early 1919. The head of 
Germany’s Supreme Army Command asked that the German chancellor “fight ‘Bolshevism.’”374 
Right wing paramilitary groups were formed to root out communist infiltrators. The Sparticists, 
far-left German revolutionaries, were “hunted down,” culminating in the assassination of their 
two key leaders: Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Germany faced striking workers in 
numerous economic sectors including mining, steel, electrical and water works for the duration 
of 1919. 
The U.S. government cracked down hard on communism and labor unions both during 
and after the war. During the war, red or black flags, emblems of communism and anarchism, 
respectively, were banned in 33 states.375 Anti-war statement, support for the Russian Revolution 
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and labor radicalism were viewed as “un-American.” Eugene V. Debs, a founder of the 
International Workers of the World (IWW), wrote of the Russian Revolution in the early winter 
of 1918 that it was “the soul of the new-born world. Verily, the last are now the first and the 
world’s most pitilessly plundered and shamelessly exiled have become the world’s revolutionary 
redeemers and supreme liberators. From the crown of my head to the soles of my feet I am a 
Bolshevik and proud of it. The Day of the People has arrived!”376 Later that year, Debs was 
imprisoned for what was termed an “anti-war speech” under the U.S. Espionage Act, although 
the actual speech referred to the war only once.377 Government sequestration of labor and 
potential Bolshevik activities inherently served the interests of business ownership. 
The U.S. witnessed its greatest labor upheaval in 1919, with strikes of over four million 
workers. Popular opinion blamed the labor unrest on Bolshevism. The 14 June 1919 Literary 
Digest estimated that there were at least five million communists in America.378 Massive strikes 
gripped Seattle, Boston, Chicago and numerous other U.S. cities. Most of the strikes were 
disbanded by agents of the U.S. federal or state governments. Massachusetts governor Calvin 
Coolidge, a prominent speaker at various U.S. Chamber of Commerce meetings prior to 
ascending to the U.S. presidency in 1923, called out the National Guard to quell the Boston 
policemen strike, firing them all. The strike was officially ended by a court injunction from 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. What came to be called “The Great Steel Strike,” which 
was organized by Samuel Gompers, was disbanded by 1920 after steel magnates turned to the 
media, brandishing the strikers as associates of “the IWW, communism, and disloyalty.” Indeed, 
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“no strike, no act of violence, no deviation from the norm failed to bring charges that the 
probable cause was domestic Bolshevik activity.”379 
During the 1920 ICC Organizational Conference, Willis H. Booth, representing the 
American delegation, indicated the separation between the “public” and labor. Referring to the 
1919-1920 series of strikes in the U.S., Booth stated: “Our labor problem is serious and of late 
there has been appreciation that the public is the most interested party and strikes are not as a 
rule successful.” Booth, like his ICC business colleagues and, for that matter, their governments, 
separated the public from the laboring class. The public was the rational, the labor class the 
irrational, instilled with an insidious, seditious mutation of bolshevism. 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George wrote to French Prime Minister Georges 
Clemenceau in March of 1919: “The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution…The 
whole existing order in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned by the mass of the 
population from one end of Europe to the other.”380 Industrial strikes occurred in Britain in 1919 
in Glasgow. Police went on strike in London. In 1920, a “triple alliance” was formed amongst 
the mining, transport and railway unions. From January to June of 1919, Britain experienced 747 
labor disputes involving nearly one and one half million laborers.381 France experienced similar 
labor issues, as its railway system was shuttered by a strike in February 1920. Over the course of 
1920, over “1.3 million [French] workers participated in strikes.”382 These labor movements 
gave the ICC the impression that unionism was strong and growing. The ICC, which brought 
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together businessmen on an international scale, was deemed progressive. The international 
organization of laborers was, from the ICC and Allied standpoint, dangerous and seditious. 
5.1 The ICC and Migratory Labor 
Employers benefit from a surplus of labor since striking workers can be easily replaced. 
This helps explain the ICC’s support of migratory labor. The Monday 19 March 1923 
Transportation Group, chaired by Sir Arthur Balfour of Great Britain, initiated discussion by 
addressing the issue of “flag discrimination.” Flag discrimination is defined as the granting “of 
preferential treatment to ships under the national flag.” This includes preference granted “in 
respect of port and railway facilities,” “shipping and port dues,” and “the imports and exports of 
the country,” which includes passengers.383 “Passengers,” who were, potentially, immigrants, 
became the crux of the discussion. 
The Italian delegation, under the chairmanship of Giuseppe Biancardi, argued that the 
committee should replace the terms “emigrants” and “immigrants” with the term “passengers” in 
all proposed ICC resolutions. Biancardi’s chief concern revolved around Italian shipping to the 
U.S. since American immigration restrictions applied to Italian passengers. Sir Alan Anderson, 
representing the British delegation, recommended a “rider” be placed on resolutions to address 
the concerns of the Italian delegation. 
The French delegation, however, disagreed. It argued that the terms “immigrants” and 
“emigrants” should remain in all resolutions because “international traffic by sea should be free 
from restrictions whether it related to passengers, emigrants or cargoes.”384 Use of the term 
“passengers,” the French delegation argued, would “imply that they [the French] were 
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sympathetic towards making such restrictions.” The French argued that “such a policy would be 
disastrous to international commerce,” and “would certainly lead to retaliation on the part of 
France.” The committee voted to maintain the usages of the terms “immigrants” and 
“emigrants,” though Italy was to attach a “reservation” regarding commerce with the U.S. for 
future resolutions. 
It is important to mention this brief altercation during the 1923 ICC session because it 
alludes to the larger issue of immigration that existed following the war, especially in regard to 
the U.S. The Senate was considering further immigrant restrictions by late 1922-1923. This was 
pointed out by ICC Belgian representative Alfred de Brouckere. He argued that “the importance 
of the” flag discrimination and freedom of the seas resolution, mentioned above, “lay in the 
difficulties attendant upon the emigrant traffic from Europe to America, which had brought 
disappointment to many, who, after years of misery, had made up their minds to turn their backs 
upon regions devastated by the war and find for themselves a new home in the country of their 
choice.”385 De Brouckere was surprised that the U.S., “which has been an outlet of Europe,” 
would consider harsh immigration restrictions. He argued that the “3% Restriction Act,” which 
was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1921, limiting immigration to the U.S. to three percent of 
each nationality already in the U.S., was too draconian. “Until the [U.S.] restrictions finally 
disappear, to the great satisfaction of the overpopulated countries of Europe who have always 
looked upon the United States as the Promised Land [sic],” unemployment would continue and 
prosperity would diminish.386 
The U.S. Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, was the most 
restrictive immigration policy in U.S. history. For the first time, U.S. ports of entry required 
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passports and visas to document the national identity of immigrants. The U.S. law, however, was 
part of a broader global trend of immigration restriction by Anglo-Saxon nation-states following 
the Great War. Nativism, namely in the U.S., as well as Social Darwinism, which had directed 
Western racial logic since the late nineteenth century, combined with the 1919 Red Scare to 
create a conflagration of hysteria toward immigrants entering the West. Furthermore, the First 
World War created a sea of refugees forced to find new homes, especially with the redrawing of 
borders during the Treaty of Versailles and the fading of empires in Europe and Asia.387 Most 
especially for the U.S., however, “industrial capitalism had matured to the point where economic 
growth could come more from technical advances in mass production than from enlarging the 
workforce.”388 
It is important to point out that the 1924 Immigration Act did not limit immigration from 
the Western Hemisphere into the U.S. This was mostly because of the labor needs of large 
agribusinesses in the Southern U.S. The “new factories in the field,” created during the early 
twentieth century in the U.S., required “a large, mobile and seasonal labor force.”389 
Furthermore, as U.S. corporations moved into the Western Hemisphere, corporations in places 
such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and elsewhere were able to rely upon a vast array 
of seasonal migratory laborers. A relatively low cost labor force, absent of unionization and 
worker rights, reproduced itself annually. This situation suited the labor and production desires 
of the industries represented in the ICC. 
During the 1920s, production was increasingly moved from regions where labor was 
relatively expensive, such as in the U.S. or Western Europe, to regions where labor and 
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production was relatively cheaper, such as Latin America. Globalization in the 1920s fits closely 
with Aviva Chomsky’s characterization of the phenomena, rather than the ICC’s: “globalization 
has less to do with countries, cultural contact, and speed and more to do with capital’s search for 
cheap labor.”390 Inherently, capital seeks to concentrate wealth at the top while labor seeks to 
distribute wealth below. This “tug of war,” as Chomsky accurately describes it, was taking place 
on a global scale by the dawn of the twentieth century. Despite calls by the capitalist class, 
especially ICC participants, to restrain government involvement in business and capital 
accruement, business relied upon government not only to quell labor unrest, but to open 
pathways for “capital flight” (the movement of production to regions providing cheap labor) to 
Latin America. Furthermore, business leaders hoped for fewer immigration restrictions to 
provide for cheaper labor in the U.S. and Western Europe. At this juncture, let us briefly turn our 
attention to the ICC’s stance on capital flight in Latin America. 
As alluded to in previous chapters, for the ICC and “U.S. officials and business leaders, 
the purpose of stabilization loans” during the 1920s, especially in Latin America, were used to 
“spread a globally integrated gold standard that would then provide a basis for rising levels of 
trade and investment everywhere.”391 Moreover, the U.S. insisted that its own officials be placed 
in charge of banking and economic operations in the countries receiving loans. In Peru, for 
example, William Wilson Cumberland, a student of Edwin Kemmerer (see chapter three), was 
placed in charge of Peru’s banking reforms with the title of “administrator of customs.” He later 
served in a similar position in Haiti.392 Similar systems, administered by U.S. banking officials, 
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were also established in Ecuador, Columbia, Chile, Cuba, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic. 
Moreover, the U.S. took direct military control of countries such as Haiti and Nicaragua. As we 
have seen in previous chapters, U.S. policies in the Caribbean and Central and South America 
exhibited a racial, capitalist discourse for the duration of the 1920s, permitting the influx of U.S. 
corporate and political control. 
The placement of U.S. bankers in Latin America was a commonsense operation for ICC 
businessmen. As we saw in the previous chapter, the gold standard, a British creation, and 
Western jurisprudence were viewed as solutions for global political economic problems. The 
Allied powers viewed themselves as the beacon of modernity. The ICC did not directly discuss 
U.S. economically-driven incursions into Latin America during the 1923 or 1925 sessions. There 
were however, “representatives” of various Latin American countries, as listed in the ICC 
proceedings, at the 1923 Rome conference, including Argentina (one), Brazil (one), Mexico 
(two), and Peru (one). Four of the five representatives, however, were attaches, ambassadors or 
consuls representing various Italian cities in the respective Latin American country. Only one 
member, Prieto Souza, an engineer from Mexico, directly represented a Latin American nation-
state. He did not give a formal speech during the session. 
The 1925 conference in Brussels had only six Latin American representatives, who hailed 
from Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Mexico and Peru, respectively. Once again, most were diplomats. 
As opposed to the previous conference, all six representatives actually hailed from their 
respective country. Dantès Bellegarde, Haiti’s first ICC representative, would later become a 
harsh critic of the U.S. military occupation of Haiti, speaking before the League of Nations in 
1930. There are no recorded statements from Bellegarde in the 1925 ICC proceedings. 
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We see the oblique acceptance of the infusion of U.S. bankers into Latin America, and a 
disregard for the laboring class, in the speech given by Fred I. Kent, a renowned U.S. banker and 
prominent ICC member for the duration of the decade, during the 1920 ICC Organizational 
Session. Kent first addressed American war profiteering critics, arguing that American bankers 
had, “since the armistice,” officially loaned “$500,000,000, and unknown millions which run 
into very large figures,” to Europeans “for the purpose of investment in Europe.”393 Furthermore, 
Kent argued, “the American Relief Association” provided untold millions in food and supplies 
during the war. Kent then itemized monetary allocations made by U.S. government departments 
to European governments. 
The problem for Europe, Kent argued, was not American war profiteering, but, rather, 
labor unrest. “If labor had returned to work promptly” following the war, Kent argued, “much 
greater progress could have been made toward financial and economic reconstruction.”394 
Instead, Europe was impregnated with “professional agitators” who prevented the restoration of 
“all means of production” and “channels of trade.” Kent argued that “No one can estimate the 
tremendous difference that would exist at present in the cost of living…if all the millions of 
hours of labor which have been lost through strikes and sabotage could be restored.”395 Kent 
acknowledged that “America has felt the force of this situation” as well. Striking U.S. workers, 
Kent proclaimed, made “prices in America higher than anywhere else.” High prices would have 
been avoided, he believed, “if orderly production had continued.” Instead, “due to strikes, goods 
have been piling up in warehouses.” 
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The radical labor movement itself, however, began to wane during the early to mid-
1920s. In the U.S., the practice of “welfare capitalism,” in which employers offered private 
pensions and even medical insurance, placated many demands of unions. For the duration of the 
decade, unions in the U.S. lost over two million members.396 The U.S. Supreme Court visualized 
unions as an infringement upon the rights of workers. Furthermore, the rapid rise of the stock 
market in the heart of the decade and the rampant employment provided by the automotive 
industry seemed to negate the necessity of unionization. Unionization in the U.S. stabilized 
during the decade with an average of nearly four million members per year. 
The ICC’s 1925 “Progress in Economic Restoration” report continued to view labor as a 
hindrance to economic development and profit despite the waning of the labor movement by the 
mid-1920s. The report indicated that “the pressure to make concessions to social legislation 
(reduce working hours, more holidays, more staff, etc.) resulting in increased salary 
expenditures,” increased government debt in numerous European nation-states, hampering global 
commerce.397 The solution to this issue, as well as rampant inflation in Europe, the report 
concluded, was “to produce more…and restore credit by scrupulously respecting” international 
trade agreements.398 
Once again, we see that the rehabilitation of productive capacity, rather than the physical 
and financial health of the worker, was indefeasible for the ICC. “The great increase in the cost 
of production as covered in wages,” Kent lamented in 1920, “is not available for investment.” 
This mindset helps us understand more clearly U.S. government and business interests in Latin 
America. Kent himself, for example, had worked closely with Norman H. Davis, U.S. president 
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of the Trust Company of Cuba since at least 1918.399 Unsurprisingly, Kent would become a 
major critic of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal by the 1930s. Both U.S. government and 
business, working in tandem, relied upon U.S. political control of Latin America to facilitate 
profit for investors as well as manufacturers. Identifying workers as “agitators,” “hotheads,” and 
“Bolsheviks” played into corporate, and thus ICC, demands for production. 
5.2 The U.S., the ICC, and Latin America  
The U.S. government reinvigorated businesses in the Caribbean, maintaining a 
“plantation society,” based on sugar production, in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Dominican 
Republic under U.S. imperial domination during the first half of the twentieth century. Contrary 
to dependency theory, which argues that “the persistence of plantations in the region is the cause 
of economic underdevelopment,” U.S. economic imperialism in the Caribbean “radically 
transformed economic relations” in the region.400 “A new form of underdevelopment, based on 
the spread of wage labor and the introduction of the most modern forms of economic 
organization plagued the islands,” causing economic underdevelopment.401 Corporate-owned 
sugar plantations, run by local elites and worked upon by regional journeymen planters, became 
the norm following the 1898 Spanish-American War. Large mills were owned “by United States 
corporations and businessmen.”402 While the wealthy remained as “independent contract 
farmers,” “the descendants of slaves became a permanent agricultural proletariat.”403 The new 
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industrial economic organization created a vast amount of migration between the islands of the 
Caribbean. 
As railroads spread across Cuba, U.S. sugar companies cleared vast tracts of land for 
sugar cultivation. By 1925, American investments in Cuba amounted to over one billion dollars, 
with more than half invested in the sugar industry.404 The United Fruit Company, which acquired 
vast domains in eastern Cuba, encouraged a flow of seasonal immigrants from Jamaica and Haiti. 
In 1919 over thirty thousand Jamaicans and Haitians arrived in Cuba to work in the sugar mills. 
They were paid “a minimum of $2.70 per day” with skilled laborers accruing even more.405  
Wages plummeted, however, with the crash in the sugar market in the autumn of 1920 and 
remained much lower for the remainder of the 1920s. Lands were divided into subdivisions by 
U.S. sugar companies to avoid unionization by workers.406 
U.S. officials sought to transform the Cuban mentality through the manipulation of 
curriculum in the Cuban school system during the U.S. occupation of the island nation following 
the Spanish-American War. General Leonard Wood explained to President William McKinley 
that “We are dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred years, and into 
which we have to infuse new life, new principles, and new methods of doing things.”407 U.S. 
implementation of trademark laws and legislation in Cuba to protect intellectual property, 
foreign concepts to the Cuban culture and economy, went hand in hand with the “reeducation” of 
the populous. The Cuban classroom was to be “transformed into an agent for the transfusion of 
cultural values” of capitalist accumulation and wage labor for a capitalist mentality.408 Textbooks 
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were translated “directly from American versions” while over thirteen hundred Cuban teachers 
were sent to Harvard to gain “a firsthand experience with American culture.” By 1914, U.S. 
investments in Cuba amounted to two hundred and fifteen million dollars, up from fifty million 
dollars in 1896.409 
 The ICC conferences in 1920 and 1921 paid little attention to Latin America, 
specifically Cuba, or its labor issues, though two Cuban delegates, General Carlos Garcia Valez 
and Rodriguez Alcunaga, attended the London Conference in 1921. Valez was a frequent Cuban 
representative at pan-American trade conferences dealing with trademark and customs rights in 
the 1910s. It is perhaps telling, however, that Cuba was not represented during the 1923 and 
1925 conferences. Consider as well a reference made to Cuba during the 1925 ICC Brussels 
Conference in which Ernst B. Filsinger, Export Manager of Lawrence & Co. of New York, 
lamented: “A long series of strikes, or port congestion such as occurred in Cuba in 1920, result in 
heavy losses to the commercial world.”410 The issue, then, was not the plight of the laborer, but, 
rather, trade and profit. We can speculate that this may be a main reason for Cuba’s lack of 
participation in the mid-decade ICC meetings. 
Government corruption became endemic as U.S. corporations became more entrenched 
across the island. Some “fifteen percent of all taxes collected disappeared before they reached 
the treasury.” Corrupt indigenous officials remained empowered within the bureaucracy as long 
as they towed the U.S. corporate line. A U.S. “reform” effort in 1921 was subsidized by a fifty 
million dollar loan from J.P. Morgan. The loan ended up strengthening the corrupt officials 
already in power. Indeed, “the rapid growth of U.S. corporate interests fueled the spread of 
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government corruption” at the expense of the average Cuban citizen.411 Cuba’s economy and 
finances remained under the control of U.S. corporations such as the United Fruit Company, the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, National City Bank, the General Electric Company, and others for 
the duration of the nineteen twenties. As we have seen in previous chapters, many of these 
companies were frequently represented at ICC conferences. 
Major worker strikes occurred throughout Cuba in 1919 and 1920 that called for higher 
wages, unionization rights and better working conditions. However, strikes often failed due to 
the massive influx of foreign workers on a recurring basis. Moreover, Cuban workers and 
immigrant labor were often circumvented from decision-making processes by more highly 
regarded U.S. engineers who maintained a paternalistic attitude toward immigrant and 
indigenous laborers.412 Worker strikes continued for the duration of the decade as 
“anarchosyndicalism” and communist ruminations appealed more and more to the working class. 
By 1925, the nascent Cuban Communist Party railed against “American Imperialism” and 
“foreign capital” control.413 
In the Dominican Republic, under military occupation of the U.S. from 1916 to 1924, 
“corporations were able to manipulate the uncertainty of land titles to obtain land at the expense 
of the peasantry.”414 Meanwhile, the U.S. military was accused of numerous human rights abuses 
by the McCormick Committee in 1921.415 The corporate land grabs and U.S. military brutality 
led to a bloody peasant rebellion that gripped the eastern Dominican Republic from 1917 to 
1922. With the revolution quelled by both U.S. forces and Dominican Republic elites, the 
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peasant masses were forced to turn to wage labor rather than subsistence farming. A supposedly 
free election in 1924 placed U.S. supported strongman General Horacio Vasquez in charge of the 
country. 
We can gauge the ICC’s opinion on the matter by its lack of attention to Latin America, 
although the ICC, from 1920 to 1925, did not directly discuss American endeavors in the region. 
Consider, for example, the 1925 ICC “Report of the Committee on Economic Restoration.” The 
report confidently asserted that “trade is now resuming a more normal character and course.” 
The report added that “as stability is established in less advanced countries, the rate of progress 
should increase.”416 Thus, U.S. government, military, banking and industrial activities in Latin 
America were, by default, valid in the eyes of the ICC, since these actions created what the 
Allied powers regarded as “stability” for “less advanced countries.” The “normal” course of 
trade was an international trade regime that favored the economic systems of the U.S. and 
Western European nation-states, since these countries portrayed the most rational political 
economic systems. 
Haiti, like Cuba, witnessed similar U.S. military and economic policies. U.S. racial bias 
played a fundamental role in its “civilizing mission.” The “American disdain for ‘savages’” often 
“degenerated into torture, systematic destruction of villages, and military tactics tantamount to 
genocide.”417 However, U.S. political economic policies and desires also played a key role in its 
decision to occupy the country. The Haitian constitution, written by U.S. policy-makers and 
“rammed through by an illegal, [U.S.] marine-supervised plebiscite,” included a provision for 
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“the legalization of alien landownership.”418 U.S. marines policed a “massive forced-labor 
corvee” to build roads while “plantation agriculture was financed by private American 
investments.”419 Corporations such as the United Fruit Company refused to invest in Haiti unless 
the U.S. government maintained its direct military involvement in order to prevent 
revolutions.420 Finally, Haiti was used by U.S. banking firms, especially National City Bank, to 
not only absorb Haitian debts, but to also prevent further incursions by European powers. 
U.S. economic, political and military interventions in the Caribbean, Central America and 
South America for the duration of the early twentieth century were not limited to Cuba, Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic. However, the three aforementioned countries were the only ones that 
involved direct military governance by the U.S. However, numerous other instances of U.S. 
political and economic incursions, which greatly impacted the working populous of Caribbean, 
Central and South American nations, abound. U.S. fiduciary and corporate incursions into 
Mexico, for example, were documented in previous chapters. The American charge in Honduras 
wrote, in 1933, “The United [Fruit Company] controls the Honduran Government to an 
unprecedented and incredible extent.”421 An independent banana grower commented in 1920: 
For some time now, most of the inhabitants of this north coast of 
Honduras have been feeling asfixiated [sic]; this asfixiation [sic] 
has been caused by the extortion of the United Fruit Company, a 
ruthless banana company that day after day absorbs the energies of 
these young people who are striving for greater progress and well 
being.422 
  
The 1925 ICC report on “Progress in Economic Restoration” found that “government 
financial policy” tends to “restrict…industrial activity, commercial prosperity and the well-being 
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of the working classes.”423 Yet, the report mentioned nothing in regard to U.S. governmental, 
military and corporate governance of Latin America, or, for that matter, British and French 
control of various Middle Eastern countries (see chapter one). Instead, the report focused only 
upon the progress in economic restoration of European countries since the “object” of the report 
was “to make a survey of financial conditions in several important countries.”424 The nations 
selected by the report, it states, “were carefully selected with a view to making the survey as 
representative as possible” of “the whole world.”425 Moreover, we have explored previously the 
ICC’s aversion to labor unions. The aforementioned report, however, adds government as a 
hindrance to labor as well. 
The interpretation of the report above is speculative, since we are analyzing what was not 
stated in the report. Latin American countries were perhaps not included because most were not 
on the gold standard. They may also have been eschewed because most did not participate 
directly in the Great War. The report mentions, for example, the lasting economic strains of the 
war upon European nation-states. Based upon the previous discussions in this thesis of the social 
Darwinist mentality of the ICC, however, it is difficult to disregard the report’s usage of the 
phrase “several important countries.” Moreover, if the point of the report was to only investigate 
gold standard nation-states, but also claim to represent the global economy, this only further 
displays the ICC’s myopic economic lens and reliance upon its own pre-conceived notions of 
political economic, Allied policy-making superiority. 
Cuba experienced a mass migration of Haitians from 1915 to 1927 with well over two 
hundred thousand coming ashore, mostly to work on sugarcane plantations.426 The influx of 
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migrants correlated with Cuba’s increasing visibility on the world sugar market, increasing from 
ten percent in the 1890s to over twenty percent during the 1920s.427 Between 1916 and 1929, 
Cuban sugar production increased from over three million metric tons to well over five million 
metric tons, respectively.428 Simultaneously, the number of sugar mills decreased from two 
thousand in 1860 to only one hundred and fifty eight by 1930 as industrialization, modernization 
and industrial efficiency, mostly through American finance, took hold of the island.429 
Immigration numbers reflected this decline, as Cuba only received only nineteen thousand five 
hundred Haitian immigrants from 1927 to 1929.430 
The U.S. Tariff Commission, in 1930, found that U.S. investment in Cuba increased from 
fifty million dollars in 1898431 to over six hundred and sixty million by 1930.432 As the tentacles 
of U.S. corporations spread across the island, one Cuban commentator noted at the turn of the 
century: “All becomes mass, shapeless, collective and anonymous: the company, the sugar and 
the syndicate; mass of capitalists, mass of products, mass of workers.”433 Latifundia spread 
across Cuba, and for that matter, the majority of the Caribbean, driven by U.S. capital 
investment. Over one third of Cuba’s one hundred and fifty eight sugar mills were American 
owned. Collectively, five major U.S. corporations controlled over one point five million acres for 
sugarcane cultivation.434 Furthermore, corporations sought vertical consolidation of the industry. 
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The Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., argued in 1930 that “The highest cane and sugar 
yields per acre, the best qualities of cane, and the maximum recovery of sugar per ton of cane, 
are found in countries where all operations from plowing the field to bagging the sugar are under 
one management.”435 
Fred I. Kent, the prominent American financier and Vice-President of the Bankers Trust 
Company discussed earlier, began a long speech demanding “more business in government and 
less government in business, speaking to the Finance Committee on Friday 23 March 1923.”436 
“The present suffering in the world,” Kent continued, “is due to the interruption of business, 
which carries within it the production, transportation and distribution of all man’s requirements. 
Individually every man who produces, directly or indirectly, is a business man, but those who 
guide and control, because they have worked in to positions of trust, should use their experience 
and ability to solve the great problems of the day.”437 
Businessmen and the actions of businessmen were to be trusted to right the globe’s 
economic ship in Kent’s estimation. Simply because they were businessmen, especially “those 
who guide and control,” they are to be “trusted” to not only ameliorate global economic 
conditions, but to also act as leaders in government. Furthermore, though Kent labels 
“producers” as “businessmen,” he clearly delineates the average worker from the more 
sophisticated and trustworthy entrepreneur. As we have seen, the average laborer, from the 
standpoint of the businessman and thus the ICC, could not be trusted. 
Kent had long spoken out against politicians and their perceived meddling in 
international business affairs. In a 1923 New York Times piece, Kent was indicated as one of the 
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prominent international businessmen who believed “leadership in international affairs must be 
taken from politicians and soldiers and placed in the care of financial experts and economists.”438  
Dr. G. Vissering, who was President of the Netherlands Bank of Amsterdam, was also cited in 
the article, arguing that “due to the obstinacy of many countries in ridding themselves of 
politicians as leaders and substituting businessmen, there has been a steady depreciation in the 
value of foreign currencies. Politicians and soldiers,” Vissering argued, “should no longer rule 
the world; they should yield their places to economists and business people of every-day life.”439 
The businessmen of the ICC viewed themselves as a class above the rest. They believed 
that by abiding to the interests of business, and hence production, this would somehow trickle 
down to the working and poorer classes. Yet, in numerous examples indicated throughout this 
thesis, they often relied upon government assistance and “politicians,” when corporate interests 
could not easily be ascertained. 
ICC delegates believed they spoke for the interests of people in every country. Sir Felix 
Schuster, a prominent British banker and financier who lauded Kent’s speech, spoke after Kent 
on 23 March 1923. The ICC, Schuster claimed, “speaks not for one class; but for all classes. It 
speaks especially for that class which has suffered most, for the working people of the world 
who have suffered and are suffering more than others from the effects of the war. It is for these 
men especially that we desire to promote trade and industry and commerce.”440 Yet, in the same 
conference, as mentioned above, members agreed upon the dangers of “the organizations of 
men.” They argued for more output per individual worker, which would actually negate 
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employment for numerous laborers. The ICC’s ambitions for economic reinvigoration not only 
conflicted with labor unions, but with laborers themselves. For the ICC, production in the name 
of capital accumulation, at any cost, was sacrosanct. 
Typically, we think of labor as fixed to a geographical locale while capital is, by its very 
nature, mobile. Corporations move to regions of the globe in which production can be 
accomplished at the lowest possible cost. And indeed, this was true, to an extent, in the 
Caribbean. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and other Caribbean, Central American and South 
American countries became economically strategic locations not only for sugar production, but 
also banana production, railroad construction, electricity production, banking and investment and 
more. However, these predominantly U.S. corporations relied upon the movement of peoples in 
the Caribbean seeking work as well as the U.S. government and military establishment. ICC 
participants received exactly the type of production and worker efficiency they had so adamantly 
advocated for during the first half of the 1920s, regardless of the personal costs to migrant and 
indigenous laborers. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has focused upon the International Chamber of Commerce from its 
inception in 1919 to the 1925 Brussels Conference. I have limited the focus to this particular set 
of years for a few key reasons. The year 1919 offered an opportunity for international 
organizations to develop, in the ashes of the Great War, a fresh approach to international 
relations. It was a chance for the Allied powers to realize past errors that caused the Great War 
and the economic depression of 1920-1921. Instead, the ICC, as well as the League of Nations, 
remained steadfast in its commitment to prewar maxims including the maintenance of the social 
Darwinist imperial order, the gold standard, and the subjugation of the labor class. Allied state 
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intervention in the economic systems of the Middle East and Latin America, with tacit support 
from the ICC, remained cloaked in the rhetoric of free trade. ICC members were intertwined in 
politics, international banking and international business. Essentially, the ICC and the League 
were created in the mold of the long established political economic core mentalities of the 
American, British and French empires. The first three ICC sessions, then, show us that the die 
was cast for Allied, core trans-national political economic domination for the remainder of the 
1920s. 
The proceedings of the 1920 Organizational Conference and the subsequent three 
biennial ICC meetings show that the businessmen of the ICC remained resolute in their 
preconceived notions of racial and ethnic superiority, which translated into a continuation of the 
dominance of Western oriented industry and banking. These attitudes, then, formed the 
foundation of the ICC epistemology. ICC policy-making and resolutions were exacted through 
the lens of Western European and American jurisprudence, which was viewed as the only means 
by which the global economy, as they perceived it, could be repaired following the Great War 
and the severe recession of 1920-1921. Understandings of industrialization and modernization 
emanated solely from the staid traditions of the Allied core’s political economic dominance. 
Chapter one indicated that the ICC, and the League, was a culmination of nineteenth 
century Western European ideals of free trade and internationalization. ICC and League officials 
imagined themselves in a globalized world. In truth, the globe remained under the international 
political economic imperial tutelage of the Great War victors. The ICC and the League, by 
default, worked to maintain the imperial international order. Because the businessmen of the ICC 
believed they were part of a globalized order, they believed that they spoke for “every class.” A 
close reading of the proceedings from 1919-1925, however, tells a different story. ICC 
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businessmen, with major political and banking ties, born in the midst of the late nineteenth 
century during which time the social Darwinist mindset was consolidated, helped to reinvigorate 
the pre-war political economic system. Although the Allied powers hoped to overcome the 
nationalist zeal that contributed to the cause of the Great War, they actually perpetuated a Trans-
Atlantic, internationalist plutocracy. International organizations, like the ICC and the League, 
helped to convince corporate, political and economic leaders that they lived in a globalized 
world. 
In the second chapter, we investigated the League Mandate System in the Middle East. 
Despite the ICC’s supposed disdain of government interference, which it viewed as a hindrance 
to free trade, the organization remained silent in regard to British, French and American political, 
military and multinational corporate domination of the region. The ICC’s numerous discussions 
in regard to bills of exchange, export credits and the maintenance of “global” free trade actually 
referred to interactions between the Allied powers. This, in turn, made the ICC’s core motto, 
“peace through trade,” ring hollow. The “merchants of peace” were actually agents of Allied 
international political hegemony. 
The third chapter analyzed the ICC’s conception of the reorganization of the global 
economic system in the wake of the Great War. Highly revered Allied bankers, who were key 
ICC members and participants, reinforced the pre-war gold parity as inviolable and the hallmark 
of a “civilized” economy. Bankers, with ICC support, molded the banking systems of peripheral 
nation-states to fit the Allied conception of a rational economic structure. Moreover, with Allied 
government assistance, MNCs, many of which were represented in the ICC, infiltrated and 
controlled various economic sectors, especially electricity and oil, in Latin America and the 
Middle East. The government-business relationship of the 1920s was symbiotic and intertwined 
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as numerous businessmen participated in a revolving door in which they interchangeably worked 
in political, banking and business circles. This was exemplified by the insistence of ICC 
delegates to receive government support from their respective governments to facilitate the 
development of the burgeoning automobile and airline industries. 
Finally, chapter four considered the ICC’s relationship with labor. Through the ICC 
proceedings, we saw the businessman’s interpretation of modernity, which was then enforced 
through the medium of the Allied powers. Production, the ICC believed, was the panacea for any 
malaise in global trade. Businessmen spoke out against unionization, as worker rights took a 
back seat to output. Modernities that challenged the core, capitalist system, such as socialism and 
communism, which businessmen tied to organized labor, were viewed as dangerous and 
detrimental to production. Moreover, although the ICC did not approve of U.S. immigration 
restrictions, it said nothing in regard to U.S. political and military manipulation of migratory 
labor in the Caribbean and Central America since U.S. government interference in these regions 
maintained lower levels of worker pay and higher levels of production. 
6.1 The Spirit of Locarno 
The Allied political economic system showed signs of recovery by mid-decade. The 
value of the German mark finally stabilized after the astronomical hyperinflation that saw it 
reach four point two trillion to the dollar in late 1923.441 Gustav Stresemann, the German 
chancellor, introduced a new currency, the Rentenmark, in November 1923, tying it to gold 
bonds. This instilled a renewed faith in German currency. The 1924 Dawes Plan, resoundingly 
supported by the ICC, discussed earlier, provided further stability by reducing Germany’s 
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reparation payments and reorganizing its national bank. Germany was reintroduced to the 
international community with its admission to the ICC in 1926 and the League of Nations in 
1927. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Germany’s first national chairman to the ICC was a prominent 
banker, Franz von Mendelssohn, who would later be elected president of the organization in 
1931. 
The Allied powers, and numerous other nation-states, by 1925, returned to the gold 
standard. Britain pegged its exchange rate to pre-war gold values, which greatly contributed to its 
unemployment rates of over ten percent for the entire decade.442 Regardless, production for the 
last half of the 1920s, relative to pre-war 1913 levels, grew by one-fifth. The gold standard and 
production, two maxims held in high regard by the ICC, seemed to return the world economy to 
prosperity. 
The fall of 1925 seemed promising on a diplomatic level as well. Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Belgium met in Locarno to settle controversial European border issues that 
had remained since Versailles. Germany, represented by Stresemann, accepted its western border 
with France and Belgium while also agreeing upon a permanent demilitarization of the 
Rhineland. Britain and Italy agreed to repel any invasions across the agreed upon western 
borders. Stresemann, as well as the other signatories of the Locarno Pact, however, refused to 
acknowledge Germany’s eastern border with Poland. Nobel Peace Prizes were awarded to 
Stresemann and the French and British delegates, Aristide Briande and Austen Chamberlain, 
respectively. “In the glow of improved relations with the West, few people cared to notice that 
Germany’s eastern frontiers, and Germany’s eastern policy, had been left open to revision.”443 
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The “revisions” would later be made through conciliatory agreements with Adolf Hitler in the 
1930s and war by the 1940s. 
The illusion of peace was captured by prominent U.S. banker and ICC representative 
Thomas Lamont, who addressed the ICC in May 1927. He concluded that “men of sobriety and 
judgment, experienced and schooled in the world of politics, declare that Locarno means the 
permanent appeasement of Europe [and] a new era…there will never again be any great 
cataclysm on the continent of Europe…within the lifetime of our youth war will have become as 
outworn as witchcraft, slavery and dueling.”444 Lamont, like his ICC colleagues, was convinced 
that the diplomatic peace of Locarno, and the supposed economic peace that would come with 
Germany’s admission to the ICC and the League, which was assumed to open European 
channels of trade, would prevent war. 
Numerous fault lines remained, however, within the Allied relationship and in the 
political economic international community. The U.S. remained adamant that Britain and France 
repay loans granted them during the war. In Lamont’s report, mentioned above, he fastidiously 
described the loan amounts granted by the U.S. and its bankers to European, Latin American and 
Asian nation-states. Lamont described, for instance, U.S. loans to Nicaragua, whose government 
and economy were dominated by the U.S. as we saw in chapter four. Boastingly, Lamont 
proclaimed “it is only fair to say that American banking guidance of Nicaragua’s financial affairs 
caused business there to grow and prosper. American commercial interests as now exist in 
Nicaragua are the result of these American bankers having put the country on a gold basis…and 
having rehabilitated the national railroads…and the industrial needs of the country.”445 In regard 
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to Europe, Lamont pointed out that “European currencies, stabilized [by gold],” would soon be 
strong enough to permit “capital” to “return home” and thus “diminish the demand upon 
America for foreign loans.”446 The belief in the superiority and infallibility of pre-war Allied 
social, political and economic systems remained. 
Alternative models to the Allied political economic system, however, emerged 
throughout the 1920s. Italy fell victim to Mussolini’s fascist state by 1923. Though ICC 
businessmen praised his regime during the 1923 Rome Conference because of its control of 
labor, the imperial characteristics of fascism could not, over the long term, meld with the Allied 
international capitalist model. Politically, the Locarno agreement alienated the nascent state of 
Poland by not setting Germany’s eastern border. From an economic standpoint, despite 
Kemmerer’s efforts to rectify the Polish banking system, corrupt officials serving in Wladyslaw 
Grabski’s government contributed to an economic crisis that gripped the country by the end of 
1925 leading officials to nationalize the banking system. Empowered by the corruption of the 
previous regime, fascists came to power in 1926 under Jozef Pilsudski. 
The Allied gold standard mentality played a central role in the global economic 
meltdown after 1929. Recall our chapter three discussion of the gold standard mentality, 
advocated vociferously by the ICC and its cohort of bankers following the war, which turned the 
“stability of currency into a popular myth,” causing an overwhelming fear of inflation.447 By the 
end of the 1920s, central and southern European nation-states such as Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Italy, many of whom had borrowed heavily from 
British and American banking systems, which controlled most of the globe’s gold supply, were 
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obliged to nationalize their banking systems “when the inflow of foreign capital ceased.”448 The 
Allied financial system, reliant upon the gold standard, left banking systems that were reliant 
upon money from abroad, half of Germany’s bank deposits, for example, belonged to foreign 
investors, vulnerable to investors pulling their money out of the system.449 The Allied 
international political economic system, reliant upon not only the gold standard but also the 
leadership of U.S., British and French politicians, bankers and businessmen, collapsed upon 
itself once the Allied powers turned inward to protect their domestic interests while investors, 
shocked by the market crash, cashed in their foreign bonds. The fascist contagion, which seemed 
more stable than the Allied gold-backed system, spread globally by the late 1920s and early 
1930s, gripping the aforementioned nation-states as well as Germany, Spain, Japan and various 
Latin American countries. 
It is important to recall that ICC participants were a product of their era. ICC 
businessmen were born and raised in the late nineteenth century, when ideals of social Darwinist, 
Anglo-Saxon superiority reigned supreme. The Great War rattled the European imperial system, 
but did not destroy it. Government nationalization of industries and abandonment of the gold 
standard during the war defied long established economic mindsets that preached the liberalist, 
free market order. The disruptions caused by the Great War had no historical comparison. Thus, 
the only way to repair the world, for the men of the ICC, was to regenerate the previous political 
economic order. 
There were, however, some key differences to the rejuvenated imperial order. The 
League and ICC, despite their original exclusivity, offered an opportunity, over the duration of 
the 1920s and 1930s, for non-Allied nation-states to participate in international organizations. 
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For example, though ICC leadership positions were filled by Western European and American 
leaders for the duration of the 1920s, the organization offered seats to delegates from countries 
such as Cuba, Peru, Mexico, Latvia, Lithuania, Japan and others out of a basic desire of 
individual businessmen to meet with other businessmen. In this sense, then, the ICC cut through 
the artificial barrier of borders in an effort to create individual business connections and markets. 
It is important to bear in mind that although the aforementioned non-Western countries did not 
hold leadership positions and therefore did not partake in official deliberations, they likely held 
unofficial, impromptu discussions with various businessmen of various nationalities. Despite the 
ICC’s strong, parochial commitment to Allied jurisprudence and imperialism, the desire for 
profit, on an individual level, created potential ties that would expand regardless of nation-state 
aspirations. 
The ICC was part of the post-war process of transferring the nationalist project to a 
systematized, international project rooted in organizations such as the ICC and the League. Prior 
to the Great War, the imperial order, in an economic sense, was an international, post-mercantile, 
proto-capitalist competition between rival, sovereign powers. I use the term proto-capitalist here 
because of the lack of a truly global free market, as discussed in this dissertation, during the 
nineteenth century imperial era. The British, French, Germans, Italians, Belgians and others 
competed to control vast swathes of territory, which led, in part, to the Great War. Following the 
Great War, there was a realization amongst the core powers of a need for systemization and 
organization on an international scale to avoid the nationalist, political economic competition 
that contributed to the causes of the Great War. The ICC’s core belief that trade generated peace 
fit the Allied internationalization project. Within the international framework, however, the core 
powers, the U.S., Britain and France, sought to maintain their core status. Thus, the sovereign 
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British, French and American nation-states coalesced around Allied nation-state mentalities 
rather than the actual empowerment of international organizations. 
Control, as it had been prior, was an inherent facet of the post-war international system. 
The system, however, developed new characteristics. It consisted of the League and the ICC, 
with the League as an international diplomatic public platform and lever. The ICC was the 
international platform for economic discussion, which received a great deal of economic 
leverage, as in the power to manipulate economic policy, through the medium of the League. 
Within the halls of ICC meetings, businessmen, bankers and politicians were able to share ideas 
and propose legislation that could facilitate international trade. The League and ICC provided an 
international platform for discussion on a scheduled, recurring basis as opposed to the prior era, 
which relied upon ad hoc nation-state summits. From the standpoint of the ICC, biennial 
meetings guaranteed that men of business would discuss and share ideas. 
The imperial project, however, remained. The League and the ICC were controlled by 
representatives of the Allied powers. The international economic system they wished to create 
revolved around a rejuvenation of the gold standard. This required, from the Allied standpoint, 
the manipulation of peripheral banking and economic systems to fit the Allied fiduciary model, 
as we saw in chapter three. The post-war system also required the sequestration of labor in the 
name of production. Hence, the heated ICC discussions regarding flag discrimination and the 
free movement of migrants as well as the ICC disdain for labor unions. The existence of the 
League and the ICC contributed to the illusion of a globalized system. It was, in reality, core 
international control under the guise of free market globalization. 
The political economy of the 1920s, and the roles played by the ICC and the League in its 
functioning, is not far removed from the neoliberal economic model that dominates today’s 
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global economy, according to some economists, political scientists and historians. Marxist 
geographer David Harvey contends that neoliberalism emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
under the tutelage of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping. Neoliberalism 
“proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets, and free trade.”450 The neoliberal model assumes that the privatization of 
industry in conjunction with a decreased tax burden on the wealthy will permit the wealthy to 
create more job opportunities in the private sector. This model actually creates a system of 
“accumulation by dispossession,” as public ownership of land and wealth is transferred to private 
capitalists. The capitalists then use what has become their property for profit maximization. 
Neoliberal policies work to redistribute wealth to the world’s top ten percent while 
leaving millions unemployed and in poverty. Non-elected institutions such as the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, upholding the dollar as the international standard currency, work to serve the interests 
of the wealthy. Moreover, calls for market liberalization by the U.S. or global institutions such as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), collectively 
referred to as the Washington Consensus, often have major negative repercussions for the poor, 
neoliberalism contends, since the U.S., the majority stock holder of the IMF, continues to 
subsidize its own agricultural sector. Neoliberalism is itself a sort of international subsidization 
system for the wealthy, undercutting the poor and middle classes. 
My goal is not to debate whether or not a neoliberal system exists. Rather, I contend that 
the neoliberalist argument has deeper historical similarities to the projects embraced by the ICC 
in the 1920s. Consider, for example, the ICC’s focus upon the creation of an international patent 
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system and library for documentation and record maintenance to protect intellectual property. 
This was, arguably, a predecessor of the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPPS), administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Harvey contends that this agreement granted over-reaching powers to the WTO to define 
intellectual property rights. The WTO’s definition of “genetic materials” and “seed plasmas” 
permits monopolistic enterprises, namely pharmaceutical companies, to extract natural resources 
from public domains, using cheap labor. The companies privatize said resources, gain 
intellectual ownership rights and then charge rents for use. This system, which Harvey deridingly 
refers to as “biopiracy,” benefits “a few large pharmaceutical companies” at the expense of the 
public domain.451 
Neoliberalism’s argument that organizations such as the IMF and WTO, dominated by 
the Washington Consensus, spread economic liberty, echoes the ICC’s message that free trade 
harbors global peace. The IMF's incursion into the Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1997-
1998, which led to severe economic consequences for the region, sounds similar to the Allied 
banking missions of the 1920s in central Europe and Latin America. The Thai Baht collapsed in 
1997, sending a once prosperous region of the planet into a precipitous economic decline. The 
IMF offered to assist Thailand and other affected states including Malaysia, Cambodia, Taiwan 
and others. However, the IMF insisted upon the privatization of Southeast Asian industries and 
laissez-faire government practices. This was problematic for countries such as Thailand, whose 
economic success during the 1990's had been achieved in large part due to government 
facilitation of economic interactions and employment. The quick privatization of industries in the 
region, specifically in Thailand, led to capital flight as investors immediately began speculating 
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on Southeast Asian currencies, buying and selling at a rapid pace, draining the region of hard 
currency. Because Thailand and other countries in the region had under-developed banking and 
stock exchange institutions, they were ill-prepared for the onslaught of market traders. 
Inevitably, the economies crashed as unemployment soared.452 
The ICC was a product of its era. The businessmen who began the organization in 1919 
believed that they could restore the world to peace and prosperity following the chaos of the 
Great War. The ICC proceedings provide an intimate view of the businessman’s and the banker’s 
understanding of not only the 1920s political economy, but also the Great Depression. 
Nationalism, considered a root cause of the Great War, remained a potent force following the 
war, but in a new form—it had transitioned into a form of Allied interstate nationalism, 
perpetuated through organizations such as the ICC and the League of Nations. Allied social 
Darwinist myopia determined who could and who could not participate in the core system. This 
contributed to nation-states turning to alternative systems such as fascism once the Allied system 
collapsed by the dawn of the 1930s. 
6.2 Epilogue 
We know, of course, that within five years of Lamont’s 1927 report, mentioned above, 
which discussed the stability brought to Latin American economies and European currencies by 
Allied bankers, the world was immersed in the worst economic depression in human history. The 
ICC’s reaction to the Depression, however, offers a perspective that historians are yet to address. 
We will see that the organization remained dedicated to its core philosophies of free trade as a 
harbinger of peace and the maintenance of the Allied political economic order. Because of the 
organization’s adherence to its core philosophies, including the superiority of Allied 
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jurisprudence, production as a panacea, the control of labor and adherence to the gold standard, 
the organization struggled to come to terms with the crisis of international capitalism that came 
about after the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the ensuing Great Depression. 
The 1927 and 1929 meetings, in Stockholm and Amsterdam, respectively, lay outside the 
purview of this study. However, let us briefly summarize them below in an effort to show the 
continuation of the ICC’s political economic outlook for the remainder of the 1920s. The ICC’s 
allegiance to production, the gold standard, and its imagined version of free trade, each of which 
was bolstered by the organization’s embedded sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority, left the 
organization blinded to the systemic problems that would contribute to the Great Depression. 
6.2.1 Stockholm 
Trade barriers were the paramount issue of the 1927 Stockholm conference. The agenda 
provided to the American delegation two months before the late July 1927 conference, included 
a rather telling phrase: “A departure will be made from the usual practice to the extent that, with 
the exception of the Trade Barriers group, the other sections will not have a regular chairman and 
officers.”453 The “usual practice” for the ICC involved the assignment of chairmen and officers 
for each committee in order to facilitate deliberation. The other committees, the aforementioned 
statement seems to indicate, were not as critical. Moreover, Etienne Clèmentel, the highly 
respected first president of the ICC who stepped down after the 1923 Rome conference, returned 
to chair the Trade Barriers Committee, showing us once again the importance of the committee. 
Prior to the Stockholm conference, the League of Nations sponsored an economic and 
financial conference in Geneva in 1926, as a prelude to the League’s larger World Economic 
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Conference to be held in Geneva on 4 May 1927. The ICC, as the chief economic advisement 
body to the League, issued the “Report of the Trade Barriers Committee.” Prominent British 
banker and former 1925 ICC chairman Walter Leaf stated: “The capacity for production exists, 
and is generally much larger than in prewar times; but the products are stagnating because they 
are refused…by foreign tariffs and trade barriers.”454 Leaf argued that tariffs, or, as he labeled 
them, “artificial restrictions on human efficacy,” created “unemployment, stagnation of 
industry,” and a lowering of “the whole standard of living.”455 In 1921 the British Parliament 
passed the Safeguarding of Industries Act. The U.S. issued the Fordney-McCumber Tariff in 
1922. These tariffs, however, “taxed only a small number of commodities,” which affected no 
“more than 2 to 3 per cent of imports.”456 
Most telling was Leaf’s statement regarding production. The “refusal” of products, in 
Leaf’s estimation, was the fundamental issue for the world economy. This is problematic for two 
reasons. First, Leaf’s assertions regarding commerce and standards of living referred only to 
trade and living conditions between and amongst the Allied powers. The myopic ICC world 
view, established at its birth, remained. Perhaps more troubling, however, was Leaf’s, and for 
that matter, the ICC’s, adherence to production as a panacea for global economic health. 
Production, naturally, requires demand. The purchase of new cars and “household consumer 
goods,” in the U.S., was stagnant by the latter half of the 1920s.457 As European industries 
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recovered from the Great War, European demand for American products decreased. Moreover, 
as industries, in both the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, continued to produce (or, 
overproduce), wages for the average worker remained stationary. Wealth, in the U.S., remained 
concentrated in the hands of the top ten percent of the population. 
Owen Young, the head of the American delegation, conveyed a similar message during 
the 1927 Stockholm conference, arguing that “the most significant pronouncement of the 
congress was its declaration that the object to be sought was the largest and most economical 
production and distribution of goods and services to all peoples—that trade was not an end in 
itself but only a means to enable people to produce more and buy more, and thereby raise their 
standards of living.”458 Young, who would be recognized as Time Magazine’s “man of the year” 
for engineering the Young Plan to reduce Germany’s reparations burden in late 1929, identified 
production as beneficial for business and the worker. The late 1920s, however, were marked by a 
period of “overproduction in primary products.”459 Furthermore, as was typical of ICC 
businessmen for the duration of the 1920s, Young argued that “all peoples” would reap the 
benefits of production. 
The wealthy British steel magnate and frequent British ICC representative Arthur 
Balfour, discussed in chapter three, published an article discussing the ICC and its recent 
endeavors in November 1927 for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science. The ICC, Balfour insisted, “has no connection with any government.”460 As we have 
seen, this was a half-truth. The ICC did not, of course, have legislative or executive powers on an 
                                                 
458 George Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace (Little, Brown and Company, 1959), p. 101. 
459 Charles Poor Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Rev. and enl. ed., History of the World 
Economy in the Twentieth Century, v. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p. 290. 
460 Authur Balfour, “Europe in 1927: An Economic Survey,” Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 
134, no. Europe in 1927: An Economic Survey (November 1927): 124–31, p. 125. 
190 
international level. Realistically, this can be said of most international organizations, whose 
parts, consisting of nation-states, are more powerful than the whole, the international 
organization, in the global anarchy of nation-state interests. The ICC, however, was infused with 
businessmen with intricate political connections as we have seen in previous chapters. 
Balfour also, in an effort to show the ICC’s inclusiveness, discussed the increased 
participation of nation-states. The first ICC gathering, Balfour stated, consisted of only Belgium, 
France, Britain, Italy and the U.S. He indicated that by 1927 there were twenty-four National 
Committees, including “Indo-China and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Indo-
China, however, remained under the colonial control of France. Furthermore, only National 
Committees were permitted to speak during ICC proceedings. Though Latin American nation-
states such as Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala and Haiti had “organization member” status, 
they were not granted debate or speaking privileges. U.S. and MNC political economic 
domination of these regions, detailed in chapters three and four, speaks in large part, I have 
argued, to the exclusion of these nation-states from “National Committee” status. 
Currency and trade barriers were also addressed by Balfour. He reemphasized the 
importance of the gold standard, arguing “the stabilization of currencies on a gold basis should 
be the ultimate goal.”461 In regard to trade, Balfour argued that the ICC, “international in its 
character and outlook, has always realized that the needs as well as the national economic 
opinion of individual countries must be considered if success in the international field is to be 
attained.” Nation-states, Balfour stressed, needed to be permitted to develop their “own powers 
of production,” since “relations of one country towards other foreign countries” is dependent 
upon a country’s “own material prosperity.” However, Balfour warned, “there has been a 
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[dangerous] post-war desire on the part of almost every nation to become self-supporting, and 
this has induced several countries to seek to develop industries for which they are not 
economically or geographically suited.”462 
Based on the analysis presented in the previous chapters, we can hypothesize that 
Balfour’s use of the term “international” refers to the trans-Atlantic American and Western 
European relationship, rather than “every nation.” Nation-states in Latin America and the Middle 
East were not permitted to develop their “own material prosperity,” as we read in chapters two 
and three. Moreover, Balfour’s reference to “economically and geographically” unsuited nation-
states likely alluded to Latin America. Their efforts to become “self-supporting,” or a process 
economists call import substitution industrialization, spread across Latin America by the 1930s 
as many nation-states in that region sought to stabilize their import-export imbalances caused, in 
large part, by European and American political economic imperial endeavors, and the eventual 
crash thereof, which were, as we have seen, tacitly supported by the ICC. 
Finally, Balfour reiterated the ICC motto “trade creates peace,” arguing that “the 
maintenance of world peace depends largely upon the principles on which the economic policies 
of nations are formed and executed.”463 The ICC, Balfour boasted, would continue to play a 
central role in the elimination of “the economic difficulties which cause friction and 
misunderstanding.”464 The elimination of “friction and misunderstanding,” or, in other words, 
trade barriers and unfair competition, would, in Balfour’s estimation, prevent another global 
conflict. Additionally, the ICC was, according to Balfour, “directed towards the increase of 
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material wealth,” which would, by default, improve “the conditions of the workers of the world” 
and inherently “maintain or improve the standard of living” for all.465 
For the duration of the 1920s, however, the ICC did not work to alleviate “friction and 
misunderstanding” in Latin American and Middle Eastern nation-states. As the previous pages 
have laid bare, the ICC implicitly supported British, American and French political, economic 
and military domination of these regions. MNCs, whose agents represented ICC national 
delegations and participated in ICC committees, worked with their respective governments to 
manipulate labor and politics in the aforementioned regions, validating their activities in the 
discourse of Western superiority. “The workers of the world” were, at best, secondary to 
production and profit. These political and economic realities made the ICC motto ring hollow. 
Perhaps it was actually peace that was the augury of trade. 
6.2.2 Amsterdam 
The ICC’s Fifth General Congress met in Amsterdam from 8-13 July 1929, just three 
months before the “crash” of the American stock market. Once again, trade barriers served as the 
major point of contention. The Economic Committee, which assembled in the summer of 1928, 
prepared an economic report for the 1929 General Congress. The committee’s report called for 
nation-states “to put an end to a series of abnormal practices which developed particularly after 
the war and constitute a serious obstacle to international trade.”466 This was in response to 
ruminations in the American Congress in the summer of 1928 to increase farm subsidies as well 
as 1928 presidential candidate Herbert Hoover’s calls for agricultural tariff legislation. By May 
of 1929, the U.S. Congress debated an increase in tariffs that would become the 1930 Smoot-
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Hawley Tariff, increasing taxes on both agricultural and industrial imports. During the ICC 
Amsterdam conference on 8 July 1929, the ICC president Georges Theunis, in his opening 
address, “made a friendly gesture toward the American delegates,” stating “we cannot deal here 
with particular states” in regard to their tariff policies.467 ICC participants were convinced that 
tariffs were the ultimate hindrance to global trade. 
For the first time since its inception, the ICC, during its 1929 conference, addressed the 
topic of real wages. The 1929 list of “Resolutions” stated: “Modern industry, by large capital 
ventures in machine and power equipment, directly increases the productivity of the worker. The 
value of that productivity, both by natural economic competition and by far-seeing management, 
is widely shared through increased real wages and reasonable hours of labor.”468 However, this 
was not a demand for an increase in real wages. Rather, it was an acknowledgement of an 
increase in real wages. Conversely, statistics from the era show a different reality. Between 1925 
and 1929, per capita income and production decreased, most especially in the U.S., but also in 
Britain, France, and Germany.469 The businessmen of the ICC, as had been their practice, 
assumed that modernity and thus production were harbingers of worker contentment and higher 
standards of living. 
In October of 1929, however, disaster struck with the “Crash” of the New York Stock 
Market Exchange. On Tuesday 29 October, over 16,410,000 shares were bought and sold, which 
would remain a record for nearly forty years.470 The worst economic depression in recorded 
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human history followed, lasting for the duration of the 1930s. However, few Americans were 
affected by the Crash itself as only an estimated two and a half percent of Americans actually 
owned shares in 1929.471 The Crash did not invariably cause what would become the Great 
Depression. Indeed, it was the reactions of bankers, merchants and governments that contributed 
to the downward spiral. The 1931 ICC conference, held in Washington, D.C., provides a glimpse 
into the organization’s interpretation of events. 
6.2.3 Washington, D.C.  
Herbert Hoover gave the opening address before the 1931 ICC Conference in 
Washington, D.C. on 4 May 1931. “This depression,” Hoover stated, “is no doubt contributed to 
by many very important, immediate, economic causes to which each of you will give different 
weight, but I believe you will all agree with me that the destruction of life and property, the great 
tax burdens, and the social and political instability which resulted from the Great War have had 
large responsibility in its origins.”472 After referring once again to the Great War as the root 
cause of the economic problems of 1931, Hoover lent the remainder of his speech to a call for 
arms limitations. “The world expenditure on all arms,” Hoover lamented, “is now nearly five 
billions of dollars yearly, an increase of about 70 percent over that previous to the Great War.” 
Militarization, Hoover argued, created fear and “all forms of instability, whether they be social, 
political, or economic.” 
It is likely that Hoover consigned the heart of his oration to armament control rather than 
challenging the businessmen of the ICC to address the causes of the Depression, which Hoover 
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relegated to the Great War, because many international businessmen, including some from 
America, viewed the U.S. as a root cause of the global economic disorder. Hoover, after all, was 
an advocate of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, despised by European businessmen and the ICC. 
Granted, numerous countries were militarizing at an alarming rate. However, it seems that 
Hoover, a businessman with close ties to American bankers and fellow businessmen, would ask 
the bankers and businessmen of the ICC to work on specific economic issues that caused the 
Depression. 
The American media exposed another potential reason for Hoover’s lack of insight and 
direction. An editorial in The Nation reported that the ICC delegates “found themselves blocked 
at almost every turn by the influence of the United States government,” which “warned” them 
“to go easy on the question of tariffs, on debts and reparations, and on the gold problem.”473 It 
was reported that “the entire conference was emasculated,” and resolutions were “weak” and 
essentially meaningless. The U.S., the editorial proclaimed, continued “to refuse to face obvious 
facts; we are trying to ignore our partial responsibility for the crisis and are still cherishing the 
delusion that we can recover…while the rest of the world…drifts toward violent social 
change.”474 
The public, it seemed, had lost faith in the businessmen of the ICC. An editorial by 
Homer Hudson in The New Republic sardonically referred to the delegates in attendance at the 
Washington Conference as “the laissez-faires.” Hudson, with an oblique attack upon the 
participants’ manhood, observed “an ineluctable creative impotence” amongst the businessmen 
that “seemed to paralyze the proceedings,” making their resolutions “empty and sterile.”475 
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Hudson especially lambasted the American delegation, stating that their “picayune personalities” 
and blocking tactics hindered “forceful men, like Pirelli of Italy and Balfour of England.” 
Regardless of American intransigence, Hudson argued, “it was perhaps impossible to expect very 
much from a mass of bewildered businessmen from abroad whose governments are sitting on 
volcanoes and preparing for war to escape internal explosions.”476 Granted, The Nation and The 
New Republic were leftist publications. Thus, they did not speak for the public as a whole. It is 
difficult, however, to ignore or deny the authors’ untrustworthy and weary tone toward the ICC 
businessmen and their free market beliefs. 
On 5 May 1931, a day after Hoover’s uninspiring opening speech, the ICC summoned 
prominent banker Melvin A. Traylor, President of the First National Bank of Chicago and the 
First Union Trust and Savings Bank, to clarify, from a banking perspective, the causes of the 
global economic downturn. His address, entitled “The Human Element in Crises,” claimed that 
financial officials “spoke of the possibility of a collapse of the boom, privately, not publicly,” as 
early as 1928.477 “We [financiers] must accept a large measure of responsibility for what took 
place in those years and the subsequent results,” Traylor claimed. However, Traylor spread 
blame further, arguing that responsibility “is not confined to financial leaders but rests equally 
upon leaders in every line of activity including industry, commerce, agriculture, and 
government.”478 
Though Traylor recalled the negative economic effects of the Great War, the more 
immediate cause in his estimation involved the issue of gold. As Traylor pointed out, some 
economists and financiers in 1930 and 1931 argued that “the maldistribution [sic] of gold 
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supplies was the cause of declining price levels.” In response to critics who related “gold to 
recent price declines,” Traylor argued: “It seems to me that some of the critics are unfair to gold, 
as apparently they would have it sustain a price structure in the making of which gold had little 
or no part.” The real problem, in Traylor’s estimation, was not the gold standard itself, but rather 
the use of “fiat credit” not based or “erected upon a gold basis” and a “nearly complete 
abandonment of the gold base.”479 An abandonment of gold, Traylor argued, would lead to “a 
revival of the old campaign for bimetallism or fiat issues of other types,” which would only work 
to hinder economic recovery or worsen global economic conditions. 
Traylor then turned his focus to the “human side of the problem.” He showed the myopic 
Allied focus that characterized the ICC as well as global financial dealings throughout the 1920s, 
stating: “I am assuming that human conduct has differed little in most countries of the world.”480   
Global markets, however, were dominated by the Allied powers. Indeed, other countries in 
regions such as Latin America, most of Africa and Asia were under the financial sway and 
political economic manipulation of American and Western European credit and financial 
interests. Regardless, “the human side of the problem,” in Traylor’s estimation, emanated in part 
from a plethora of economic sectors including “leadership in industry, finance, agriculture, and 
government.”481 
From the standpoint of business leadership, Traylor argued: “Business leadership, had it 
read the barometer [during the 1920s just prior to the Crash] properly, should have noted the 
storm that was gathering and trimmed sail accordingly.” The “ambition for place, power, and 
profit,” he continued, “blinded leadership to the obvious dangers ahead and prevented the 
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preparation of a safe harbor against the hour of storm.”482 Actual consumption of manufactured 
goods, for example automobiles and radios, was in decline after 1926. However, Traylor argued, 
“business leadership” continued to expand “its plant and equipment without considering the 
source of its temporary market.” U.S. automakers, for example, were producing “8,000,000 
trucks and cars per annum, while recent estimates of the possible American market place it in the 
neighborhood of half that sum.” Furthermore, Traylor continued, financiers had “larger and 
larger demands” placed upon them to finance needless expansion of industry.483 During this 
process, Traylor claimed, “American financial leadership” and “government officials” remained 
silent. Finally, an ICC participant acknowledged the problem of over-production. 
Traylor called for more government regulation and involvement. “The record of 
American financial leadership and of responsible government officials was a regrettable one of 
too much silence,” Traylor lamented.484 He urged that the Federal Reserve Board must work to 
“regulate to a reasonable extent the flow of credit,” otherwise “business stability is impossible.” 
Moreover, “floor trading” on the Stock Exchange, which amounts to “the characteristics of plain 
crap shooting,” must be abolished.485 He called for “the adoption of rules” to be used by the 
government, including surveillance of the Stock Exchange that would work to govern amounts 
traded on a daily basis. “The welfare of 120 million people,” he argued, “should not be sacrificed 
to the vested interests of any group, however large or small.”486 However, Traylor did not 
directly concern himself with the plight of labor. He argued against “the pernicious and seductive 
influence of so-called Federal aid for public improvements.”487 When governments seek a “cure” 
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for “economic ills,” Traylor warned, “State socialism with failure immeasurably worse has been 
the result.” Ironically, Traylor concluded: “Government cooperation is imperative, but leadership 
must come from business.”488 
The renowned eighteenth century Conservative British politician Edmund Burke once 
stated: “Free trade is not based on utility, but on justice.” The businessmen and bankers of the 
ICC wished to incorporate justice into the practice of global trade in the 1920s. Free trade, they 
were certain, was a guarantor of world peace. However, their brand of “justice” came of age 
during the Western European and American imperial era. Their concept of a fair and objective 
international economic system was developed in a social Darwinist milieu that greatly 
contributed to a misconception of a globalized world, where laissez faire, free trade, and 
production were supposed harbingers of peace and stability. This mistaken assessment was 
inherited from decades of Western European and American ideological development and 
convention. The myopic Allied political economic system, constructed upon a faulty foundation, 
collapsed under the weight of the Great Depression and the rise of fascism. Despite the efforts of 
the business leaders and bankers of the ICC, Europe, and the rest of the world, fell into another 
world war by 1939. Indeed, as so often occurs throughout history, catastrophe was a prerequisite 
of change. 
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